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Abstract
With the increasing number of stealthy computer network threats computer
security has become a serious concern of commercial, industrial, and military orga-
nizations. Detection approaches for each of these general threats are of course very
important security techniques in cyberspace warfare environments. Reactive activi-
ties are also required in order to respond to intrusions and anomalies, take protective
actions, and possibly find the source of the attack and use corrective measures in these
environments. A dynamic, distributed multi-agent model is suggested as a method of
addressing these problems and generating the desired behaviors.
Contemporary security multi-agent structures are based on static, hierarchical
designs which lack scalability and flexibility due to centralization of control and com-
munication. Thus, self organized, entangled hierarchy multi-agent swarms are evolved
in this study to decentralize control and communication.
In order to define the complexity of these network security problem domains, the
formalized problem domains are mapped to partially observable Markov decision pro-
cess (POMDP) mathematical models. Agent swarm and scenario specific behaviors
are formalized within DEC-POMDP, I-POMDP, and a new F(*-POMDP) model in
order to provide mathematical insight into the tractability of their complexity. This
complexity implies that stochastic, global search for behavior solutions is the only
computationally feasible solution technique.
The formalized agent swarm model is integrated with a new architectural solu-
tion for dynamically generating the desired behaviors computationally using an offline
and online search technique. The resulting design exhibits a self organized multi-agent
swarm (SOMAS) with entangled hierarchical control and communication through the
use of multi-objective evolutionary algorithm optimization techniques. The develop-
ment of this new and innovative architecture employs an a priori generation of agent
iv
structures (rules and parameters) based upon desired swarm behaviors. Then, online
the swarm self-adapts to its environment using an online search.
SOMAS effectiveness is compared across multiple network scenarios using tech-
niques of targeting intrusions, engaging intrusions, assessing intrusions and anomalies,
and reacting to intrusions. Significant results across various behaviors and scenarios
are described using statistical testing techniques for an appropriate variety of metrics.
Also, significant results are shown in multi-objective visualization through Pareto-
front graphs and analysis along with swarm simulation animation. Suggested future
investigationsn as discussed should provide a more effective and efficient SOMAS for
addressing network security problems.
v
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Self Organized Multi Agent Swarms (SOMAS) for
Network Security Control
I. The Need for Decentralized Network Security Control
1.1 Introduction
Today, anyone can fire up a hacking script and take out their anger on their
neighbor. The internet is in a state of war. A secret hacking battle between the US
and China has been reported [113]. Russian computers have disrupted Estonia with
denial of service attacks [136]. Al Queda extensively uses the internet for gaining
support and organizing its operations [129]. The bitter, and ancient Sunni/Shiite
feud has spilled over into modernity where websites have been defaced with threats
and webservers have been shut down [13] [14]. Sweden and Turkey have fought each
other online over the caricature of Muhammed in Swedish newspapers [12]. The
proliferation of attacks has lead some to question whether cyber vigilante-ism might
be a good idea [26]. The Air Force has made repeated, recent statements that it is
no longer content with merely playing the defensive game, that reactivity is not an
option [63] [20] [124]. It is not just nations that are involved. With the increasing
number of stealthy computer network threats, computer security has become a serious
concern of commercial, industrial, and military organizations from financial activities
and power system operations to internet information communication, Cybercraft, and
aircraft reconnaissance activities.
To stop the network security and stability threat important security tools are
needed such as outside intrusion detection systems, insider covert network detection,
resource protection, system anomaly detection techniques, attack reaction, and infor-
mation surveillance. Many such systems have been proposed using standard hierarchi-
cal management structures with identification of features employing classical pattern
recognition algorithms. Also used for network security are bio-inspired approaches
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from artificial immune system constructs [68] to particle swarm approaches [42] with
support vector machines [84], as well as incorporating multi-objective aspects [39].
Various commercial security packages embed many of the associated algorithms. Nev-
ertheless, such network security systems are generally quite slow and limited when
operated automatically due to brittle hierarchical communication and control, and
lack of autonomy.
Network security threats run the gambit from internal to external attacks. The
most serious threats come from insider attacks, denial of service attacks, and infor-
mation exploitation. These attacks aim at exploiting and corrupting information and
capabilities on the networks, and the deactivation of network defense. The online bat-
tlefield requires a security solution that flexibly adapts in real-time to the constant
flux of cyber war, while still providing overall control with humans possibly in the
loop. All of this must be achieved without centralized control.
Currently, the Air Force is developing a defensive infrastructure by implementing
secure middleware across all network hosts [65]. This defensive architecture is secure
but rigid and hierarchical. Research shows that mobile, multi agent systems can
provide the needed decentralized flexibility for such security systems, see Section 2.3.4.
The solution is found in nature: extensive, vast self organized systems exist that semi-
autonomously accomplish incredible complex tasks of resource management, defense,
and offense without an overarching leader or internal blueprint.
Self organization is exhibited by many physical systems, ranging from the optical
[50], to [70], to biological [66]. Additionally, self organization is a real phenomena
according to mathematics and computer science [101]. This research explores how
self organization allows the swarm behavior to adapt and respond to its environment
in a decentralized manner without hierarchical control, using entangled hierarchies.
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1.2 Goals and Objectives
The research goal is to investigate network security real-time performance using
a swarm of autonomous self organized agents that evolve a non-hierarchical entangled
Cyberspace security management structure.
In particular, this research defines a self-organized multi-agent swarm (SOMAS)
system with a limited number of desired behaviors. A mobile, multi agent system that
uses self organization to create entangled hierarchies is as or more robust, adaptive,
and overall effective and efficient for accomplishing network based behaviors than
systems that do not use self organization and entangled hierarchies. Therefore, the
general objectives to show measurable completion of the goal are:
1. Create a robust simulation framework for evolving self organizing multi-agent
systems (SOMAS)
(a) Approach/foundation
• Environment: formally defined computational network
• Agent domain: formally defined mobile multi-agent swarm
• Formal modeling: augmented POMDP models
• Search: multi-objective evolutionary algorithms (MOEA)
• Evaluation: simulation and metrics
(b) Design
• Two level search
• Evolving self organized swarms
• Intrinsic entangled hierarchy communication and control
• Pareto front optimization
2. Evaluate feasibility of self organization for effective accomplishment of desired
behaviors
(a) Approach/foundation
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• Pareto plots
• Behavior visualization
(b) Design
• Pareto plot objective correlation analysis
• Visual identification of self organization
3. Evaluate feasibility of entangled hierarchies for effective accomplishment of de-
sired behaviors
(a) Approach/foundation
• Pareto compliant metrics
• Non-parametric hypothesis tests
(b) Design
• Pairwise swarm behavior hypothesis testing
1.3 SOMAS Architecture Design Approach
The off-line approach makes use of simulations to evaluate generated agents
for a finite set of network security behaviors using random network configurations.
This is represented by a decentralized partially observable Markov decision process
(DEC-POMDP) [22] model. This model is chosen because the global network state
and reward function can be observed for evaluating the global fitness of the swarm
during off-line generation.
The on-line approach uses local data from the network the swarm is on, and
thus an interactive partially observable Markov decision process (I-POMDP) [40] rep-
resents the on-line approach. The I-POMDP model is chosen because it presupposes
individual agents are only capable of local observations of other agents in the swarm,
and can only observe a local reward function. Furthermore, due to the inability of
the POMDP models to fully represent a dynamic problem domain, the models are
augmented. The augmentation replaces the state transition function with a model
4
transition function. Thus, the models are capable of representing and adapting to dy-
namic systems. However, the POMDP models are not used for producing the swarm’s
rules. Both the off-line and on-line approaches make use of evolutionary operators
to achieve optimum or optimal agent rules and parameters. The off-line production
uses an explicit evolutionary algorithm and the on-line production’s evolutionary al-
gorithm is implicit in the interaction of the SOMAS and the environment. The swarm
behaviors are formalized as reward functions for computational processing. The for-
malization consists of mathematical equations and well formed first order predicate
logic formul æ.
1.4 Measuring Success
The attainment of these objectives can be achieved through a computational
and stochastic measurement evaluation along with a visualization simulation of the
results of the “optimization.” Therefore, additional, derivative objectives are:
1. Develop new appropriate metrics for evaluating SOMAS behaviors
2. Use metrics to measure achievement of behaviors
3. Visualize swarm behaviors to qualify behavior characteristics
The behaviors are evaluated in two ways: statistical tests and visualization.
The statistical tests give statistical quantifications of performance, while visualiza-
tion gives a more qualitative analysis. Visual analysis consists of specifying visually
identifiable characteristics, and then determining whether they exist within the swarm
visualization.
1.5 Risks
Since the solution technique is stochastic, the major risk is due to the approx-
imate nature of solutions. Approximation implies that there is imperfection, and
consequently the SOMA swarm may not react appropriately to a given scenario. A
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second risk is due to the degree of self organization the swarms exhibit. If they do
not remain self organized, then the swarm can either become trivial or chaotic, and
therefore useless in both cases. Finally, the complexity and seriousness of the threats
in Cyberspace may mean that the SOMA approach requires additional architectural
modification.
1.6 Assumptions and Constraints
• The model developed for the agents assumes limited domain complexity. The
agents are assumed to operate within a container model, which is a valid as-
sumption if they are to be deployed in the CyberCraft structure.
• The agent structure consists of sensors, rules, and actuators. Additionally, the
agent contains a memory that can carry different state information relevant for
the agent, such as a fitness value.
• The OSI stack, as well as bandwidth and latency issues, are not addressed for
network communication. Communication is simplified to direct delivery between
nodes, i.e. an agent is merely moved from one node’s data-structure and placed
in another’s data-structure. This means the agents are only being represented
on each node, not on any intermediary edges unlike an actual network.
• The agents cannot fully trust each other due to the stochastic environment and
the limitation of partial observations of the environment and each other. This
constrains the POMDP model representing the agent swarm to a decentral-
ized model, such as DEC-POMDP or I-POMDP, since complete swarm state
information is not collectively available.
1.7 Innovation
The general innovative elements of this research are
• Development and implementation of a framework for the multi-objective evolu-
tion and testing of agent swarms.
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• Quantified self organization
• Entangled hierarchies
• Most of the scenario behaviors, except for intrusion detection, are innovative
1.8 Thesis Organization
Section II describes the background research for the SOMAS problem domain, as
well as symbolically describing the problem and algorithm domain. Section III breaks
down the problem domain into its representation and complexity, and describes the
design choices for creating the solution. Section IV explains the low level engineering
of the design choices to create a solution. Section IV specifies the hypotheses to be
tested and how the solution will be tested in order to prove or disprove the hypotheses.
Section VI presents and analyzes the results. Finally, Section VII presents the research
conclusions and suggested future work.
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II. Background Research for Agent Based Network Security
2.1 Overview
Current network threats are various and quite serious, see Section 2.2. Ac-
cordingly, there are many contemporary approaches to network security. A recent
trend is to decompose network security into multi-agent systems, in order to both
distribute and automate security tasks, see Section 2.3. Multi-agent systems can be
formalized in a variety of Ways 2.4. Self organization and tangled hierarchies are
appropriate concepts for solving the problems of decentralized communication and
control, see Section 2.5. To generate the self organized multi-agent system (SOMAS),
search algorithms are necessary for finding optimum behavior configurations, see Sec-
tion 2.6, and simulations for the simulating the generated system, see Section 2.7.
Once the behaviors are generated, visualizations are required for viewing the results,
see Section 2.8, and test and analysis procedures to determine whether the SOMAS
goals are achieved, see Section 2.9. Finally, the possible languages for implement-
ing the SOMAS framework are covered in Section 2.10. However, this chapter only
provides background material for the design and implementation discussions. Those
discussions are addressed in Chapters III and IV.
2.2 Network Security Overview
The realm of computer networks crosses a wide variety of disciplines. From the
theoretical angle, graph theory is very important for determining crucial invariant
network properties and developing efficient routing algorithms. The computer sci-
entist also has a tremendous job of getting all the disparate networked systems to
talk with each other, without also bringing the information flow to a standstill due
to complexity overhead. Then, from the engineering perspective, computer networks
are extremely complex. Not only must the engineer know how to route information
around the network, he must also be knowledgeable about all the kinds of systems
that can use and interact with the network. The great complexity inherent in com-
puter networks means it is very difficult to plug all the holes and keep out threats. It
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seems that every day there is yet another debilitating attack vector. Thus, the net-
work defenders has a very difficult task cut out for them of keeping the information
flows safe and secure.
2.2.1 Network Graph Types. There are numerous kinds of graphs that
can form the network topology. The simplest topologies are line, circle, star, and
randomly interconnected, see Figure 19. Additionally, these graphs can possess certain
characteristic. An example is planar graphs, where the graph can be created on a
2D surface without overlapping edges. Non planar graphs are the complement of
planar graphs, encompasing graphs that require three dimensions. However, three
dimensions is the maximum number of dimensions necessary to connect any graph
without crossing edges. This is intuitive because if any edges cross in two dimensions
they can just go around each other in the third dimension.
Scale invariant graphs consist of sections that exhibit the same pattern of edge
degrees for any arbitrary section of any scale. While not exactly the same, often
campus scale and larger networks exhibit this pattern, see Figure 16. Small world
graphs possess the property that every node is linked within N edges, where N is
small in magnitude. All of these graph related issues are covered in the mathematical
discipline of graph theory.
Such network graph characteristics have an impact on the best rules for gener-
ating certain swarm behaviors. For instance, if the swarm is on a randomly intercon-
nected graph, then, probabilistically speaking, the same rules should work generally
well regardless of where an agent is on the graph. On the other hand, if the graph
is composed of highly interconnected sections that are, in turn, sparsely connected,
agents require different rules to have the same effect depending on the section they
are in, and whether the behavior needs to span multiple sections.
2.2.2 Networking Protocols. Most networks in the real world make use of a
protocol for relaying information. According to the end-to-end principle [108], system
9
design accumulates too much overhead if every part of the system tries to account
for all possible needs. Thus, similar to the design principle guiding agent oriented
modelling, it is best to have particular services addressed by the part of the system
that actually requires the services. Thus, protocols are developed, which are schema
composed of the bare minimum level of information necessary to perform the required
service.
For example, in order to transport information from point A to point B, it
is generally only necessary to know the location of point B. Thus, the transport
service only checks the part of its schema that tells it where B is, and leaves the
rest of the information alone. The protocols used by networks are often stacked,
since higher level services are based on lower level services. In the Internet, the OSI
stack [8] is used. There are low level protocols for moving information from point
A to B [4], middle level protocols for splitting messages into packets and routing
them along a particular path [10], and higher level protocols for dealing with end user
application services [2]. The use of the protocol stacks places an overhead on the
network transportation, and can introduce new forms of errors. The protocols also
provide useful information. However, if the agents in the multi agent system are to
interpret all the various protocols used by all possible networks they may inhabit, the
agents become too large for use. Consequently, the end to end principle is followed,
and the job of interpreting the protocol data into information is pushed to the host.
The agent only needs to know an interface for accessing this information.
2.2.3 Real World Networks. There are numerous real world networks. They
range from extremely local networks, such as between a laptop computer and a blue-
tooth phone, to global networks, such as the Internet or the telecommunications
network.
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, the properties of networks tend to change as
they become larger. At the local level, networks are fairly ergodic, their measurement
does not change significantly depending on where they are measured. However, com-
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munication in such networks takes on too much overhead once the network passes
a certain size. In this case, the network becomes split into sub-sections, which, in
turn, contain other subsections. As the scale increases, the subsections resemble the
global structure, whereas as the scale decreases the subsections resemble the local
structure [86].
Networks can either be static or dynamic. Dynamic network topologies are most
often found in wireless settings, since wireless nodes tend to change their geographical
relationships. An example of an existing dynamic network topology is the Network on
Wheels (NOW) [87]. NOW is an ad hoc network formed between cars on the highway.
Utilizing the network, the cars can route themselves very effectively and efficiently by
identifying existing routes, traffic patterns, and problems.
On the other hand, there are a greater number of static networks. These can
be found ranging almost every institutional domain, from the financial sector, to the
business world, to military operations. The networks particular to a specific domain,
such as finances, tend to be fairly sparse with high bandwidth between nodes. Net-
works aimed at a more general demographic and use more hierarchical organizations
to provide more efficient communication.
Once network topologies are implemented in the real world, new concerns come
into play. For instance, the links between nodes take on important characteristics,
such as bandwidth and latency. Furthermore, links can become hyperedges, as in the
case of wireless networks, where the same medium links all network nodes.
Communication and the routing of information also becomes a concern. While
Metcalfe states the addition of network nodes adds polynomial value to a network [81],
Reed explains how the network actually provides more than just communication be-
tween nodes, it provides the basis for higher level networks to form. Today, one pop-
ular variant of this idea is social networking. The possibility of higher level networks
raises the potential value of a new network node to exponential rates of increase [104].
However, this value is both negative and positive. Therefore, the net gain from an
11
added node may actually be negative, and the increase in nodes can rapidly lead to
destabilizing the network. The interplay between negative and positive gain led to a
reevaluation of Metcalfe’s and Reed’s laws in [91], stating that the rate of increase,
while still superlinear, is more on the order O(n log n). According to the authors, this
growth rate more accurately reflects empirical observations.
2.2.4 Network Threats.
• Web Based Insider Attacks: According to the multitude of internet analysis
and military leadership, we are fighting a losing battle against those who create
malware. Although, the external worm threat is currently under control, the
computer virus signature types have grown to astronomical numbers. While any
unpatched computer that is hooked up to the internet is guaranteed to be at-
tacked and compromised in less than 20 minutes [35], most attacks are ineffective
against a properly protected computer. Consequently, the contemporary mal-
ware effort has moved to the client side and application layer, embedding exploits
in web pages, emails, and external storage devices such as thumb drives [120].
The implication is that the threat has moved inside the network [80] [67]. Thus,
border control is no longer adequate. Intrusion detection must look both at
network traffic and host activity. Any kind of defensive system must be able to
handle an internal threat by identifying it, quarantining it, and eliminating the
malicious entities involved [93].
• Botnets: Recently, there have been many notable large scale botnets. Examples
include Storm and Nugache [111], which some have estimated have over a million
infected PCs. Such botnets are used for a wide variety of purposes, such as denial
of service attacks, password cracking, information stealing, etc. Furthermore,
these botnets are maintained by software engineering professionals, and are
difficult to counteract [44].
• Denial of Service Attacks: Even though the threat of external infiltration by
worms and viruses is low, denial of service attacks are still a very real problem, as
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recent events in Estonia show [136]. The threat is heightened when the attacking
computers can be within as well as outside the targeted network, brought about
by internal intrusion.
• Information Exploitation and Corruption: The degradation of network perfor-
mance results in the corruption and destruction of information. Besides corrupt-
ing information, malicious agents exploit and remove confidential information
from the networks .
• Counter Defense: Finally, the defenders of all the information are the secondary,
yet immediate, target of malicious agents; since defense keeps attackers from
desired information.
2.2.5 Network Security Metrics. To gauge a network security system, it is
important to have metrics for evaluating its performance. There are two aspects to
network security metrics. First, the issue is what and where to use them. Second, the
issue is how to measure the security metrics are.
2.2.5.1 Use of Security Metrics. There are many different areas in
which security can be measured [21]. It can be measured at the network layer such
as counting the number of packet types. It can be measured at the user level by
monitoring network usage patterns. It can be measured at the organizational level by
determining the level of security education. However, it is possible to have too many
metrics, such that operators can suffer from data overload [54].
It is important to pick a minimal set of key metrics in order to make the job of
security monitoring manageable. To do this a person needs to determine the network
security areas that are important [106] and establish a method for creating a definitive
metric [97]. For instance, a good list of security areas [106]:
• Policy and compliance
• Network and machine monitoring
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• Outreach and education
• Legal compliance: DMCA, PCI, FERPA, etc.
• ID: authorization and authentication
• Asset protection
• Privacy
A good procedure for creating metrics [97]:
1. Define the metrics program goal(s) and objectives
2. Decide which metrics to generate
3. Develop strategies for generating the metrics
4. Establish benchmarks and targets
5. Determine how the metrics will be reported
6. Create an action plan and act on it
7. Establish a formal program review/refinement cycle
2.2.5.2 Measuring Security Metrics. Once the metrics have been es-
tablished then the issue is how to measure them. Metrics can be measured with or
without a model, for instance a simple model-less metric is to measure how many
network incidents occur each month with different levels of severity. However, such
metrics only specify how a system is currently doing, or may do in the future. In
order to define the system’s security characteristics a-temporally, the system must be
formally modelled in a way that captures its general structure. The model itself is
not necessarily measured, though it may, but measurements are taken as the model
is simulated in different ways.
A number of researchers use different variants of POMDP models to do this,
while other researchers have developed specialized formal models for network security.
In one example, POMDP models have been used to characterize a system’s surviv-
ability [32] by establishing policies to maximize the uptime for network elements. A
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similar work was done by [109]. The authors of [103] use POMDPs to define optimal
routing protocols. In [141] the authors develop a model to counter multi-stage collu-
sive attacks and develop two algorithms to find the key observations in the POMDP
model that allow the most dangerous attack vectors. By removing these observa-
tions from the system, they mitigate the attacker’s ability to successfully complete
his attack.
Besides POMDP models, a there are a few other formal models that are used,
which tend to more directly resemble a network or an attack. The authors of [79]
create a model that accurately reflects a conventional network, down to the use of
IP addresses. The authors of [94] use an attack graph, which is a graph that links
different attack nodes to each other, to derive the weakest conditions for a successful
network attack on a given network. Networks can thus be ranked against each other
using these conditions such that a network with weaker conditions is more vulnerable.
2.3 Multi-Agent Based Network Defense
Due to the great complexity of network defense, it is a tall order for a single
application to take care of. Just as one police officer cannot patrol a city and enforce
the law, so one network defense solution cannot capture the totality of network de-
fense. It makes sense to divide up the job of network defense so there are different
applications for different concerns. Once the job of defense is divided up among dif-
ferent applications around the network, network defense is a distributed system, and
requires a different way of thinking than centralized systems.
2.3.1 Distributed Systems. Middle-ware provides a unified mechanism and
interface for access to system-wide services. The goal of middle-ware is to make the
system invisible to the end user. This discipline of distributed systems is providing
middle-ware that fulfills, as best as possible, the tradeoff between transparency, lo-
cality, and availability [127]. The end user should be under the illusion that they are
only accessing local resources through a single system. An important manifestation
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of this design today is service oriented architecture [96]. Service oriented architecture
is a middleware system that aims to provide access to a diverse set of resources such
that the end user can combine them in arbitrary manners to fulfill a set of objectives.
There are a number of issues involved with providing the illusion of accessing a
single, local system. First, a universal chronology is essential in many applications.
One example is the make tool, which requires chronological information to know which
files to compile. Second, the location of system wide resources must be known so they
can be accessed. Finally, both issues have to deal with the possibility of failure and
need to be able to backtrack so failures do not result in corruption of the system state.
One of the most important concepts for this discipline is the end-to-end prin-
ciple [108]. The end-to-end principle states that concerns should be handled at the
point where they are needed. For instance, if only some hosts in a network need
secure communication, and there are varying security requirements, it is best for the
particular hosts to handle their security instead of each node in the transport layer
of the OSI model. The goal is to prevent bloat and fragility.
2.3.2 Agent Oriented Design. Agent oriented design can be considered an
extension of object oriented design. Its distinguishing feature is that the objects are
autonomous, instead of only reactive. That is, the objects do not depend on external
triggers to act. Thus, there are two primary facets to agent oriented modelling:
autonomy and systemic. The first facet is reflected in the domain of intelligent agents,
which is covered in the following discussion. The second is found in the study of multi-
agent systems, which is covered in Subsection 2.3.3.
The author of [62] makes the case for agent oriented modelling in complex prob-
lem domains characterized by stable sub components. The primary idea is that such
large systems are decomposed into individual agents. This reduces the application
logic because the system no longer needs to account for every combination of agents.
Additionally, the system becomes more flexible, since new agents can be introduced
and old ones removed without having to change the system architecture. Finally,
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since the agents are autonomous, they can carry out complex group tasks without
external involvement [62].
The general capability to accomplish the tasks is called the swarm’s behavior. A
behavior can be composed of sub behaviors, which accomplish the necessary subtasks
to complete the main task. Besides task completion, behaviors can also be general
characteristics that most task completion requires, such as swarm stability. Nature
can be modeled as a network of agents. An example of the agent based systems is
an ecosystem. An ecosystem is composed of a great variety of entities all attempting
to maximize their local reward. Yet, with local maximization they are able to create
a superstructure conducive to all their goals. An agent is an information processing
device. Since all physical agents are finite, they can only process a finite amount of
information. Consequently, no agent has perfect information and cannot completely
represent its environment.
However, the aggregate of communicating agents can be capable of representing
their environment to a greater degree, and process this information as a group. Addi-
tionally, even though in theory a swarm is not computationally different than a single
agent, real worlds constraints imply a swarm with decentralized information process-
ing is inherently more capable than a single agent. Thus, in a swarm there is always
an irreducible, emergent level that can be considered an information processing unit
itself. This is the basis for the self organizing and multi-agent aspects of SOMA. The
self organization is inherent in the emergent, irreducible ruleset.
Once a system has been decomposed into multiple agents, then the question
becomes one of how to organize them. multi-agent systems (MAS) can either be
centrally organized or decentralized. MASs can have a variety of different commu-
nication structures, ranging from flat, to hierarchical, to a hybrid of both. Finally,
the MAS can either be composed of homogeneous or heterogeneous agents. A sim-
ilar topic to multi-agent systems is multi-agent swarms. A swarm is a subtype of a
MAS. Whereas a MAS can take on many different kinds of organizations and levels
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of autonomy, swarms tend to be flatly organized and highly autonomous. A common
example of a swarm system is boids [105] by C. Reynolds.
Such multi-agent systems are covered extensively in the literature, both in the-
ory and application. On the theoretical side, [90] describes a language and method
for creating a multitude of virtual machines that evolve themselves, that are both
sustain themselves and their environment (autopoesis) and accomplish this through
stable feedback mechanisms (hypercycles). The author of [73] gives an overview of
the state of the art in swarm intelligence in 2000. Swarm intelligence is an important
augmentation to multi-agent design. Instead of modelling agent cognition explicitly,
as Wooldridge and Jennings document as an unsuccessful approach in [61], cognition
(intelligence) is implicit in the large number of simple agents. This is an elaboration
on the ideas behind Brooks’ subsumption architecture, non representational reasoning
and intelligence [28].
The work of [95] is a more recent overview (2005) of cooperative multi-agent
learning (similar to swarm intelligence). The authors state that the field of multi-agent
learning suffers from lack of realism. The number of agents in a group is generally
quite small, the environments are limited, and the objectives simplistic. On the more
application oriented side [134] explains how swarm intelligence leads to effective route
discovery in networks, [128] is a dissertation on the use of ant colonies to provide
fault tolerance for network communication, and [72] combines the business version of
multi-agent systems, services oriented architecture, with self organization.
2.3.3 Intelligent Agent Framework. As argued by Stytz, et al [126], military
networks require a distributed intelligent agent framework for security in order to
avoid the weaknesses associated with centralized control structures, such as lack of
scalability, single points of failure, and fragility. According to Servat and Drogoul.
[116], the networks of the future should be characterized by a ubiquity of mobile end
devices, even perhaps with nanotechnology. Such a large, heterogeneous environment
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makes centralized control extremely difficult and costly, which further implies that
controlling the system requires a MAS.
Intelligent agents are agents that have decision making abilities. These decision
making abilities are based on artificial intelligence (AI). AI consists of knowledge
representation and search [88]. Knowledge and rule representation in agents can be
composed of first order propositional logic, modal logic, and probability [37].
There are a number of outstanding problems in AI that so far prohibit the
creation of strong AI that emulates human intelligence, and thus truly intelligent
agents. One significant problem is the framing problem, which is determining what
information to retain from past states. The information from the past can increase
quite rapidly, and it is difficult to predict what the future requires. Thus it is currently
an unsolved problem. Another issue is dealing with uncertainty. It is possible to
model uncertainty for a single agent and develop policies for acting with uncertainty
for small problem domains. But, solving the general problem is PSPACE-complete
and increasing the number of agents makes the problem even more difficult. All of
these issues are covered in [88].
2.3.4 Mobile Agents. In [110], the authors argue that allowing mobility
in software agents allows the MAS to have a greater range of ability. Yet, there
is a danger of multi-agent systems devolving into chaos, and adding a new degree of
freedom, with the allowance of movement, threatens to produce an extremely unstable
system. Consequently, human involvement is required. In this regard, the concept
of controlled self organization has been developed [27], essentially a hybrid between
the extremes of completely autonomous self organization, and completely controlled
external organization.
2.3.5 Container Model. Once agents are mobile it can become quite a
complex task to allow them to operate in a heterogeneous environment, which is
especially problematic since most networks are very heterogeneous. One way to solve
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this problem is to use a container model for the agents. Essentially, the container is a
specialized virtual machine for agents. The container abstracts away the host specific
details and provides the agent with a common interface of sensors and actuators
across all hosts, applying the end to end principle [108]. Additionally, the container
can provide utility functions for local agent interaction, such as providing each agent
access to the data structures of other agents based on access rights. Formally, the
container is characterized by the following tuple:
< Parameters, Accesslist, Sensors,Rules, Actuators >
Abstractly speaking, the agents are essentially sets of rules and parameters in
the container which can be shifted from container to container. On the other hand, the
container specific parameters and rules are not transported. An agent is differentiated
from another agent by the rules that are transported and the access list.
2.3.6 CyberCraft. To defend against a network attack, a comprehensive
solution is needed, allowing security to quickly be pushed out to all nodes and rapidly
report back incidents. This security solution can be considered a form of middleware,
a distributed computing system that all users of the network interact within. The Air
Force is developing secure middleware called Cybercraft [65]. While the exact imple-
mentation design is still in development, it is based on a container model. Each node
receives and deploys software “payloads” governed by a policy. Using these payloads,
the Cybercraft architecture provides the operator with situational awareness.
With a CyberCraft infrastructure in place, it remains to populate the infras-
tructure with payloads. The payloads can generally be described as agents, and as
such are encompassed by agent oriented design. Using the situational awareness ca-
pability, the ultimate aim of the CyberCraft model is to automatically respond to
cyber attacks using the payloads. However, since the system is meant to be largely
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Table 1: Taxonomy of commonly used MDP types
Type Scale S O A T Ω R
MDP L L N/a L L L L
DEC-MDP G L N/a L L L G
POMDP L L L L L L L
DEC-POMDP G G L L R L G
I-POMDP R R R L R R R
R-MTDP G R L R R L G
L = Local, R = Regional, G = Global
autonomous, trust is the primary concern. The commanders have to be sure they can
trust the CyberCraft to accomplish their intent without disrupting the system.
2.4 Agent Formal Modeling
There are many ways that agents can be formally modelled. The benefit of
using a formal model, as opposed to just implementing an agent design in code, is
the generality of the formal model. Consequently, anything that applies to the formal
model applies to the particular agent implementation in question.
2.4.1 Markov Decision Processes. Markov decision processes (MDP) are
reducible to the agent schema as outlined by Russel and Norvig in [88]. The agent
schema consists of sensors, actuators, and state. The agent acts within an environment
that may or may not have rewards. When the agent cannot obtain a full observation of
its environment, it is represented with a partially observable Markov decision process
(POMDP) [64].
The elements of the schema correspond to the POMDP tuple in this way: S
is the agent’s state, A are the agent’s actuators, O are the agent’s observations, and
R are the rewards the agent can receive [88]. Along with the basic agent schema
described in [88], there is a taxonomy of agents, ranging from purely reactive agents
to decision theoretic agents. The mapping parameters T and Ω are the symbolic
equivalent of the agent’s cognitive capabilities. Whereas MDPs are a simple matter
to solve and generate a policy from, since they are P-complete [88],
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POMDPs are a more complex matter because the true state has to be in-
ferred from observations. POMDPs are consequently PSPACE-complete, which is
only tractable for small problem domains. POMDP models can either be solved for
an finite horizon, or for a infinite horizon [64]. The horizon denotes the number of
transitions in a Markov chain a model is evaluated for. A finite horizon can be solved
using straightforward numerical techniques, such as matrix multiplication combined
with various pruning and reward propagation algorithms. The approach used can
either be a feedforward or a backtracking algorithm. The backtracking approach is
most convenient if a utility function exists. Generating a policy, then, is a matter of
backtracking from the end states with rewards. If no utility function exists, then the
feedforward algorithms give a total policy for all decision branches. In either case,
the complexity of the decision space climbs exponentially as the number of transi-
tions increase as with a breadth first search. The complexity is O(bt), where b is the
branching factor, i.e. the number of decisions an agent has for any given state, and t
is the number of transitions.
Solving for the infinite horizon is much more complex, and requires mathemati-
cal analysis of the model, since there are a countable infinite number of transitions to
be evaluated using straightforward numerical techniques. One such infinite horizon
technique is to find the Nash equilibrium of a competitive multi-agent model. The
infinite horizon can be approximated by using finite horizon where the values have
converged to within a certain threshold based on an error criteria.
A standard POMDP only represents one agent. However, it is often useful
to model more than one agent such that all, some, or none share a reward func-
tion, yet all can affect each other and the environment. These models are the de-
centralized POMDP (DEC-POMDP), role based multi-agent team decision problem
(R-MTDP), and interactive POMDP (I-POMDP), respectively. The DEC-POMDP
and I-POMDP models encompass most of the other models. The exception to this
is that they do not group actions into roles like the R-MTDP model. Additionally,
while the majority of POMDP models are not recursive, and thus have countably
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infinite horizons, the interactive POMDP (I-POMDP) model is recursive, since the
policy is based both on the observations of the environment and the beliefs the agents
have about each others’ policies [40]. There are thus two different horizon axes, one
for actions in the environment and the other for recursive levels in mutual agent be-
liefs [48]. Additionally, since the beliefs contain policies as well and thus the horizon
consists of an infinite number of infinite sets, the I-POMDP’s horizon is uncountably
infinite.
Finding a DEC-POMDP policy is NEXP-complete [22] (see Section 2.6.3 for
an algorithmic complexity discussion) and finding an I-POMDP policy is harder or
impossible due to the potentially uncountably infinite horizon. In the literature, all
deterministic, optimal techniques for solving these MDP models do not scale past a
few agents in a very simple problem domain. Consequently, due to the great com-
plexity in solving the general case of POMDP models, heuristic based searches and
memoization [51] are necessary. Sometimes the problem domain lends itself to a sig-
nificant dimensionality and complexity reduction. In the case of the I-POMDP, if
only the previous state’s agent beliefs are necessary to predict the next state, then
the problem is solvable too.
Using principal component analysis, Spaan and Spaan have reduced a real world
POMDP model complexity such that it is tractable to generate its policy [122]. An-
other technique, as used by [31], reduces the dimension space by filtering only the
most commonly used observations. Another technique is to use a stochastic process
to generate an approximation to the optimal policy, such as with stochastic particle
filtering [41]. These techniques have met with limited success, but not at the level
that is required by the SOMAS problem domain.
Besides the problem of intractability, neither the DEC-POMDP or I-POMDP
model allows for the production or deletion of agents. This can be simulated by a
priori establishing the maximum number of possible agents, and then changing how
they influence the agent swarm based on transition rules representing creation and
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deletion. However, the maximum possible number of agents is significantly larger
than the number that is usually needed, so these models are composed of a lot of
wasted space and become even more intractable. Finally, the maximum number of
agents can be potentially limitless, and a finite model is incapable of handling an
arbitrary infinite set. To solve these problems, POMDP models are augmented with
functions because functions can produce a potentially unlimited number of values
while still having a finite representation. Of course, this means the models can no
longer be solved in the general case by an algorithm, since the models can be Turing
complete [11].
The traditional, finite *POMDP models, where * stands for extensions such as
DEC and I, are equivalent to regular grammars in a finite state machines [3], where
strings are state/action histories. To augment the *POMDP model with a function,
the state transition function, T , is replaced with a model transition function, T ′, as
detailed in formula (1). A represents a non empty set of actions.
T ′ : ∗POMDP × S×A→ ∗POMDP (1)
As long as the number of agents is constant or monotonically decreasing, then
the multi-agent model is equivalent to a finite state machine with no pushdown stores.
Once the number of agents is monotonically increasing without limit, then the multi-
agent model is equivalent to a finite state machine with one pushdown store. Finally,
if the number of agents can either decrease or increase without limit, then the multi-
agent model is equivalent to a finite state machine with two pushdown stores. A finite
state machine with two pushdown stores is equivalent to a Turing machine [77].
As a concrete example, the T ′ function can add or remove agent tuples from an I-
POMDP model, as well as change the other dependent agent tuples accordingly. Thus,
T ′ adds lengthening and shortening rules for manipulating the size of the *POMDP
tuple. According to [55], the existence of lengthening and shortening rules in a formal
system means it is potentially undecidable. This is because such a formal system
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can be equivalent to a Turing machine, and thus susceptible to the halting problem.
Therefore, the F (∗POMDP ) models are algorithmically unsolvable in the general
case, though this does not preclude them being mathematically solvable in particular
cases.
2.4.2 Agent Ruleset. As Norvig describes in [88], the agent can be ab-
stractly considered a table matching observations to actions, which Norvig terms the
agent’s “external” characterization. The “internal” characterization of the agent is a
program. There are many different general characterizations for the agent program.
A representation that is used in much of agent learning is a policy. A policy maps
observations to actions, similar to Norvig’s “external” characterization of agents. A
policy can either be optimal or suboptimal, fixed or changing. It can either be gen-
erated a priori, as is often the case with a POMDP model, or it can be generated
online, such as in reinforcement learning. [88]
Rulesets are the most general kind of agent program, since a program is essen-
tially a ruleset (which may modify itself). The basic distinction in rulesets is between
rules that have decision functions and rules that constantly activate their actuators.
Policies are a subset of rulesets, since a policy is a ruleset that use a simple numeric
comparison for the decision function.
Policy ( Ruleset
However, while a policy’s decision function is essentially a simple numerical
comparison, in the general case a ruleset can use a very wide range of decision func-
tions. Once the agent ruleset is defined, it is considered more or less effective based
on how well it achieves a certain objective. The ruleset used to achieve the objective
is considered the agent’s behavior. Since a behavior is described in terms of what it
accomplishes, the behavior also includes the objective. Thus, an agent’s behavior is
its ruleset and the objective the ruleset accomplishes.
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2.5 Self Organization and Entangled Hierarchies
In order to develop MAS based security systems, it is necessary to create a
scalable, flexible control structure. However, a scalable, flexible control structure
tends to be an anachronism in computer science, as added flexibility and scaling leads
to rapidly increasing overhead. Consequently, as evidenced by the literature, research
is drawing inspiration from the many successful large scale, self organizing MASs in
nature [27] [116] [114] [115].
For instance, many stochastic global search algorithms are inspired by such
systems. Simulated annealing models how the annealing process causes the molecules
to become organized in steel, making the steel less brittle. Evolutionary algorithms
are based on the idea that the process of variation and selection in nature, whether by
environment with natural selection or by animals as with the Baldwin effect, causes
the genetic code to become more organized according to a fitness function. The ant
colony algorithm copies the capability of foraging ants to find the most efficient path
between a food source and their nest without overarching guidance.
To investigate such self organizing MASs three related, yet distinct, concepts
are discussed in this section. They are: emergence, self organization, and entangled
hierarchies. Emergence refers to things that are composed of parts, but are not
reducible to the parts and their interaction. For example, a car is composed of a
body, an engine, and four wheels. However, when we talk about cars, we use the term
“car” as if it is something other than the parts it is composed of.
There are various ways phenomena can emerge. They can emerge by accident,
by design, or by some mechanism. One form of mechanism based emergence is called
self organization. While similar in certain regards, emergence and self organization
are distinct concepts [137]. Emergence refers to a macroscopic (global) pattern being
generated from microscopic (local) interactions. Self organization is when a system
robustly sustains itself through internal local interactions and observations, without
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the need for external or global direction. However, given that both refer to a local
dynamics to global property mapping, they are often conflated.
In a self organized system, the parts influence each other. This influence can
proceed in a strictly hierarchical manner, where the higher levels influence all sub-
sidiary levels unidirectionally. Alternatively, the influence can proceed bidirectionally.
Besides bidirectional influence, the organization may be composed of many disparate
and intermingled hierarchies. This complex form of organization, composed both of
bidirectional influence and intermingled hierarchies, is called an entangled hierarchy.
To incorporate an entangled hierarchy in a self organized system, the global level must
have a concise enough Shannon coding [118] that the local level can interact with it,
given its more limited memory space.
This is where emergence is important. A global pattern means that the global
level can be encoded more concisely than just the aggregate of the system parts. For
example, the word “example” on this paper or monitor is more concisely encoded as
a series of ASCII characters than as aggregate of the atoms or pixels (i.e. bitmap
image) in its composition. So, if global or regional behaviors in the self organized
system are emergent, then the local elements can refer to and interact with them,
within their memory limits.
2.5.1 Emerging Behavior is a Real Phenomenon. The idea of emergence
is widespread in both modern day science and philosophy. In both disciplines, the
interest is founded on the assumption that reality can be entirely based on physical
processes, therefore every science is derivative of physics. However, the reductionism
that this idea implies does not cohere with the view of many of the scientific disciplines,
who consider certain phenomena in their disciplines as not being easily or even possibly
reducible to basic physics. On first glance, this may seem to be logically invalid.
If the sciences study physical objects, and all physical objects run by the laws of
physics, then are not all objects just particles in motion, by definition? While this is
a compelling argument, there is a rigorous theoretical basis for the idea of emergence
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based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem [25]. However, the relevance of this insight
requires a proper understanding of reductionism.
First, it is important, as always, to define the terms being used. There are at
least 3 distinct meanings of “emergence:”
1. It is practically intractible describe an “emergent” property in terms of its lower
level structure. Notice that this says nothing about the existence of the emergent
properties. The properties may or may not really exist in this case. For example,
most people cannot describe a car in terms of its mechanisms, and instead
describe it in terms of its function. However, it is perfectly possible to describe
a car completely in terms of its mechanism without any loss of detail.
2. The “emergent” property has an existence distinct from its lower level structure.
An example of such an emergent property is the color red. Even if everyone sees
a different color when they see the wavelengths that produce the color red, we
all (for the most part) know what each other are talking about when we say
“red.” This happens despite the fact that no one’s neuro-chemical process is
composed of the same particles and the light’s photon energies and wavelengths
that produce the vision are all completely different.
Another example is DNA. The specific strand is made up of a unique set of
molecules and cells. However, the information it encodes is universal. The same
configuration means the same thing regardless of the particular material it is
made of. Thus, the information is distinct from the material and is an “emer-
gent” property. However, while this idea may be philosophically compelling
(though it is still quite controversial in the philosophical disciplines), it does not
find easy acceptance on rigorous grounds among the sciences.
3. A property cannot be produced by lower level structures that lack informa-
tion about the property, even though its existence is reducible to lower level
structures. Kolmogrov complexity [71] is one quantification of this idea, that
there are certain programs (given a computational model) that cannot be re-
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duced to still smaller programs. A program’s Kolmogrov complexity is the
smallest program necessary for its reproduction. A familiarity with Godel’s in-
completeness theorem shows Kolmogrov complexity is a particular instantiation
of Godel’s theorem. Then, given the assumption that reality is computational,
which seems reasonable if reality is quantized and it all can be emulated on a
computer of adequate fidelity, irreducible physical phenomena is at least plausi-
ble. The benefit of definition 3 for emergence is that it does not contradict any
of the assumptions of modern science, while still giving a theoretical justification
for properties that are semantically irreducible, instead of merely syntactically
irreducible as in the case of definition 1.
Thus, with definition 3 in mind, it is possible to answer the original question
“isn’t the concept of emergence meaningless since everything is reducible to physics?”
with a “no.” Formulæ (2) and (3) describe the modality of the bidirectional rela-
tionship between emergent phenomena and physical law in the more general terms of
modal logic.
emergent phenomena→ axiomatic system (2)
axiomatic system 6→ emergent phenomena (3)
Emergent phenomena necessarily imply an axiomatic system, such as the laws
of physics, but the axiomatic system does not necessarily imply a particular emergent
phenomena. The emergent phenomena are, in turn, specified by information that is
latent in the physical system, analogous to the Kolmogorov complexity of a computa-
tional representation. In order for a decentralized MAS to remain organized without
resorting to centralized organization, its behavior must be emergent. Therefore, the
theory of emergence is essential for the design of a decentralized MAS.
2.5.2 Self Organization. Self organization is the essential mechanism for
producing robust emergent behavior in a MAS. A pattern is emergent if it is not
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explicitly specified in either the swarm or the environment, and it is unlikely to
happen given a random set of parameters. External organization describes how a
MAS behavior necessarily emerges primarily due to environmental feedbock. Internal
organization, or self organization, describes how the behavior in the MAS necessarily
emerges primarily due to internal feedback.
Since internal organization does not depend on the environment, it is more
robust than external organization. Hybrid organization, of course, describes how
both sources of feedback provide equivalent organization for the swarm. However,
in all cases, no new information is being created. The information necessary for the
behavior to emerge is latent within the system, whether MAS, environment, or both,
in some way.
2.5.3 Qualifying Self Organization. To construct a self organizing swarm, it
is necessary to qualify when a swarm is self organized. If the information necessary
for a certain emergent property is latent in a system, then the question becomes
how does the emergent property emerge? A new property implies new information.
Yet, information is said to be conserved [38], and new information must come from
somewhere.
There are a number of ways patterns can be constructed. The patterns can be
explicitly constructed by a designer, such as a construction chief at a building site.
Alternatively, the pattern can be the result of an environmental template, such as a
river bed. However, in each of these cases, we do not say that the pattern is emergent,
because the pattern already exists.
In nature, there are occurrences of what are called self organizing systems. These
systems show a pattern of behavior over a long time despite the fact that there is no
overarching control of the system. For instance, ants and termites display this kind
of behavior to an amazing degree. Even though many human organizations rely on
hierarchical control, there are also organizations that operate without such control,
though this is rarer than in the insect world. The benefit of self organizing systems is
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that they can easily adapt locally to changing environments while maintaining a global
objective. This is a very useful idea for mobile agents in a network since networks
can have a wide variety of configurations and change rapidly.
There are a number of definitions of self organization. They range from the
observable, such as that of [53] who states that self organization is the emergence
of a global, organized pattern in a system without any overarching control, through
local observations and interactions; to the measurable, such as the notion that the
statistical complexity of the system increases faster than the statistically complex
information flows into the system [101].
With these two definitions, there are two primary ways self organization can
be qualified: in terms of observable system dynamics (qualities) and in terms of a
metric (quantities). The first way is to identify whether the global pattern results
only from local observations and interactions. The second is to measure the complex
information flows. In the latter case, a quantitative metric of self organization can be
constructed and used as an algorithm heuristic. With the observational qualification
of self organization, it is possible to visually identify, and thus humanly engineer a
self organized MAS.
It is not always easy to formalize the qualities we observe, so the observational
qualification provides the most general method of qualifying self organization. In
[114] the authors present an extensive list of observational qualities that depict a self
organized system. With the self organization metric, a search algorithm can find a
self organized MAS automatically. Of course, it is essential that the metric specifies
a swarm is self organized when it can be observed to be self organized.
The modal, unidirectional relation between the two qualification methods is
specified in propositional logic form in formulæ(4) and (5).
metric qualification→ observational qualification (4)
observational qualification 6→ metric qualification (5)
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The successful evaluation of the metric always implies self organization is observ-
able, but observed self organization does not necessarily imply the metric measures
the self organization. Nor does it even imply a metric is possible.
2.5.4 Quantifying Self Organization. The organizational characteristics of
the swarm can be formalized described in reference to transition function T (6). Θ
is the set of swarm states. Σ is the set of environment states. ΨΛ is a set of state
classes, Ψλ, where each class is composed of < ΘO,ΣO > tuples. The subscript I
means input and the subscript O mean output. A subset, ΨΛ×B, of ΨΛ maps to a set
of behavior classes according to functionMB (7).
T : ΘI × ΣI → ΨΛ (6)
MB : ΨΛ×B → B (7)
A behavior b in B is emergent if predicate E(b) (8) is true, and it is decentralized.
Altogether, the formula states if b contains a set of state classes that are unlikely to be
obtained given all possible transition functions, then b is emergent. Additionally, this
result can be generalized to a subset of B by considering the subset to a particular
behavior.
E(b)→ ∃ψλ∃Ψλ∃Ψ
E
Λ{ψλ ∈ Ψλ ∧Ψλ ∈ Ψ
E
Λ :MB(Ψ
E
Λ, b) ∧ PT ∗(Ψ
E
Λ) < ǫ} (8)
The function PT ∗ is a probability function based on all transition functions T ∗
that computes (ΨΛ|T ∗) where ΨΛ is some subset of ΨΛ. ǫ is a threshold that is at most
0.5. The is based on Shannon’s information theory, where the amount of information
in a behavior is the log2 of the inverse of its likelihood of occurring, or log2(
1
PT ∗(ΨbΛ)
).
If the information content of a behavior is normalized according to the information
in the system as a whole, consisting of the set T ∗, then any result more than unity
implies the behavior contains more information than the system can account for. If
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PT ∗(Ψ
b
Λ) < 0.5 then the information content must be more than 1. Thus, it fulfills
the condition of “unlikely to happen given a random set of parameters.”
The other two criteria of local observation and interaction are grouped under
the qualification of being decentralized. These, in turn, can be measured by another
metric that is introduced in Section 2.5.6, which discusses entangled hierarchies. To
talk about self organization, then, is a matter of examining the relation between the
sets ΘI × ΣI and ΨΛ, and functions T and MB. If sets Θ
ω
I and Σ
ω
I fulfill formula
(9), then
|ΘωI |
|ΘI | ∝
1
SOm and
|ΣωI |
|ΣI | ∝
1
EOm . If
SOm
EOm > EOǫ then the behavior is externally
organized. If EOmSOm > SOǫ then the behavior is self organized. EOm and SOm are
thresholds for their respective properties.
∀θI , σI{θI ∈ Θ
ω
I ∧ σI ∈ Σ
ω
I : θI , σI ∈ T (Ψ
b
Λ) ∧ E(b)} (9)
Many scientists have developed methods of creating or measuring a particular
characteristic of self organization. For instance, a set of robots that group together
can be said to show self organization [18]. A decentralized intrusion detection system
that uses two agent populations to detect and eliminate intrusions relies upon self
organization for the populations to work together without centralized control [45].
Robots that evolve specific, global behaviors are self organizing as well [18]. An
evolving modular robot that reduces the entropy in its behavior also exhibits self
organization [102].
Other researchers have developed more general metrics for self organization
that can be applied to a general class of problems, or ways of characterizing the
conditions for self organization. [29] lists and relates the general characteristics of self
organization. [140] describes a set of conditions that lead to emergence, one essential
characteristic of self organization. A few general quantifications of self organization
have been developed by [34, 117]. The authors of [101] presents a good overview of
different self organization quantification techniques applied to selected problems. Out
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of the quantitative techniques, the predictive information metric is the most general
of the set, and is fairly straightforward to implement. The essential idea is that as the
number of chronological sequences (l−) that can be used to predict future sequences
(l+) in a history increases, then the system is developing more structure, and hence
becoming more organized.
I[x; y] = P (x, y) log2
P (x, y)
P (x)P (y)
(10)
Once a system’s history is obtained, the sets L− and L+ are extracted and
I[l+; l−] is calculated for each element, resulting in a measurement of systemic orga-
nization. If the metric is used on sub sequences of the history, then the increase in
organization can be measured.
It is important to note that the metric is opposed to both random and trivial
histories. If a history is random, that means any given l− and l+ are equally likely
to occur together and P (x, y) = P (x)P (y). On the other hand, if a history is trivial,
then the sets L− and L+ are minimal, again resulting in P (x, y) = P (x)P (y). As
long as P (x, y) = P (x)P (y) then Equation (10) produces a zero value. Thus, once
the metric gives a positive reading, the history contains organization.
A causal state is a probability distribution over future sequences. For each
causal state there exists a set of pasts that each have the same causal state. With the
use of the ǫ statistics, which is the minimal sufficient statistic for a causal state [117],
Equation (10) can be simplified to Equation (11). This Equation states that the
amount of predictive information is, per Shannon’s information theory [118], the log2
of the number of causal states.
I[L+;L−] = log2 |ǫ| (11)
While the metric measures the amount of organization, this still does not spec-
ify whether the organization is created, emergent, or self organized. In the case of
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SOMAS, emergence can be assumed, since an organization is not pre-built into the
swarm and the swarm generates its behaviors through local observation and interac-
tion. Whether the emergent structure is self organized or not depends on the amount
of interaction within the swarm, which can be characterized by whether it exhibits
an entangled hierarchy.
2.5.5 Constructing Self Organization. Besides qualifying whether a given
system is self organized, it is possible to create systems that exhibit self organization
through certain rulesets. These rulesets tend to be developed through observing
existing self organized systems in nature. For example, a well accepted situation
where we say a pattern is emergent is in the case of foraging ants. The ants execute
very simple rules only with reference to their local situation, yet they are able to
accomplish global behaviors such as foraging and routing.
Within such a system there are 3 main principles at work: positive feedback,
negative feedback, and information transfer. For example, the positive feedback is
the path reinforcement when ants relay new pheromones on existing pheromones
when a good path is discovered. The negative feedback does not really exist in the
ant system, except in pheromone decay and random exploration, but an example of
such feedback is in the stock market where too many investors in a stock dilutes its
value, eventually leading to a decrease in investors. Finally, information transfer is
apparent in the ant system’s use of pheromones. These three elements of negative
and positive feedback, and information transfer, are generalized from a wide variety
of self organized biological systems in [29].
2.5.6 Entangled Hierarchy. In multi-agent systems, both human, mechan-
ical, and computational, effective behavior depends on using both global and local
information. However, usually the individual agents cannot observe all the informa-
tion they need. Consequently, the information must be communicated from those that
have it to those that need it. With small networks, this can be achieved effectively
and efficiently by all to all broadcast, multicast, or pointcast. However, as networks
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grow in size, such communication schemes grow in overhead at an exponential rate.
Even the number of hierarchies itself has an upper limit. Humans can generally han-
dle between 3 and 7 unique items in their mind at once. Any more than this and
they’ll start becoming confused and making mistakes. Thus, an increase in hierarchy
generates its own overhead, and beyond about 3 or 4 levels the point of diminishing
returns is reached.
Consequently, there is an effective limit on the size a hierarchical structure can
grow, and thus the size of a network. Of course, computers can process much more
data in a given period of time than humans, so the hierarchical limit of computational
networks is many magnitudes greater. But, there is also a limit to the size of com-
putational networks that are based on hierarchies. Some use a more flattened system
to avoid the inefficiencies of hierarchies. Beyond a certain size, the individual agents
cannot establish a good global perspective, and such systems become direction-less.
Alternatively, sometimes hierarchies can overlap, and two global perspectives com-
bine. This can work if the perspectives are compatible, but often their goals conflict,
again leading to lack of direction at the lower layers.
The communication problem can be characterized by routing the right infor-
mation to the right agent at the right time. There are many different methods of
routing this information, some more or less efficient. The goal is to produce the most
efficient routing, and as such the problem becomes a minimization problem. Using
a hierarchy is one effective heuristic for creating an efficient routing scheme. But,
it is inherently inefficient in certain ways since it predetermines that communication
with at least half the network proceeds indirectly. Unless communication structures
fit such a structure exactly, the indirection always leads to inefficiency.
A second, more general inefficiency with communication, which does not depend
on whether it is hierarchical or not, is the use of information packets. If the packets
are only sent point to point, then either certain nodes do not receive all the infor-
mation they need directly, or the sender must do a lot of bookkeeping to ensure all
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recipients get exactly what they need. Additionally, the latter case presupposes the
sender has an adequate global view to know what information each recipient needs.
Neither is this approach easily scalable. Yet, if multicast or broadcast is used, then
often recipients receive redundant information. Essentially, the communication and
information structure needs to be an emergent property of the communication itself,
since any kind of external control presupposes a certain communication routing.
If the measure of a resources is the cost of its use, then the pairing of tuples to
resources results in the resources’ costs being respectively scaled according to their
tuples’ commonality in the actual communication structure. Summing the total re-
source cost for the routing scheme gives a measure of its optimality. The optimal
routing scheme minimizes the resource cost. A symbolic formalization of this dis-
cussion is found in Formulæ (12-14). Where Ψ is a set of tuples relating route and
information. < Route, Info >, P is a set of probabilities, abiding by the standard
properties of probability sets. R is a set of resources. C is a set of costs.
p : Ψ→ P (12)
s : Ψ×R → C (13)
m : Ψ×R → {0, 1} (14)
Formulæ (15-16) detail the nature of efficiently coded and inefficiently coded
communication. For a given mα, te is the threshold of
|M≥|
|M | above which mα is con-
sidered an efficient coding and t6e is the threshold of inefficient coding.
c(m) =
∑
ψ∈Ψ
∑
r∈R
m(ψ, r)× p(ψ)× s(ψ, r) (15)
∀m{m ∈M≥ ↔ m ∈M ∧ c(m) ≥ c(mα)} (16)
In general, the efficient communication scheme is called an entangled hierarchy.
This is because the information sharing covers the whole range of pointcast, multi-
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cast, and broadcast, but not according to any general principle, only according to
the actual information needs. Additionally, the data gathering and decision making
communication does not proceed in only one direction, but both types of communi-
cation can proceed in both directions between any given recipient and sender. Thus,
the communication routing structure can range from being completely flat to being
a strict hierarchy. The optimal structure likely falls midway between the extremes,
exhibiting a number of different interrelated hierarchies.
The stock market is a concrete example of both the phenomena of an entangled
hierarchy, and its attendant difficulties. The stock market is an emergent aspect of
worldwide trading. At the same time, investors interacting with the stock market
influences the individual companies that are engaged in this trading. Thus, both the
highest level in this hierarchy emerges from and is dependent on the lowest levels, while
it also influences the lowest levels. However, if not pursued with care, an entangled
hierarchy can become unstable.
An entangled hierarchy supported by the trusted system of CyberCraft pro-
vides the crucial resilient flexibility necessary to adapt to the constant changes of
Cyberspace. At the same time, the example of the stock market shows the promise
of entangled hierarchies must be met with caution. A communication structure is not
self aware, and there must always be a human in the loop to help ensure stability.
Entangled Hierarchy vs Power Law Hierarchy: The internet is built based on a
power law distribution [119], such that the number of hops between any two arbitrary
nodes scales logarithmically with the number of network nodes. This is a very useful
network design if the nodes’ dependability increases with their link degree, and if the
network topology is fairly static. However, if this characteristic cannot be guaranteed,
then a communication structure based on the power law distribution is not necessar-
ily beneficial. In such a case, the more general concept of a specialized entangled
hierarchy may work better.
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Figure 1: Normal hierarchy vs entangled hierarchy
2.5.7 Quantifying Entangledness. While self organization means that the
swarm develops a consistent structure of behavior, an entangled hierarchy means
that the structure exhibits hierarchical relationships between the different parts (such
that certain parts exert more influence over the swarm’s behavior than that of the
influenced parts). The causal relationships do not only procceed in one direction in
the hierarchy. An example comparing a normal hierarchy to an entangled hierarchy
is shown in Figure 1.
The benefit of an entangled hierarchy is that it is a higher level abstraction that
encompasses all the standard communication structures. There are two extremes to
a communication structure: completely flat or completely hierarchical. In turn, there
are 2 metrics that distinguish these extremes. They are influence ordering and causal
relationship. An influence ordering means that there is a ordering of more influential
to less infuential amongst the parts being measured. The causal relationship shows
the direction of influence. In a hierarchy, the parts have a strong influence ordering
and unidirectional causal relationships. Whereas, a flat communication structure
has a weak influence ordering and bidirectional causal relationships. However, in an
entangled hierarchy, the parts both have a strong influence ordering as well as bicausal
relationships.
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The entangled hierarchy can be measured as a multiobjective problem, detailed
in the following equations. While these objectives do not exhaust the concept of an
entangled hierarchy, they imply an entangled hierarchy.
min(argmaxrank(|rank|)) (17)
max(argminv∈V(|v’s unique cycles|)) (18)
Where rank is a given influence rank. C is a set of cycles. V is the set of vertices
in the influence graph.
Minimizing equation (17) creates influence stratification amongst the vertices of
the influence graph. In equation (18), a unique cycle is a cycle that v is in such that
there is another cycle v is in where none of the other vertices in the second cycle are
in the first cycle. Maximising this objective creates complex bidirectional causality.
2.5.8 Intelligence Augmentation. Intelligence augmentation (IA) is the
study of the mutual interaction between man and machine for the ultimate bene-
fit of man’s intelligence. As exhibited by arguments such as Godel’s incompleteness
theorem [74], Searle’s Chinese room argument [112], qualia [130], and other theoretical
concepts, it is not very likely that true AI is logically possible.
However, these same arguments provide an important insight into the more
useful direction for computer research, which is intelligence augmentation. Godel’s
work, in particular, highlights the specific ability that humans have, which is self
formalization. This means that humans can identify a process they are performing
and then formalize its syntax. Since all computer programs are state machines, they
cannot represent themselves. Therefore, computer programs cannot self formalize like
humans can. At the same time, computers are very good at running state machines,
and humans are not. This suggests that the best interaction between computers and
humans should allow humans to easily define a state machine for a given problem,
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Table 2: Information source mapped to search
Local Solution Space Global Solution Space
Local Population Deterministic EA
Global Population EA EA
which the computer would then maximize and feed the results back to the human as
a new problem.
Similar to our interaction with our body and the environment, this process gives
rise to emergent properties, providing the human with new directions for investiga-
tion. This interaction between human and computer is called intelligence augmen-
tation, since a human is using a computer to augment their intellect instead of as a
replacement for their intellect.
Self organization is incorporated into the discipline of IA through the notion
of controlled self organization [27]. The essential idea is to use self organization to
give humans control of the system. This is one possible way to deal with the issue of
instability in self organized systems.
2.6 Search Algorithm
A better search for a domain encodes more information relevant to the search
domain. There are two sources this information can come from: before the search
(offline) and during the search (online). During the search, there are also two sources
of information: the list of partial solutions and the solution space. These sources of
information can either be local or global.
The rating of a source before the search is based on the calculation of expected
active information P (T ∈ S|IE)∗IA. P (T ∈ S) is the probability of the target being in
the search space given IE, the exogenous information. IA is the active information [38].
The online sources of information can be combined with both the offline sources and
other online sources. Table 2 describes how the source of information and the locality
of the solution space that can be sampled specifies the kind of search algorithm.
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The neighborhood to solution hyperarch denotes the search space and the offline
source places a probability distribution on the search space. In a search operation,
characterized as the modus polens rule ∃P∃Q{P → Q : P ∈ SPart, Q ∈ SSrch},
the selected partial solutions are the antecedent P and the selected solution space
solutions are Q. SPart and SSrch can both be populated by searches as well, nested to
an arbitrary depth.
The distinction between deterministic and stochastic search is the straightfor-
ward observation that given P → Q ⊢ Q ∈ Q′, Q = Q′ in the case of deterministic
search and Q ⊂ Q′ in the case of stochastic search. For an arbitrary domain, the
baseline search is the Monte Carlo sampling [138]. This is the baseline since any
solution is just as likely to be picked as any other solution. Any search that per-
forms statistically worse or better than the blind search has information about the
search domain, regardless of whether that information is accurate or inaccurate [38].
The likelihood that an informed search finds a solution compared with the random
search’s likelihood provides a precise quantification of the information the search en-
codes regarding the search domain. This quantification allows an accurate (though
not necessarily precise), and implementation invariant, comparison between search
algorithms.
There are a large number of ways of formalizing search domains. The algorithm
chosen is primarily dependent on the complexity of the search domain. If the solution
can be decomposed into a partial solution search, then a search based on local infor-
mation is likely appropriate. This method of searching is generally used for solutions
that can be found in polynomial time.
On the other hand, in very complex search domains, there are many local op-
tima, and both global and local information is needed to find the optimal solution.
Additionally, in large search domains, it is usually necessary to use an approxima-
tion search instead of an exact search. Approximation searches are good at finding
solutions in polynomial time, and they often provide good enough approximations.
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Table 3: Algorithms mapped to fitness landscape characteristics
Hilly Craggy
Smooth Tabu search Evolutionary strategies
Rough Simulated annealing Evolutionary algorithm
Approximation searches are either deterministic or stochastic. The benefit of
stochastic search, such as simulated annealing or EAs, is that it avoids getting trapped
in local optima without the need for storing previously visited solutions. Due to the
law of large numbers [5], if the probability the stochastic search algorithm finds the
optimal solution is greater than zero, then it finds the optimal solution as the number
of sampled solutions approaches infinity. To achieve the same result, deterministic
searches must store their entire search history in some form in order to guarantee that
the optimal solution is found. For a detailed description of a number of stochastic
global search algorithms please see [82].
Selecting a good global search algorithm requires information about the fitness
landscape. Such knowledge can come in a general form, such as knowing how rugged
the landscape and how smooth the slopes are. For example, the smoother the slopes
are and the fewer the number of slopes, then the more useful a hill climbing algorithm,
i.e. local information search, is. A very rugged landscape can trap searches in local
optima, so such landscapes should be searched using some form of global solution
sampling [82].
2.6.1 Fitness Landscape Characteristics. Mountainous means the landscape
has a lot of optima that vary greatly from the optimal in magnitude. Hilly means
there are not many optima that vary greatly in magnitude. Smooth means the slopes
that lead to the optima can be climbed fairly easily by a backtracking hill climber
with a small amount of memory. Rough means a large amount of memory is necessary
to find the optima.
2.6.2 Evolutionary Algorithm Packages.
43
• GALib [132]: GALib is a genetic algorithm library written in C. It is quite
computationally fast, and is fairly popular. However, since it is written in
C, its design is not loosely coupled, and can be unwieldy. It does not have
support for parallelization. A major disadvantage of the package is that it is
only a single objective genetic algorithm framework. The SOMAS domain is
best expressed as a multi-objective problem. To evolve solutions in the SOMAS
problem domain using GALib, it is necessary to use some kind of scalarization
of the objective vector. This likely loses too much important information.
• Swarmfare [100]: The existing evolutionary algorithms are good, such as the self
organizing genetic algorithm that uses entropy to perform differential evolution.
The framework does not provide a lot of flexibility for the implementation of new
algorithms. Specifically, much of the problem domain information is hardcoded
into the algorithm, and it requires a significant amount of software engineering
to make it loosely coupled enough to evolve solutions for other problem domains.
For instance, the chromosome and gene sizes are a set length. The chromosome
is directly tied to the phenotype level, which is the UAV platform.
Swarmfare does have an inbuilt parallelization capability. It is a farming model
that uses a master slave structure. The slaves are initialized on all the nodes and
then request functions to evaluate from the master. Swarmfare also has an ex-
tensive GUI. The GUI makes it simple to understand how to use the framework,
reducing the learning curve. The scenarios are configured by using external text
files, so many different scenarios can easily be generated and tested. The sim-
ulator comes with visualization capabilities. The simulation elements consist
of UAVs, obstacles (lines), and enemy targets. The UAVs can be programmed
with a variety of behaviors.
• ECJ [76]: ECJ is a widely used general evolutionary computation package writ-
ten in Java. It has been improved over a great many years, which comes with
advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is that the package has
been software engineered extensively so it is fairly straightforward to develop
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complex algorithmic workflows. However, since the package has existed for so
many years, there are legacy aspects that convolute the code, but are kept to
preserve backwards compatibility.
There are a wide variety of evolutionary algorithm types that are already sup-
ported. All the standard representations and operators for genetic algorithms,
genetic programming, and evolutionary strategies are contained in the pack-
age, such as bit strings, real vectors, and programmatic trees. Additionally,
the package design pattern is based on the concept of Linux pipes, such that
processing elements send their output to other processing elements. With these
pieces, complex algorithmic graphs can be built.
ECJ is built with parallelization in mind, and can be parallelized using a number
of different job distribution techniques. It can handle both farming and island
approaches. That is, either distributing only the fitness function evaluation or
also the solution variation and selection.
• Open BEAGLE [47]: Open Beagle is a evolutionary computation framework
written in C++. Its object oriented design means, as with ECJ, it is easy
to extend. Additionally, the framework can handle multi-objective evolution.
Open Beagle contains the standard representations and operators for genetic
algorithms and evolutionary strategies. Once the user specifies the objective
function and the chromosome type minimal code is required to combine the rest
of the package elements into an evolutionary algorithm.
Open Beagle has a distributed computing library called Distributed BEAGLE.
However, it is not actively developed. The latest release is 2004.
• GEATbx [99]: GEATbx is an extensive EA library written in MATLAB. MAT-
LAB is not object oriented, so the design of GEATbx is not as easily extensible
as Open BEAGLE and ECJ. Since it is in MATLAB, it has the most useful
analysis and visualization toolset out of all the researched libraries. MATLAB
can also run its code distributed on a grid, so GEATbx can be parallelized.
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GEATbx has two significant disadvantages. The first is that the fact MATLAB
is closed source means it is hard to have MATLAB programs interoperate with
external programs. If all development and testing is to be done within MAT-
LAB, this is not such a big problem. But, since MATLAB does not provide a
package that meets the simulation needs, none MATLAB programs are a neces-
sity. The second disadvantage is GEATbx has been commercialized and is now
closed source. While the interfaces it provides are adequate for most needs, it
is risky to assume they meet all needs. Waiting for the library to be extended,
if it is, can cost a lot of time.
2.6.3 Algorithmic Complexity. There are two aspects to algorithmic com-
plexity: time and space. An algorithm’s complexity can be measured according to
the amount of each it takes. Algorithm classes become progressively more complex,
as shown by the following set relations [9]
P ⊆ NP ⊆ PSPACE ⊆ EXPTIME ⊆ EXPSPACE
These classes are defined as:
• P =
⋃
k∈N
DTIME
(
nk
)
• NP =
⋃
k∈N
NTIME
(
nk
)
• PSPACE =
⋃
k∈N
SPACE
(
nk
)
• EXPTIME =
⋃
k∈N
DTIME
(
2n
k
)
• EXPSPACE =
⋃
k∈N
SPACE
(
nk
)
Where DTIME signifies the amount of time to solve using a deterministic Tur-
ing machine. NTIME signifies the amount of time to solve using a non deterministic
Turing machine. SPACE signifies the amount of space used, regardless of whether
the Turing machine is deterministic or non deterministic, since the difference does not
affect the power of the complexity class.
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2.7 Simulation Packages
2.7.1 Network. The network simulation requirements for the SOMAS frame-
work are very simple. Essentially, the simulator needs to contain nodes and edges.
The impact of issues such as protocol stacks and bandwidth and latency are not dealt
with in this study.
• OpNet [7]: OpNet is a widely used commercial package for network simulation
work. It is used for many production applications and provides the greatest
realism out of all the packages. However, since it is commercial, modification
to the simulation is very limited. Additionally, it does not provide host level
simulation. It only simulates the traffic flows between hosts. Consequently, it is
not applicable for the SOMAS simulation since the simulation requires running
new code on the hosts. It may be used in tandem with another simulation to
provide realistic traffic conditions.
• NS2 [6]: NS2 is used to simulate networks. The ruleset and basic framework
are hardcoded in C++, and the runtime behavior is manipulated by Tcl scripts.
One the benefit of using NS2 is the scalability of the model’s realism is already
provided. More or less of the network stack can be incorporated, and more
realistic settings can be placed on the edges.
A benefit of using NS2 over packages like OpNet is that NS2 provides host level
simulation as well as traffic simulation, and the code is completely open source.
Thus, it can be used for the complete simulation of a scenario, and adjusted to
meet the study’s specific needs. JNS is the Java port of NS2. Consequently, it
is an ideal candidate for improving the realism of the SOMAS simulation, if it
is written in Java.
• Custom: Since the basic simulation requirements to develop the SOMAS frame-
work are very simple, it is quickest to create a custom built network simulator.
By using an object oriented language to write the network simulator, it is pos-
sible to attach an existing, and much more indepth package once the SOMAS
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framework is complete. This is the approach that is used, due to the simple
simulation requirements.
2.7.2 Misc.
• JGraphT [85]: JGraphT provides a standard set of graph algorithms. It is
useful for manipulating the network graph in the custom simulation.
2.7.3 Multi-Agent System.
• Swarmfare [100]: Swarmfare is the in house framework for developing swarms
with emergent behavior. Currently, much of it is hardcoded (simulation parame-
ters are values instead of variables) for UAVs, which are different than software
agents in a number of important ways. The main sections that need to be
reimplemented are the behavior set, the simulation, and the visualization/GUI.
The advantage of a custom created framework like Swarmfare is that it can
be fine tuned for speed. This is important for the problem domain, since the
simulations can become very complex and time consuming when there are a large
number of nodes and agents. Unfortunately, the framework is too hardcoded
and different from the SOMAS problem domain. It cannot be easily converted
over, or at least not more easily than building a new application out of other
packages.
• SWARM [49]: SWARM is the precursor to MASON. It is written in C++.
Consequently, it is likely faster than MASON, but it is more unwieldy due to
C++ being a more difficult language to use than Java.
• MASON [75]: MASON is an open source Java package for simulating multi-
agent systems based on the C++ SWARM package, and is very fast. It can also
exploit thread level parallelization, by running the different simulation compo-
nents within different threads and on different cores. To prevent the loss of data
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due to an unforeseen exceptions, it can also log the simulation and resume from
the results of a log file.
2.8 Visualization
The topic of visualization covers two main areas of the framework: allowing a
human to interact with the online swarm and evaluating the results of producing a
swarm offline. There are many overlapping concerns between the two areas, though
the online visualization also has a time and resource concern.
There are two aspects to the visualization. One aspect is to directly observe
the agents’ behavior on the network. The other aspect is to observe different mea-
surements on the agent swarm. Measurements can consist of many dimensions, so
some form of dimensional reduction is necessary. Most importantly, the measurement
visualization needs to visualize the key metrics of self organization and tangled hier-
archy. If the visualization of the metrics is paired with the direct visualization of the
swarm behavior on the network, then it is possible to visually confirm whether the
metrics are correct. Additionally, the data from the metrics can be superimposed on
the direct simulation to bring out non-obvious or invisible details.
2.8.1 Self Organization Visualization. It is important to be able to visualize
the self organized aspect of the system in order to allow effective human interaction.
The best result is if the self organized aspects of the system can be tied to the
objectives, so that a person can also specify new SO patterns to further achieve the
objectives. There are not many researchers who have a technique for visualizing self
organization. This is because there is no consensus on a quantitative way to identify
self organization.
Some authors [117] have developed a a visualization technique based on their
self organization metric. The idea is essentially to darken the more influential parts
of a system and lighten the less influential. When this is done, the structure of the
system’s organization is evident. The viewer can visually identify whether the authors’
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self organization metric corresponds with a system that appears to be organized. One
visualization looks at the chronology of a self organized system, showing the impact
of each causal state on the future. Another visualization takes a snapshot, showing
the influence of each part.
2.8.2 SOMAS Visualisation. The criteria for choosing a visualization pack-
age are
• integration with existing languages and packages
• ability to take screenshots and record video
• customizable graphics
• automatic network layout generator
• graphing ability (i.e. bar charts, scatterplots, etc.)
• customizable visualization aspect This item means that the visualization is not
restricted to a certain set of data, but can be customized to whatever data is
appropriate
• MASON [75]: Besides the simulation capabilities, MASON also offers a very
general visualization API with many pre-constructed visualization techniques,
such as 2D, 3D, networks, etc. The visualization runs in a steppable real time
visualizer along with the ability to export the visualization as screenshots or
movies. The interface itself is also highly customizable and includes the ability
to inspect the simulation through the visualization, for example selecting an
agent to examine its variable values.
• JUNG [92]: JUNG is a network visualization package. It specializes in network
layout algorithms, and includes graph generators and basic graph algorithms.
Combined with MASON, JUNG provides very nice looking network layouts.
JUNG also gives the user the ability to interact with the graphs and create
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their own layouts. With SOMAS, JUNG’s interaction capability means users
can custom design their own scenarios.
• Swarmfare [100]: Swarmfare has a very nice GUI, which includes both an inter-
face for setting the algorithm parameters and an ability to visualize the evolved
parameters. However, the GUI is hardcoded for UAV simulation, making it
difficult to adapt to the task of SOMAS simulation.
• OpNet [7]: While OpNet is one of the standard commercial network simulators,
and consequently has excellent visualization capabilities, it does not have the
ability to visualize host level behavior, which is necessary to completely visualize
the SOMAS simulation.
• NS2 [6] and JNS [131]: These network simulators can simulate at both the
network and host level, so they also have the ability to visualize the simulations.
The simulators are not purpose built for agent simulation, so it requires more
overhead to construct the visualization than with MASON.
2.9 Testing
Testing requires the ability to process data into an analyzable format, and the
statistical tests necessary to test the hypotheses. While both parametric and non
parametric tests are useful, non parametric tests are the most general type, and a
testing package should have at least these. According to [83] about 30 experiments are
required in order to produce statistically significant results. However, in some cases,
running an experiment is too time intensive. In this case, as long as the confidence
boundaries of the results for the different algorithms do not overlap, statistically
significant results are still produced.
To test comparisons between algorithms, it is important to first determine
whether the results follow the normal distribution. If they do, then a p test can
be used. If the results do not, then a non parametric test must be used. In this
project, since the distribution is not known, non parametric tests are used. The tests
51
are the Fisher exact test and the Mann-Whitney test (also known as the Wilcoxon
rank-sum test). Both tests assume the runs are independent.
Besides the statistical tests, the testing framework also needs the ability to com-
pare multi-dimensional solutions. This is either accomplished through turning the
vector of objectives into a scalar using weights or some other metric, with augmen-
tation, or by comparing the vectors directly. It is difficult to scalarize the objectives
since the weights are not always known beforehand. Comparing the vectors directly
is a more flexible technique.
The direct comparison usually takes the form of establishing the Pareto front of
the solution set, and then comparing a metric based on the Pareto front. Since fronts
do not usually have the same number of points, it isn’t possible to use a standard
dominance ranking. The metric used should also be Pareto compliant, meaning it
does not order a dominant front as worse than a non-dominant front [36].
Ideally, the tests should achieve the true Pareto front, PFTrue. However, this
requires a great deal of computational power, and thus only an approximation is likely
to be achieved. Consequently, it is also important to be able to determine general
characteristics of PFTrue, so as to understand its general shape, how difficult it is
to find the different sections, and the overall sparsity. These characteristics help the
decision maker know the constraints on his or her decision making in this problem
domain. However, the search landscape to objective landscape mapping function does
not necessarily have an inverse function. Thus, a pattern on the objective landscape
does not imply a pattern on the search landscape.
• PISA [24]: Zitzler’s PISA framework [24] is a comprehensive multi-objective
development and testing framework. The testing framework consists of a vari-
ator and a selector. The variator contains the fitness function, the solution
representation, and the solution variation operators. The selector contains the
population ranking and selection operators.
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Along with these two parts there is also a number of MOEA and statistical
metrics that are used to test the hypothesis that one algorithm is more effective
than another for a given problem domain. It is simple to add a number of
scenarios, variators, and selectors, and then have them automatically tested
once the algorithm is complete.
The framework is very general, thus each variator and selector only needs to
abide by a simple state machine protocol and file format in order to work to-
gether. This allows the user to employ the many selector algorithms available
on the PISA site. Additionally, the source code for elements of the framework
is generally avaliable, except for one or two exceptions. So, the user has many
MOEA templates available to quickly bootstrap their own algorithms without
concerning themselves with implementing the required interfaces.
The tests make use of standard Pareto compliant metrics to compare Pareto
fronts. This means that while the framework is originally meant to support
the comparison of different selectors, it can be changed to compare variators,
which includes the comparison of evaluation functions. This change consists
of switching the position of the variators and selectors in the command line
arguments for the run script.
The indicator suite also contains estimated attainment functions, which, besides
testing, are useful for visualizing where the EA tends to search in the solution
space. However, they only work with 2 objective spaces. Even if the objective
space for a chromosome contains more than 2 objectives, a pairwise selection of
objectives can be used to reduce the objective space for attainment visualization.
The objective space can also be reduced by finding linear relationships between
objectives, and thus substituting a single objective for related objectives.
2.9.1 MOEA Metrics. In order to determine the comparative effectiveness
of different swarms in a scenario, their respective PFknown must be compared. The
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metrics for this comparison should be Pareto compliant [36], in order to have a fair
comparison of effectiveness.
Pareto compliance means that the metric, I : Ω → R, is an order preserving
function from (Ω,) to (R,≥), as detailed in formula (19). If the metric is not Pareto
compliant, then it may rank a dominated front higher than the dominating front.
∀A,B ∈ Ω : A  B ⇒ I(A) ≥ I(B) (19)
! It is important to keep in mind that these metrics are different than the
scenario metrics. The scenario metrics measure the online search algorithm
effectiveness and the Pareto compliant metrics measure the offline search
algorithm effectiveness.
As an example, the following list shows a range of Pareto compliant metrics
from [36].
• error ratio
• hyperarea or hypervolume ratio
• epsilon (ǫ) metric
• R1,2,3 metrics
The PISA framework contains three Pareto compliant metrics: the R2, ǫ, and
hypervolume metrics. These metrics are used in the PISA framework because while
each is Pareto compliant, they also measure the dominance of fronts in a different way.
The ǫ and R2 metrics are good for comparing relative dominance of fronts, where the
ǫ is more affected by outliers and the R metrics less so. The hypervolume ratio gives
an absolute measure related to the theoretical optimal, the objective space origin
(for many problems this is an unobtainable goal, thus it is not necessarily the real
optimal). These characteristics are discussed in more detail in the following sections.
Epsilon Metric: The Epsilon (ǫ) metric is the minimum ǫ ∈ R value such that
any solution b ∈ B is ǫ-dominated by some solution a ∈ A. This is detailed by
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Equation (20) [36].
Iǫ(A,B) = min ǫ ∈ R|∀b ∈ B∃a ∈ A : a >ǫ b (20)
Where a >ǫ b means that a ǫ-dominates b.
The ǫ metric is good for measuring the relative difference between two attain-
ment sets, since it does not require the use of any reference points not in the sets,
i.e. the sets are measured against each other directly. However, the ǫ-metric is signif-
icantly affected by outliers.
For example, the majority of the vectors in an attainment set, A, may dominate
the vectors of attainment set, B. B also contains one or two vectors that significantly
dominate vectors in B. Thus, B needs a smaller ǫ value to dominate A, even though
A mostly dominates B.
R2 metric: The R2 metric is the average difference between the utility values of
a reference set and the approximation set, such that utility is measured by a utility
function and a set of vectors used for scaling. See Equation (21) [36].
IR2 =
∑
λ̃∈A u(λ̃, B)− u(λ̃, A)
|λ̃|
(21)
Where u(A, λ̃) is the utility of approximation set A, on a scalarized vector, λ̃ (a
reference point).
The utility is measured by the minimum distance of a point in the set, A, from
the reference point. With a large number of reference points, the R2 metric is a
good metric for determining the general attainment of an attainment set. Unlike the
ǫ-metric, it is not significantly affected by outliers.
By using both metrics, it is possible to identify greater exploration, such that
an attainment has a few remarkably good solutions compared to another attainment.
Greater exploration is indicated when the R2 and ǫ metrics give contrary rankings for
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two attainment sets. If the difference is big enough, then the data may also contain
anomalies.
Hypervolume Metric: The Hypervolume metric is the volume of the minimum
values for each objective in the approximation set. This is detailed in Equation
(22) [36].
ME ,
{
⋃
i
voli|veci ∈ PFknown
}
(22)
This metric tells the user how close an attainment set is to the theoretic optimal.
In this sense, it is more objective than the previous two metrics. Although, the
hypervolume says little about the optimality of the individual points compared to
the previous two indicators, since it only can compare the best objectives out of the
complete set of points.
2.9.2 Statistical Analysis. The Fisher sign test is not accurate for more than
2 samples, while the Mann-Whitney test is. Since the experiments for this research
usually have more than 2 samples, the Fisher sign test is not accurate in such cases.
However, it is still used for exploratory purposes. This is because the run count
for both statistical tests, which is five runs per scenario, is not sufficient to obtain
accurate results, which requires 20 runs per scenario. The smaller run count is used
because of time constraints.
Fisher sign test [133]: The Fisher sign test calculates the p-value that two
distributions are different based solely on the “signs of the differences between paired
observations, not on their sizes.” The sample sizes of this test must be the same size.
It is accurate for a comparison between two samples, but is inaccurate for more than
two samples.
The inaccuracy results from the fact that multiple statistical tests are being run
on the same samples, thus the tests are not independent. In such a case, it is necessary
to give an idea of how likely at least one null hypothesis is incorrectly rejected, i.e. a
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Type I error. In the case of tests that are not independent, the lower bound of this
error is given by a′ in Equation (23) [83].
a′ = 1− (1− a)n (23)
Where n =


N
2

, and N is the number of samples.
For example, if N = 3 and a = 0.05, then a′ = 0.14. So, there is at least a 0.14
chance that at least one null hypothesis is incorrectly rejected.
Mann-Whitney (Wilcoxon rank-sum) test [83]: The Mann-Whitney test com-
pares the deviation between the medians of two samples, which may have different
sizes. The statistic is calculated by ranking the members of the samples against each
other, and adding up the ranks of the smaller sample to produce Wm. The p-value is
derived from the range that Wm falls within. The benefit of the Mann-Whitney test
is that it can accurately be used on more than two samples, in which case it is more
commonly known as the Kruskal-Wallis test.
2.9.3 Visual Data Processing. The visual data processing requirements are
fairly simple. First, since each scenario outputs more than 3 objectives, plotting the
known Pareto front, PFknown, requires dimensional reduction, which can simple be
selecting only 3 objectives at a time to plot. Second, the plots need to be capable of
incorporating LATEX markup and be publication quality. There are many very powerful
data process packages in existence, but these simple requirements only require the
use of Bash and GnuPlot. Besides the data processing for the experiment results,
the SOMAS framework requires a clustering algorithm and basic statistical functions.
The Weka library provides the clustering algorithm and the Colt library provides the
statistical functions.
• Bash: Bash is a useful all around scripting language. It is one of the standard
scripting languages used in the Linux OS. With the UNIX philosophy of tool
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chains Bash is an effective glue language. Since the SOMAS framework is com-
posed of a number of disparate packages, glue code is necessary, and Bash is
ideal for this task.
• GnuPlot [135]: GnuPlot is an open source plotting tool. It is a flexible graphing
program that can create publication quality graphs. Its graphs can also be inte-
grated with LATEX, allowing the use of LATEX directives to create mathematical
formulae and nicely formatted text in the graph.
• Weka [46]: Weka provides a very wide range of machine learing algorithms and
techniques, along with an integrated development environment (IDE) and grid
computing capabilities.
• Colt [57]: Colt is a high performance math library that is used by the Eu-
ropean Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN). It provides many of stan-
dard mathematical and statistical functions necessary for scientific work. Even
though there is significant overlap between the Colt library and the Java math
library, the Colt functions have all been heavily optimized.
• R [60]: R is a standard statistical analysis language. Unlike related packages
such as MATLAB and Octave, its language is both object oriented and based
on functional languages such as Scheme, making it quite flexible and powerful.
Additionally, its speed is comparable to that of MATLAB. Like MATLAB, it
has a very large range of libraries, though they are focussed more on statistical
operations than matrix operations. Since it is open source, it is also possible
to add new functionality to R if needed. Unfortunately, there is not as much
documentation for R as there is for MATLAB.
• MATLAB [78]: MATLAB is one of the most popular data analysis applications.
It is especially good for analyzing matrix based data, and its code is dramatically
sped up when properly vectorized. It also has a large number of commercially
developed libraries covering a wide range of applications as well as extensive and
well written documentation. Unfortunately, MATLAB is a commercial program,
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Table 4: Language hierarchy
Level Examples Properties Use case
0 machine code, byte code direct hardware manipulation, writing drivers
precision, unreadable
1 assembly precision, readable speed critical
2 c structured, imperative, speed essential,
FORTRAN procedural programming, legacy
manual memory management
3 lisp, c++, java, prolog object oriented, functional, speed important,
declarative programming; large scale,
static and dynamic aspects; framework design
garbage collection
4 python, ruby, perl, hybrid, completely dynamic prototyping,
javascript glue code,
rapid development,
throw away code
5 bash, cold fusion, HTML application tie in, markup, glue code,
excel, Office VBA, mysql DSL, graphic based non-programmer
demographic,
inter-disciplinary
which can make it difficult to interoperate with non MATLAB based programs.
Additionally, the MATLAB programming language is not a suitable language
for complex programming task, and neither is it object oriented, making it
unsuitable for large scale systems and complex tasks.
• Octave [43]: Octave is an open source equivalent to MATLAB. It does not have
the GUI functionality of MATLAB, but Octave does provide a close approxi-
mation to MATLAB’s numerical capabilities. Most MATLAB code can run as
is in Octave, with only a few modifications.
• Sage [123]: Sage integrates a large number of open source numerical packages,
such as R and Octave. It integrates all the packages through the use of Python,
a high level programming language.
2.10 Languages
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2.10.1 Simulation and Framework Development. The development lan-
guage, or languages, for the SOMAS framework must meet a number of criteria.
• speed
• libraries
• documentation (if unfamiliar)
• hardware and software compatibility
• rapid development
• extensible code structures (i.e. functional, OO)
• interoperability
Table 4 shows the wide range of languages currently available. The framework
should be fairly OS agnostic, but the top level environment is either Windows or
Linux, since it adds unnecessary complexity have a hybrid system. Since each chro-
mosome is evaluated by running a simulation, the simulations must run very quickly
to achieve useful results in a realistic time frame. High level languages, such as Python
and Perl, are not suited for developing simulations because even their compiled code
is much slower than lower level languages like C and Java. The language also must
be object oriented to both ease development and allow extensive improvement.
The SOMAS framework should be easy to extend and deconstruct. Monolithic
frameworks quickly become unmaintainable and unuseful. So, the language must lend
itself to loosely coupled code development. Finally, it is beneficial if the language can
be used for the whole framework, but this is not a necessary condition. The loosely
coupled approach allows a number of different languages to be used as long as they
share common interfaces. Thus, the object oriented and speed requirements restrict
the language choices to Java and C++.
2.10.2 Scripting. There are a number of scripting languages that have large
communities of use. Some are directly tied to an OS, such as the DOS and Bash
60
shells. Others are executed by running an interpreter, for example Perl and Ruby.
Since the scripting language needs to easily manipulate files and file structures, as
well as process the contents of files using a variety of programs. Consequently, a shell
is most appropriate. Thus, the choice of scripting languages comes down to either a
Windows based shell such as DOS or PowerShell, or a Unix based shell such as Bash
or Ksh.
2.11 Summary
This chapter covers the necessary theory and packages to implement SOMAS.
It gives an indepth look at the range of issues involved with each subject. The topic
of network security and its great complexity is explained, with the suggestion that
it be decomposed using agent oriented design to produce multi-agent based network
defense. Models for formalizing multi-agent systems are described.
The difficulty with multi-agent systems is control and the necessary communi-
cation for control. If multi-agent systems are controlled with hierarchical communi-
cation then they do not scale well. Nature provides many examples of multi-agent
systems that scale very well without hierarchical control and communication, while
still effectively accomplishing global objectives. The techniques used to generate these
multi-agent systems are self organization and entangled hierarchies. Self organization
provides the control and communication takes place through entangled hierarchies.
To produce self organizing multi-agent swarms, search algorithms are necessary.
Stochastic, global search algorithms are the most general search algorithm. If
needed, they can be augmented with deterministic local search algorithms to improve
their effectiveness and efficiency. Along with the theory behind the search algorithms,
a number of algorithm packages are discussed. To evaluate the multi-agent swarms
that are produced by the search algorithm it is necessary to either simulate or emulate
the swarm’s network behavior.
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Both network and agent simulation packages are covered. Additionally, visual-
ization and testing packages are listed for analyzing the search results. The languages
for programming and scripting the entire SOMAS system are covered, along with
criteria for picking the appropriate language. The theory is used to create an archi-
tecture design in the next chapter. The packages are used in the following chapter to
explain how the SOMAS architecture is implemented.
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III. Problem Domain Considerations for Architectural
Design
3.1 Overview
The material covered in Chapter II lays the foundation for the network security
problem domain analysis and architectural design in this chapter. The design is the
basis for “a mobile, multi-agent system that uses self organization to create entangled
hierarchies...for accomplishing network based objectives” (see Section 1.2).
Figure 2: SOMAS architecture development process
The overall structure of the chapter is displayed in Figure 2. The general net-
work security problem domain is discussed in Section 3.2, where the structure of the
domain and the reward function are described. This structure necessitates a decou-
pling between global and local reward, and thus Section 3.3 explains the two levels to
the problem domain.
Once the problem domain is informally described, it is formally described as a
planning problem in Section 3.4, where it is further mapped to POMDP models. The
63
POMDP models allow the problem domain complexity to be determined, and due to
its complexity a global search algorithm is necessary.
The solution representation is discussed in Section 3.5 and the selection of a
multi-objective evolutionary algorithm for the global search is discussed in Section
3.6.
Finally, the elements of the SOMAS architecture are covered in Section 3.7.
3.2 Network Security Problem Domain
Table 5: Problem domain elements
SOMAS Agent Scenario Agent
< SensorsRegional, Rules, AcutatorsRegional > < SensorsGlobal, Rules, AcutatorsRegional >
Sensors Sensors
Real value vectors in limited range Depend on scenario
{(0 . . . 1), . . . , (0 . . . 1)}
Rules Rules
Modus Ponens Modus ponens
condition(sensors)→ actuator(region)
Actuator Actuators
Change agent’s region Change agent’s region
actuator(region)→ region′ : (region′ = region)
Network Environment
< Locations, Edges, Scenario >
The specifics of each part of the network environment
depends on the specific scenario, as in the case of
the scenario agents.
Locations
< Agents, SensorsGlobal, Rules, ActuatorsLocal >
Edges
< SensorsGlobal, Rules, ActuatorsLocal >
Scenario
< SensorsGlobal, Rules, ActuatorsGlobal >
Can observe and change any aspect of the domain model
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Table 6: Problem domain
Transition
Element States Action Functions
1 Agent (A) AS ≡ AP AA RS ×AA ×RS
2 Region (R) RS ≡ {V
′ : hops(V, V ′) <= 1} ∪ N/A N/A
{L : connects(L, V, V ′)}
∀v′, l ∈ RS : v
′, l ∈ NS
3 Container (C) CS ≡ {CP ∪A} CA CS ×CA ×CS
4 Link (L) LS ≡ LP LA LS × LA × LS
5 Network (N) NS ≡ {NP ∪ NA NS ×NA ×NS
{L : connects(L, V, V ′)
∧ active(V ) ∧ active(V ′)} ∪
{V : active(V )} ∪ A}
6 Scenario (S) SS ≡ {SP ∪N} SA SS × SA × SS
Global reward function : SS × Time→ [−∞ . . .∞]
Local reward function : AO → [−∞ . . .∞]
S subscript A state.
P subscript A parameter.
A subscript An action.
O subscript An observation, which only agents have.
The network of network security is a very general concept. While it can refer
to the standard wired network, it can also refer to wireless ad hoc networks as well
as logical networks that are instantiated in software. As such, the problem domain
is defined symbolically in such a way that it can be mapped to any such network.
It is important to define the problem domain symbolically in this way in order to
determine different general problem characteristics, such as runtime complexity, see
Section 3.4.4, or scenario dynamics, see Section 5.6.
To symbolically defined the problem domain, first the elements and their rela-
tions are identified in this section. Then, in Section 3.4, the elements are mapped to
formal models in order to produce complexity characteristics. The problem domain
elements are covered in Table 5.
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The problem domain is composed of two primary elements: agent (A) and en-
vironment (E), which in the case of this research is a computer network (N). The
objective in this problem domain is, in general, to maximize the control of the net-
work’s owner. This encompasses many different network metrics, ranging from the
high level metrics such as mission accomplishment, mid level metrics such as quality
of service, and low level metrics such as intrusion detection. For a fuller discussion,
see Section 2.2.5.
The important thing to note is that all metrics are subject to a human agent’s
will, and the agent’s goal may not be something that can be measured in regards
to the network. Thus, it may be mathematically impossible to represent to highest
network objective in terms of a quantifiable metric. Ultimately, it comes down to
human judgement. Consequently, solutions to the network security problem should
leave as much flexibility to human judgement as possible, as the SOMAS approach
does by allowing any goal to be defined for SOMAS that can be qualified in terms
of the elements in table 5. Thus, SOMAS is a form of intelligence augmentation, as
discussed in Section 2.5.8.
For the purposes of this research all hardware in the network is assumed to only
be controlled by software. Physically securing the network hardware is outside the
scope of a computer science solution. Additionally, the container model assumption
implies that only relevant software state information is accessible for reading and
writing. If all locations in the network are constantly connected, then the container
can be considered to encompass the whole network. However, in general, this is an
invalid assumption. Thus, containers are segmented according to the links connecting
hosts in a network. Containers are described in further detail in Section 2.3.5.
The network graph is composed of vertices (V ) and links/edges (L). The vertices
are equivalent to agent containers (C) for the purposes of this research. Table 6 further
symbolically details each problem domain element, and the following list explains each
symbol. Each state element is indexed with a time-stamp. Thus, the scenario state
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SS(t) consists of all scenario state elements with time-stamp t. To reduce notational
confusion, the (t) index is only used on the global scenario state SS.
1. An agent’s state consists of a set of parameters. Its actuators can affect its
region.
2. A region state is defined as the agent’s local container state, the state of neigh-
boring containers that are one hop away, and the connecting links. All containers
and links in the region state must also be in the network state.
3. A container’s state consists of a set of parameters and all the agents in the
container. Its actuators can affect only its own state.
4. A link’s state only consist of a set of parameters, and its actuators can only
affect its state.
5. A network state contains a set of parameters, all active nodes, and their con-
necting links. Network actuators can affect the whole network state.
6. The scenario state contains scenario parameters and the network state. The
scenario actuators can affect the whole scenario.
The objective for the scenario is described by the reward functions. The reward
can either be specified at the global or local level. The objective can also be consid-
ered the swarm’s behavior, since the swarm’s is meant to accomplish the objective.
However, behavior can also refer to the swarm’s ruleset, in which case a swarm’s be-
havior is not necessarily the same as the objective since the ruleset may not achieve
the objective. There are many objectives that the swarm can achieve, and a list is
proposed in Appendix F. The specific behaviors that are examined in this research
are:
• Unobtrusive network activity
• Self organization
• DDoS prevention
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• Avoiding occupied nodes
• Removing intruders from the network
• Competition between friendly and malicious agents
• Protecting the network information flows
The following is a simple example showing how the problem domain symbols are
used to define a behavior. Each objective is meant to be minimized. The behaviors
are further described and formalized in Section 5.5.
Vital Vertex Identification: The behavior is to identify the vital vertices in a
network. The vital vertices are the minimal set of vertices in a network that cause
the greatest network degradation when they are removed. The extent of network
degradation is measured by comparing the cumulative length of the shortest path
for all pairs of vertices and the number of disconnected vertices before and after the
vertices are removed.
This is almost the same as the metric of network degradation in [19]. The
difference lies in counting the number of disconnected vertices. The original metric
did not do this, and only has a single objective. Using a single objective raises the
problem of rating the cost of disconnected vertices. However, making the metric
produce a double objective measure eliminates the ambiguity.
Finding the vital vertices in a network is an NP-Hard problem [19]. The dif-
ficulty of the problem is increased by the fact that the problem information is only
partially observed, each agent only has a partial view of the whole network. Equations
(56-57) measure the network degradation. Equation (58) measures how concisely the
agents can identify the vital vertices.
∑
∀u∀v(shortestPath(u, v)↔ u, v ∈ C ∧ u 6= v) (24)
∑
∀u∀v(pathExists(u, v)↔ u, v ∈ C ∧ u 6= v) (25)
|ID| : ID ∈ C (26)
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Figure 3: Offline to online search
Where C is the graph’s vertex set, which is equivalent to the graph’s container
set. ID is the set of vertices identified as being vital vertices.
3.3 Offline and Online Swarm Generation
Since most real networks are subject to extensive and continuous change, espe-
cially when its security is being compromised through intrusion or attack, a swarm
that maintains a fixed ruleset will perform badly in the general case. To adapt to a
changing environment, a swarm needs to search for the best ruleset in a given envi-
ronment state. One way to do this is with reinforcement learning [88], which learns
a utility function. However, this assumes local access to a global reward, which may
not be possible.
According to the No Free Lunch Theorem [138], any two search algorithms are
going to be equivalent to each other across all possible fitness landscapes, and thus
no better than Monte Carlo sampling. This means learning work needs to be done
in order to guarantee the online search algorithm has better than random behavior
in the general case. Consequently, if there is an offline stochastic search at the global
level for the online search algorithm, then it is possible to mathematically guarantee
an online search algorithm that is better than or equivalent to all other online search
algorithms, in a given range, for all fitness landscapes.
As a result, there are two stages to the swarm’s lifecycle on the network: when
it is generated and when it is executed. These stages are shown by the two panes
in Figure 3. There are two problem representation (model) domains and two search
(algorithm) domains, respectively corresponding to the offline generation and online
runtime.
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As described in Section 2.4.1, the agent schema in [88] is equivalent to the
POMDP model. The DEC-POMDP and I-POMDP models are the most comprehen-
sive for characterizing multi-agent systems. The differing perspectives match the two
stages in the swarm’s lifecycle, thus they are chosen as being the most suitable for
deriving theoretical characteristics for the problem domain, such as problem complex-
ity. Due to the nature of the reward function in either case, a DEC-POMDP model is
used for the offline problem representation where the agents can be modelled as coop-
erative and an I-POMDP model is used for the online problem representation where
agents may be competitive. Both are additionally augmented to be F(*-POMDP)
models in the case where agents can be added and removed from the environment, or
the environment can change.
The reason why the agents in the online stage may be competitive is because
an agent only has direct access to its own observations. To access the observations
of other agents requires communication, and communication affects the global state,
which can affect the agents’ local rewards. Since the global process in a computation
environment can be Turing complete, an agent may be incapable of calculating the
global state from its observations. Therefore, is not always possible in the general
case for the agent to know how its local observations map to the current local rewards
of other agents. Consequently, agents may minimize the local rewards of each other
through maximizing their own local rewards, and thus compete.
As mentioned in Section 2.4 it is intractable to generate optimal or approximate
policies from these POMDP models in all but the simplest cases. Thus, since a
POMDP policy is a ruleset, rulesets are not restricted to POMDP policies, the solution
domain in section 3.5 is generalized to a ruleset.
3.4 Mapping Problem Domain to POMDP Models
The problem domain is a planning problem [88]. All scenario state transitions
only depend on the previous state, so the Markov assumption holds for this problem
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domain. Thus, transition functions only require the previous state, as shown in the
Transition Function column of Table 6. As discussed in the previous section, there
are two perspectives the multi-agent system can be viewed from: the global or local
perspective. From the global perspective, the viewer has access to the global state
and corresponding reward. However, from the local perspective, the viewer only has
access to the local state. Since the local state does not necessarily embed any global
information, it does not necessarily provide any global reward information. Thus,
from the local perspective agents may have to compete with each other to maximize
the swarm’s global reward. Since the two views imply two different kinds of reward
functions, two different representational models are necessary: the DEC-POMDP and
I-POMDP models.
3.4.1 DEC-POMDP Model. [22]
The DEC-POMDP model is a POMDP model for multiple agents that can
interact with the same environment and share the same global reward function. This
model represents a global perspective of the multi agent system, since only from the
global perspective can the group reward be known. The use of the model here does
not exactly match that of [22] since only the elements necessary to derive the problem
domain complexity are used.
ΨDEC :< S,A, T,Ω, O,R > (27)
• S consists of all scenario states PS ∈ P . This includes the state of each vertex
(V ) and link (L), extra scenario info, etc.
• A is a set of sets, where each set is drawn from NA, the universe of possible
agent actions including the null action. Each set consists of possible aggregate
actions of agents in the swarm. It is defined according to formula (28), which
shows every action set is the same size and every agent accomplishes exactly
one action. ai is the action of agent i. n is the number of agents in the swarm.
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{β}α means the closure of alphabet β, where all strings in β are of length α.
∀A[A ∈ A : A ∈ {NA}
n ∧ ∀ai, aj ∈ A{i 6= j}] (28)
Each action in NA is composed of agent actuators of the form δ(ΦS, γ) where
δ is a function with possibly irreversible side effects, ΦS is a set of elements
∀φS{φS ∈ ΦS : φS ∈ pS}, and γ is a set of parameters. The scenario can have
rules as well, but these are implied in the state transition and do not need to
be explicit in NA.
• T maps state/action set pairs to states, according to formula (29).
T : S ×A→ S (29)
• Ω is a set of observation sets, defined similarly to A, detailed in formula (30).
∀Ω[Ω ∈ Ω : Ω ∈ {NΩ}
n ∧ ∀ωi, ωj ∈ Ω{i 6= j}] (30)
• O maps T element/observation set pairs to probabilities, according to formula
(31). An element fe of function f is pair (x, y) : f(x)→ y.
O : TE ×Ω→ (0 . . . 1) (31)
• R is the global reward, identical for every agent since it is global, accruing a
value in R for each element of T , detailed in formula (32).
R : TE → [−∞ . . .∞] (32)
As an example of how this model can be used, consider the scenario where SO-
MAS agents have to identify and eliminate malicious agents from a network. The
environment states, observations, and actions are straightforward. A state transition
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in the T function is, for example, a SOMAS agent changing its location. An obser-
vation in the O function is when the SOMAS agent at a location runs an intrusion
sensor on the location. The state (there is a malicious agent at the location) and
the scan action have a probability that the SOMAS agent will actually identify the
presence of the malicious agent. Finally, an example of an element of the R function
is when the malicious agent has been located, the SOMAS agent successfully deletes
the malicious agent.
3.4.2 I-POMDP Model . [40] Unlike in the case of SOMAS generation with
global information, SOMAS generation with local information cannot make use of a
group reward, since the agents in the swarm cannot necessarily have a global view
of the swarm and environment state. Consequently, each agent has a local reward.
Additionally, since observations are limited and local competition can maximize the
global reward, agents cannot completely trust each other. Thus, they need to be able
to examine each other, have beliefs about each other, and have local reward functions.
These capabilities are key to the I-POMDP model. The use of the model here does
not exactly match that of [40] since only the elements necessary to derive the problem
domain complexity are used.
ΨI :< ISi, A, Ti,Ωi, Oi, Ri > (33)
• ISi pairs environment states with agent tuples, where, as opposed to the DEC-
POMDP model, {S ′ : A\∅, S}, there is no agent element in the state tuple. The
notation {α\β,Γ} in the previous formula means to replace literal α with literal
β in string Γ. The set of agent tuples includes all agents except for agent i.
Thus, a pair in ISi follows the schema (s
′, ψI), where ψI is a set of instances of
agent schemas with |ψI| = n− 1 and n is the number of unique agents in ΨI .
• A is a non empty set in NA, {A : A 6= ∅ ∧ A ∈ NA}.
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• Ti describes the standard POMDP transition function for agent i, as detailed
in formula (34).
Ti : ISi × A→ ISi (34)
• Ωi is agent i’s observation of its environment, which technically can include di-
rect observation of other agents’ states, but is usually not allowed. However, this
is quite possible at least amongst SOMAS agents that share the same container,
so an observation can indeed include the direct state of other agents.
• Oi, similar to the DEC-POMDP, maps pairs of Ti elements and observations to
probabilities, as detailed in formula (35).
O : TiE ×Ω→ (0 . . . 1) (35)
• Ri, unlike its corollary in the DEC-POMDP, is an agent specific reward, which
may or may not cooperate with that of an arbitrary agent j. This is due to
the fact that the optimization of the global reward may require competition
amongst swarm agents. The function is detailed in formula (36).
Ri : TiE → [−∞ . . .∞] (36)
3.4.3 F(*-POMDP) Model. Both the DEC-POMDP and I-POMDP models
have an important limitation in that they are static and finite. Thus, while they can
represent a decreasing number of agents, they cannot represent a limitless increase in
agents. The models also cannot represent agents that can change their own or other
agents policies. In order to get past these obstacles, it is necessary to introduce a
transition function between POMDP models. This transition function is not found in
the literature, but it allows the POMDP models to adapt to changes in environment.
The F(*-POMDP) notation is used because it represents that the augmentation is a
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function mapping POMDP models to POMDP models, which are generally referred
to with the asterisk.
For another demonstration of the utility of this POMDP representation in dif-
ferent simulation and testing domain, please see appendix G where the QuERIES
model is examined and the applicability of the F(*-POMDP) model is recommended.
T ′ is the model transition function described in section 2.4.1, which maps mod-
el/action set pairs to models. The notation {α\β,Γ} works as described in Section
3.4.2.
{T\T ′, ∗POMDP}|T ′ : ∗POMDP × S×A→ ∗POMDP (37)
T ′ is necessary for both the DEC-POMDP and I-POMDP models of SOMAS
production since agents are added and removed from the environment in both cases.
3.4.4 Complexity of Deriving Model Policies. From the POMDP model
complexity results in section 2.4 it is clear that even though the DEC-POMDP and
I-POMDP formalizations capture the SOMAS problem domain, it is impractical at
this stage of the cutting edge to generate the SOMAS policies from either the DEC-
POMDP or I-POMDP models. Since T ′ is potentially Turing complete, i.e. finite state
machine with 2 pushdown stores, it is susceptible to the halting problem. Therefore,
it is logically impossible to solve F(*-POMDP) models in the general case algorith-
mically. However, this does not rule out the possibility that the models can generally
be solved mathematically, i.e. with proofs. If a policy solution is generated from the
F(*-POMDP) model, it becomes a part of the model since agents can manipulate the
policies of agents, so an infinite horizon policy has to be a fixed point function.
As can be seen in the case of each model, while they succintly capture the the-
oretical aspects of each stage of SOMAS production, optimal or approximate policies
cannot be derived from the models in general in a tractable manner. This means a
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different representation and policy generation algorithm is required for the solution
domain.
3.5 Solution Domain
A solution consists of a behavior that accomplishes a certain objective. The
behavior depends on the agent rulesets (R) and the environment. A behavior from
the global perspective is a state/action tuple to probability mapping function, formula
(38). A behavior from the agent perspective is a rule (r) to probability mapping
function, formula (39). An objective is an environment tuple set to reward mapping
function, formula (40). ℘(Ω) is the powerset of Ω.
Bg : S × A→ (0 . . . 1) (38)
Bl : r → (0 . . . 1) (39)
R : ℘(S)→ [−∞ . . .∞] (40)
The intent is to find a solution S given an initial definition of self organized
behavior that maximizes the reward, and this can be done at either the global or
local level, (see formula (41)). Thus, a solution consists of a set of rulesets, out of all
possible rulesets, that maximizes the reward.
∑
f ◦ g is the sum of the range of f ◦g.
∀b1∀b2{b1, b2 ∈ B[gl] :
∑
b1 ◦ R ≥
∑
b2 ◦ R → b1 ∈ S} (41)
Where a rule is sequence of operators (δ) and operands (γ). Rulesets (R) are
defined according to formula (42).
∀r∃δ∃γ{r ∈ R : δ ∈ r ∧ γ ∈ r} (42)
If the rules and the sequence of operators in the rules of a ruleset are fixed, then
finding the solution at the local level is detailed in equation (43), which states that
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a solution is a fixed size set of operands. A fixed ruleset is chosen in order to reduce
the state space complexity and based on the assumption that the required rulesets
are accessible to the SOMAS creator.
argminγ∈bR(
∑
bR ◦ R) (43)
Where bR is the behavior formed by ruleset (R). In this case, the argmin
function is equivalent to deriving the policy for a POMDP model, since the set of
possible actions is fixed.
3.6 Algorithm Domain
To develop a good search algorithm, first it is important to characterize the best
type of search algorithm to use. Table 7 shows a way of subdividing search algorithm
types so as to make an appropriate algorithm selection based on what is known or not
known about the problem domain. When the fitness landscape is not well known an
analysis of the problem and solution can give a general rule of thumb for additional
fine tuning of algorithm selection.
Once the algorithm is selected, the objective space needs to be defined. Gener-
ally, the objective space can either be single or multi-objective. While single objective
spaces have been extensively explored, multi-objective problems are less well known
in computer science domains, though they are well studied in the field of operations
research and other engineering disciplines.
3.6.1 General Algorithm. Finding optimal policies for either the DEC-
POMDP or I-POMDP models is intractable because the problem is not greedy in
structure such that an optimal solution can be built from optimal subsolutions [98]
and the search landscape is not known. The search landscape is not known since the
POMDP model being used is generally unsolvable, see Section 3.4.3. Therefore, a
global solution space search is required as shown by table 7.
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Algorithm 1 Deterministic global solution search
Spi ← {init()};
Sfo [0]← {};
t := 0;
Ensure: ∀sp{sp ∈ S[t]→ sp ∈ Spi }
Ensure: ∀sf{sf ∈ Sf [t]→ sf ∈ S[t] ∧ F(sf )}
Ensure: ∀sf{sf ∈ Sfo [t]→ s
f ∈ Sf [t] ∧ C(sf ,Sfo [t− 1])}
while O(Sfo [t], t) 6= TRUE do
t := t+ 1;
S[t] := generate(Spi ,S[0. . . t− 1])
Sf [t] := feasible(S[t])
Sfo [t] := select(S
f [t],Sfo [0. . . t− 1])
end while
Algorithm 2 Stochastic global solution search
Spi ← {init()};
Sfo [0]← {};
t := 0;
Ensure: ∀sp{sp ∈ S[t]→ sp ∈ Spi }
Ensure: ∀sf{sf ∈ Sf [t]→ sf ∈ S[t] ∧ F(sf )}
Ensure: ∀sf{sf ∈ Sfo [t]→ s
f ∈ Sf [t] ∧ C(sf ,Sfo [t− 1])}
while O(Sfo [t], t) 6= TRUE do
t := t+ 1;
S[t] := generate(Spi )
Sf [t] := feasible(S[t])
Sfo [t] := select(S
f [t])
end while
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Table 7: Search algorithm types
Known Unknown
Local Partial Partial
Deterministic Stochastic
(Depth First) (Random Walk)
Global Full Full
Deterministic Stochastic
(Breadth First) (Monte Carlo Sampling)
Algorithm 1 is the general format of global solution space search algorithms. A
superscript p means a partial solution and a superscript f means a feasible solution.
Feasible solutions encompass complete solutions, since a solution must be complete
in order to be feasible. A subscript i signifies the input set and a subscript o signifies
the output set. S is a set of solutions, and these can be either partial or feasible. O
is the objective, which is a function of both the output solution set and the current
iteration count. F is the feasibility function, which ensures the solution is feasible.
Finally, C is a choice function that selects the best solutions to be added to the output
set from the current set of feasible solutions.
Both generate and select are also functions of their respective sets’ pasts in order
to avoid cycles in the search for solutions. However, if a stochastic search algorithm is
used, then cycle detection is unnecessary, and the search algorithm can be simplified
To algorithm 2. As long as a stochastic search can always sample the correct portion
of the solution space at the correct time to fulfill the objective function, then the
algorithm is guaranteed to halt [88].
This result holds for all finite search graphs, and infinite planar search graphs.
However, if the graph is non planar, then the guarantee no longer holds [58]. While
the solution search space is not a planar graph, the network goal states search space
can be, if the network graph is finite or planar. Since all real world networks are finite,
then any network goal state search that incorporates a random walk is guaranteed to
eventually find the goal state. However, while halting is guaranteed, efficiency is not.
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Table 8: Algorithms mapped to fitness landscape characteristics
Hilly Craggy
Smooth Tabu search Evolutionary strategies
Rough Simulated annealing Evolutionary algorithm
Therefore, it is important to also include memory and/or a heuristic in the search
algorithm.
The field of metaheuristics provides numerous general approximation search
techniques, such as simulated annealing, Tabu search, evolutionary algorithms, and
ant colonies [82]. Evolutionary algorithms (EA) are most suited for the SOMAS
problem domain because they search the global solution space and an effective swarm
needs to incorporate multiple kinds of behaviors (building blocks).
Table 8 shows the general mapping of global search algorithm types to landscape
characteristics. See Section 2.6.1 for a discussion of the different kinds of character-
istics. Systems with positive feedback loops have the potential to become chaotic and
unstable. Feedback is one of the main characteristics of self organization, see Section
2.5.5. Consequently, the SOMAS rulesets can have chaotic effects. This means mi-
nor changes in the rule parameters can have great effects, and major changes in the
rule parameters can have small effects. So, the slopes to the optima are very rough.
As discussed in Section 1.5, the potential for instability is a serious concern when
considering whether to use SOMAS in a given problem domain.
Depending on the complexity of the scenario and the corresponding goal, the
best SOMAS behavior may be composed of many sub-behaviors. Sub-behaviors imply
agent rulesets that are significantly different from each other. But sub-behaviors
contribute to the reward of the overall behavior to different degrees. This means a
complex problem usually has a very mountainous search landscape.
Based on this analysis of the SOMAS search landscape, Table 3 states simulated
annealing and evolutionary algorithms are the most suitable global search algorithms
for the SOMAS problem domain. Since hilly landscapes are a subgroup of moun-
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tainous landscapes, evolutionary algorithms can cover a wider variety of landscapes
than simulated annealing. So, an evolutionary algorithm [16] is selected for the search
algorithm. As discussed in Subsection 3.6.4 the objective space is multi-objective. So,
the evolutionary algorithm must be a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm.
3.6.2 Genotype. Due to the design decision in section 3.5 to fix the operators
in the rule set, the solution consists of a vector of operands. Since the number of
operands each operator requires is fixed, and the number of operators is fixed, the
size of the operand vector is also fixed. The design decision for the search algorithm is
to use evolutionary algorithms (EA) for both the off and online SOMAS production.
As discussed in [107], there are numerous EA solution representation techniques.
The binary string and real value vector options are the most relevant. Since all repre-
sentations are encoded as binary strings at the machine code level, the binary string
representation is more general and encompasses the real value vector representation.
Additionally, since the evolutionary algorithm is considered the most suitable for the
fitness Landscape 3.6.1, and traditionally it uses a binary string representation for its
solutions, the binary string is a good choice for the solution representation.
There are a number of issues involved with using a binary string representation.
First, it is important that the hamming distance between genotypes is related to
the distance between phenotypes. This ensures that children are related to their
parents. If this were not the case, then the operators would violate the requirement
for variation operators in formula (46), since the solution generated by the variation
based on a set of parents would be equivalent to the solution generated given an
arbitrary sample from the solution space. Such a result would make the search no
better than a Monte Carlo sampling of the solution space. The Hamming distance
problem can be solved, to a degree, by using a gray coding [15]. Gray coding takes a
standard binary encoding of some value and, using a reversible function, transforms
it so if any arbitrary bit is changed, the new value only differs from the old value by
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1. It is an O(n) operation, where n is the length of the bit string, so gray coding does
not add significant overhead to the algorithm.
Second, the use of genetic operators means the schema theorem is applicable.
Since the distance between bits in a binary string schema affects the likelihood the
schema can be disrupted by variation, the epsistasis of good blocks is a concern. This
problem can be dealt with in a number of ways. At the representation level, a messy
representation can be used, where alleles in the chromosome no longer are placed in
positions (though they retain positional information), eliminating the problem of bits
being inserted or removed from schema. At the operator level, this problem mainly
occurs when multipoint crossover is used, since all bits between the crossover points
are potentially changed. Consequently, if uniform crossover is used instead of using
multipoint crossover, then this is equivalent to using a messy representation, since the
position of bits only matters insofar as the position dictates the solution’s phenotype.
Often it is the case that the genotype does not map to a feasible phenotype.
This is true for the SOMAS problem domain as well. There are a couple of ways of
dealing with infeasible solutions. Perhaps the simplest is to merely discard the solu-
tion. However, even infeasible solutions can contain good building blocks. Another
technique is to penalize the objective function. The problem with this technique is
that perhaps the building block is very good. If so, then the building block may still
not be selected since its objective value has been decreased. A good solution to these
problems is to add feasibility as an objective. Then, if the building block contributes
to good objective values, this is fully represented in the objective space. The feasi-
bility metric ensures that even with good building blocks the infeasible chromosome
will still be penalized in relation to all feasible chromosomes.
3.6.3 Phenotype. In section 3.5 it is stated that a solution consists of a fixed
size set of operands. Since the genotype is of a fixed size, that means the operands
are of a finite fidelity. In order to make the chromosome as flexible as possible, it
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Figure 4: Genotype to phenotype conversion
is important to make the phenotype values capable of being used in any operand
position.
Consequently, the genes all map to a floating point value in the range (0 . . . 1),
as shown in Figure 4. Thus, the operators and operands are loosely coupled and the
operands are invariant with regard to changes in the chromosome. For instance, the
gene size can be increased and the meaning of the phenotype remains the same tothe
operators, only the fidelity is increased. The operators, in turn, can convert the value
to the necessary form, such as a negative number or scaled between (0 . . .∞] using
an asymptotic scaling function.
3.6.4 Objective Space. Once the phenotype is generated, the resultant
swarm behavior is evaluated in the simulator. Often, multiple metrics are necessary
to characterize a desired behavior. This makes the problem a multi-objective problem
(MOP).
There is often a tradeoff between objectives; it is usually impossible to find a
single solution that minimizes each objective. Such problems are common in the field
of operations research and engineering. In operations research, there are two main
techniques for dealing with multi-objective optimization. The objectives are either
reduced to a single objective, augmented, or solutions are compared based on their
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Pareto dominance [36]. Since the latter technique is more general, it is used to rank
the solutions into Pareto equivalent sets, as detailed in equation (44).
PFTRUE = ∀f(argmin
P
s∈S(f(s)) : f ∈ F) (44)
The best set is called the PFTRUE, since it is the Pareto dominant set out
of all the solutions, also known as the Pareto front. In the case of a search for an
approximate solution the solution set is PFKNOWN since it is the known best set, but
not necessarily the optimal set. argminP is an argmin function that uses a Pareto
dominance ranking metric to find the Pareto dominant set of solutions.
Multiple objectives in MOPs do not generally map in a regular pattern to the
decision space. Additionally, the curse of dimensionality implies the objective vector
mean lies in a radius around the vector composed of the mean of each objective, and
the radius increases with the number of objectives [23]. Therefore, it is useful for a
MOEA to be more exploratory as the number of objectives increase. At the same
time, as the algorithm nears the PFTRUE it must become more exploitative in order
to actually reach the PFTRUE, or get significantly close.
3.7 SOMAS Architecture
3.7.1 SOMAS Algorithm Design. As shown in Figure 6, there are three
primary sections to the SOMAS production system, per the standard functions in a
evolutionary algorithm [16]. While there are four standard functions in an EA, the
figure only contains three since the recombination and mutation functions are grouped
into the more general variation function. The evaluator gives each chromosome an
objective value set (O : O 6= ∅). |O| > 1 in the case of multi-objective evolution, as
is generally true in SOMAS production. The objectives are derived according to an
objective view of the global behavior reward, but they can be transformed in order to
affect the search. For example, proportional selection [16] scales the objective values
so when a plateau is reached selection is still highly elitist.
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Figure 5: SOMAS evolution concept
In the case of the SOMAS production system, the objective values are obtained
from a set of metrics that measure the simulation. The selector makes use of an order-
ing metric to select the fittest solutions for use in generating new solutions. Selection
is straightforward if only single objective selection is required. Because fitness values
are usually numeric, then a simple ordering metric is numerical comparison. If the
fitness values are non numeric, then other metrics can be used, such as lexicographic
comparison [16].
Comparison is more complex in the case of multi-objective problems, as de-
scribed in Section 3.6.4. Numerous algorithms have been developed to deal with
multi-objective selection. Due to the loose coupling inherent in the framework de-
sign, any selection algorithm can be placed in the selection section without affecting
the other sections.
The variator takes the solutions selected by the chromosome and uses a set
of variation operators on the solutions to generate a new set for evaluation. The
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Figure 6: SOMAS MOEA design
variation operators must at least follow the criteria symbolized by general formulæ
(45, 46). These formulæ state that the generated solution set S ′ cannot be a subset
of S, and the probability of generating the set S ′ given S is greater than generating
S ′ given an arbitrary solution sample S.
S
V
→ S ′ : P (S 6⊃ S ′) > 0 (45)
P (S ′|S) > P (S ′|S) (46)
Where S is a set of solutions. V is the set of variation operators and
V
→ means
the use of V to create a new set of solutions. Finally, S is an arbitrary solution
set drawn from the solution space NS. Basically, these equations specify that the
variator must contribute to the search. They present a unambiguous formulation of
the necessary and sufficient conditions the variator must meet.
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Figure 7: Cluster rule
3.7.2 Agent. Each agent has a set of sensors and rules. There are a set
of actuators, but only the rules can access these. See Table 9. Additionally, each
agent has a memory, which it can use to store information about itself, such as its
fitness value, and information used by its actuators, such as parameter values and
chromosomes for creating new swarm agents.
When the simulator executes an agent, it first executes all its sensors. This sets
the values in all the sensor variables used by the rules and any parameter variables
necessary for the actuators, signified by “state” in the table. Then, each rule is
executed, and the rule’s execution is mediated by the weights, as shown in figure 5.
There two main ways the weights can be used to execute the rules, as used in machine
learning [23]:
• clustering, see Figure 7
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Figure 8: Classification rule
• classification, see Figure 8
The cluster rule is formalized by equation (47). The classification rule is for-
malized by equation (48). Only the classification rule is used in this research.
∆ =
⋃
δ
∃r ∈ R : distance( ~weightsr, ~parameterssensors)→ δ (47)
∆ =
⋃
δ
∃r ∈ R : mean( ~weightsr.× ~parameterssensors)→ δ (48)
If a rule is fired, it executes its actuators. The actuators are the only aspect
of the agent that can affect the agent’s environment as well as its state. The sensors
and rules can only affect the parts of the agent’s state that deals with the decision
process, which is composed of sensor variables, weights, and actuator parameters.
3.7.3 Location. Like the agents, a location has both a sensor and a rule set.
There are two main differences between agents and locations. First, only locations
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hold agents. Locations do not hold locations, agents do not hold agents, and agents
do not hold locations. Second, agents’ sensors are restricted to their location and
their location’s neighbors, and the other agents at these locations. Other than that,
a location’s sensor and rule set is very general, in order to allow for the widest range
of possible scenarios. An example of a location rule is fitness update based on fitness
of local agents.
3.7.4 Metrics. There are two primary types of metrics, runtime metrics
and metrics that are evaluated once the simulation is complete. Metrics can either
evaluate the whole scenario, or be responsible for evaluating only a section. Once the
simulation is complete and all metrics have been evaluated, the values are placed in
the objective variables, which are returned to the variator, which in turn gives them
to the selector. See figure 5.
3.7.5 Scenario Actuators. The scenario actuators are meant for two pur-
poses: global scenario actuators and general housekeeping. An example of the former
is updating the graph model as the locations are changed. For instance, if a location is
deactivated, the graph update actuator removes any edges connecting to the location
so agents do not visit an invalid location. An example of a housekeeping actuator is
a memory monitor, which ensures the agents do not cause a memory overflow.
3.8 Summary
The problem domain is formalized into a planning problem. To create an adap-
tive swarm, both global and local fitness functions are needed. The swarms with
global and local fitness functions are represented with DEC-POMDP and I-POMDP
models respectively. The inability of these models to represent arbitrary changes in
the swarm and environment is discussed, and a new, general model augmentation
F(*-POMDP) is introduced that allows the models to represent the mentioned ar-
bitrary changes, as required by the SOMAS problem domain. With the assumption
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that the operators in the ruleset are fixed, the solution domain is simplified to the
generation of the correct operands for the operators. Since it is intractable to derive
solution policies from the augmented POMDP models with a local search algorithm,
approximate global search algorithms are investigated.
Due to fitness landscape analysis, an evolutionary algorithm is considered best
suited to generate swarms. The generation of the operands requires an architecture
that can search for and evaluate the behaviors generated by the optimal or an optimum
set of operands. Consequently, the architecture design is discussed.
The architecture is composed of two parts, corresponding to the two perspec-
tives: global and local observations of environment state and reward. Finally, the
algorithm domain is tied into the SOMAS architecture. The implementation of the
architecture, and how it is tied into a comprehensive testing system, is discussed in
the following chapter.
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IV. Realization of SOMAS Architecture
4.1 Overview
With the high level design defined in Section III, the low level implementation
details are developed. The general design pattern and method for developing the
software architecture is covered in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 discusses the software
packages available for use in implementation. The search algorithms for the SOMAS
domain are discussed in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 describes how the simulation for
evaluating the SOMAS agents in the network environment, described in Sections 4.6
and 4.7 respectively, is implemented. Finally, Section 4.8 explains the difficulties and
ease of transitioning the simulation to a real world environment.
4.2 Software Development Methodology
The primary programming paradigm used for the SOMAS architecture is ob-
ject oriented programming. This method of programming is summarized by a set of
key attributes: encapsulation, loose coupling, and polymorphism. Object oriented
design is used to reduce code redundancy, simplify programming, and allow for easy
architecture extension. Following and generalizing these three design principles, the
properties design pattern is used for the SOMAS architecture, see Section E.
The main distinctions between the properties design pattern and object oriented
design is that the properties design pattern has full graph inheritance, and the classes
can be defined during runtime. These two attributes make the properties design
pattern more general than standard object oriented design, and allows the following
design patterns to be used.
4.2.1 Shared Object Coupling with Access Mediation. The properties design
pattern allows the objects to be instantiated so they are loosely coupled. However,
the scenario generatior couples many of the components by causing them to share
a common object. While this does couple the components in one way, it is not the
same as tight coupling, since components that share the same object do not need
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to know anything about each others’ internals. Instead, they communicate using a
shared variable.
The scenario generator is the only component that directly accesses the inter-
nals of objects in order to set their parameters. In this sense, the scenario generator
is termed an “Access Mediator” since once it has set the parameters on each compo-
nent correctly, each component does not need to be aware of any other components.
Normally, each component at least needs to know about the interface offered by a com-
ponent it needs to interact with. Thus, access mediation provides an even lower level
of coupling, “shared object coupling,” than discussed in traditional object oriented
software engineering.
4.2.2 Formal Modelling. Using lisp, it is possible to design a simple domain
specific language (DSL) that completely details the property interrelationship between
objects, which is called a schema. The simplified syntax allows the schema to be
automatically verified. The essential conditions that must be verified are that all get
operations on a variable are chronologically precceeded by a set operation, and that
all set operations are precceeded by variable declaration. A property is essentially a
label for a variable within a certain context. Consequently, variables can have multiple
labels within multiple contexts.
The variables are labelled during the definition of a context, which is specified
with the schema DSL. Additionally, the DSL specifies when the get and set operations
are performed on a variable. To verify the essential condition the labels for a specific
variable must be connected together to ensure there is an unbroken chain between
the get and set operations.
Due to the fact that a variable can be contained in multiple contexts, and the
definition of these contexts can be nested within each other, connecting up the labels
can be a somewhat tricky process that requires both back and forward tracking. For
instance, a variable’s label series can be backtracked from a get to the original variable
declaration. However, the actual set operation might take place within a context that
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is defined between the get and declaration. Consequently, once the backtrack has
identified the original variable, a forward track is necessary to find the set operation
in the nested context.
4.3 Package Selection
The needs that dictate package selection from the many possibilities covered in
Section II are:
• Availability
• Ease of use
• Extensibility
• Efficiency
• Effectiveness
• Language
• Target OS
• Parallel/grid computing capabilities
• Maturity
• User community
All the following packages were selected with these criteria in mind. Not all
criteria are necessarily met by the packages. For instance, many are not made for a
parallel/grid environment, though they often can be adapted. But, as many criteria
as possible are met by the following packages.
4.3.1 Simulation and Visualization. Since MASON is both written in Java
and meets many of the requirements of the SOMAS framework, as well as being
purpose built for multi agent simulation, is it the chosen simulation and visualization
package. MASON is combined with JUNG to ensure the network visualization is
93
nicely laid out. JGraphT is used in MASON for generating the random graphs used
in the simulations, and for executing different graph algorithms, such as shortest path
and max flow calculations. CERN’s high performance mathematical library, Colt,
is used in a couple areas of the SOMAS framework where probability distribution
functions are required for random sampling. Weka’s clustering capabilities are used
to perform clustering in the self organization metric.
4.3.2 Evolutionary Algorithm. The PISA framework is chosen because it
provides both a rigorous multi-objective algorithm testing environment, and many
appropriate search algorithms. Even though the PISA framework [24] does not pro-
vide the general functions to implement particular variator algorithms, the sample
algorithms on the PISA site are easily customized for the SOMAS problem domain.
During initial development, customization of an existing algorithm is the most effi-
cient and effective way to generate a working algorithm, compared with creating a
new algorithm from scratch, so it is chosen for creating the SOMAS variator.
4.4 Search Algorithms
4.4.1 MOEA. See Section 3.6 for the discussion about the algorithms used
in the SOMAS architecture and multi-objective optimization. A MOEA in the PISA
framework is composed of two pieces: the variator and the selector [24]. The vari-
ator is responsible for the creation of chromosomes and their evaluation, and the
selector selects the chromosomes to be used as parents for the next generation, as
shown in Figure 5. Currently, the nondominated sorting genetic algorithm 2 (NSGA2)
and strength pareto evolutionary algorithm (SPEA2) are the de facto selection algo-
rithms for multi-objective evolutionary algorithms, and each has its advantage over
the other. NSGA2 converges faster to the PFTRUE than SPEA2, but SPEA2 explores
the PFTRUE to a greater degree [69]. Since the curse of dimensionality requires a
search algorithm to be more exploratory as the number of objectives increases, in-
creased exploitation is still required in order to find a PFKNOWN significantly close
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to the PFTRUE. The indicator based evolutionary algorithm (IBEA) [142] combines
the exploitation of NSGA2 and exploration of SPEA2 by using a quality metric, such
as the epsilon or hypervolume metric, and is used for selection in the thesis.
4.4.2 Operators and Parameter Selection For MOEA. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3.6.1, the fitness landscape of the SOMAS solution domain is mountainous and
rough. This means there are many local optima varying greatly in height, and the
slopes to the optima are not smooth.
The implemented mutation operator is uniform mutation: it looks at each bit
in the chromosome and flips it according to a probability. Since multiple objectives
in MOPs do not generally map in a regular pattern to the decision space, it is useful
for the MOEA to be highly exploratory. For this reason the mutation probabilities
are higher than in single objective GAs. Additionally, the large number of local
optima with a large variance in fitness also require the search to be highly exploratory.
Consequently, the probability of mutation is set to 1.0 and the probability that a
particular allele is mutated is set to 0.1. The likelihood that at least one allele is
mutated is 1 − 0.9α, where α is the number of alleles in the chromosome. Since
mutation in a GA is traditionally set to a very low value, such as around 0.01, this
parameter setting is comparatively very high for a chromosome of significant length.
The crossover probability is low in regard to normal GA settings, due to the
characteristic of MOPs where the good building blocks tend to have high epistasis and
occur rarely [36]. The crossover operator is a uniform crossover to avoid the difficulties
with high epistasis, as discussed in Section 3.6.2, where the longer a building block
is the more likely it will be disrupted. Additionally, the likelihood of crossover is
significantly smaller than traditionally used so as to avoid premature exploitation.
The probability the crossover operator is used is set to 1.0 and the probability of
crossover is 0.1 for each allele. The likelihood at least one allele is crossed over is the
same as the likelihood of at least one allele mutation, which is 1 − 0.9α, where α is
the number of alleles in the chromosome.. Traditional GAs tend to use multi point
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crossover, instead of uniform crossover. So, while the likelihood of using the crossover
operator is very high, the likelihood that the same number of alleles is crossed over
as in a traditional GA is quite low.
4.4.3 Chromosome Evaluation. For the purposes of this investigation, the
variator section of the PISA MOEA framework is decomposed even further between
the variation and evaluation. Evaluation is turned into an interface, allowing any
evaluation object to be used that can translate the chromosome representation used
by the variator. A chromosome generates a specific behavior depending on the scenario
it is evaluated within. However, its general behavior is not restricted to a particular
scenario.
For example, if the chromosome is evaluated across multiple scenarios, then it
has an objective set for each scenario, as well as different kinds of meta-scenario objec-
tives, such as robustness or stability or survivability. This is because the chromosome
represents weights and parameter for the same set of sensors, rules, and actuators
across all scenarios.
It is possible that there are general settings for these agent elements that are
more effective and efficient than any other setting, for a specific set of scenarios. Of
course, according to the No Free Lunch theorem (NFLT) for optimization [139], it is
unlikely that there is a particular most-fit chromosome across all scenarios. But, it is
not an impossibility, since the total set of scenarios is not equivalent to the total set
of fitness functions that can evaluate the chromosome, and when the fitness function
domain is restricted the NFLT does not always hold [59].
Additionally, certain implementation concerns come into play depending on the
number of scenarios and the number of objectives per scenario. Since the scenarios
are randomized, two runs do not necessarily give the same objective values. Conse-
quently, the chromosome has to be evaluated over multiple runs on the same scenario,
with an overall statistic (such as sample mean or sample variance) representing the
chromosome’s fitness, or all objectives from all runs are included in the objective
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space. The former is simpler, but the latter is more accurate since no information
is lost. However, as the number of objectives increases, the runtime of the selection
algorithm increases. Depending on the algorithm used, the overhead may climb ex-
ponentially. If it does, then it is necessary to use dimensional reduction to speed up
evaluation, approximate ranking, or reduce the population sizes [36]. Thus, to make
the objective space manageable, a statistic of the runs is used for the objective space,
instead of all objective values for all runs.
4.4.4 Single Scenario Evaluation. The swarm behaviors are evaluated di-
rectly in a scenario that simulates the setting for the swarm behavior. A swarm that
is meant to stop a network attack is evaluated in a network attack scenario. A swarm
that is meant to find the vital elements of a network is evaluated in a vital element
identification scenario.
The objective values are calculated according to metrics that measure the per-
formance of the swarm according to the mission objectives. For instance, in the
Information War scenario, the amount of information on the network that is pro-
tected, the number of nodes that still remain, and the number of malicious agents
eliminated all contribute to defining the optimal behavior of a defensive swarm.
4.4.5 Multi Scenario Evaluation. Some agent behaviors can be very com-
plex, and good building blocks are consequently far apart and hard to construct.
Consequently, it may be beneficial to use simpler behaviors as stepping stones to help
the chromosome evolve towards the goal behavior. This concept is very simple to im-
plement in a MOEA. All it means is that more objectives are added to the objective
space and multiple simulations are used to evaluate the chromosome. The results are
then averaged across the different runs as in the case with a single simulation.
4.4.6 Self Organization. The concept behind the self organization formula is
to quantify the amount of information needed to predict the future. This information
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is the log2 of the number of causal states there are in a history. A causal state is a
set of pasts that have the same future configuration [117].
While it is possible to use the complete information available in the system
to quantify the predictive information, this can be very complex, and perhaps not
necessary to get a useful metric. Consequently, the use of statistics is considered.
The statistic for prediction can either be local or global. A local statistic is good for
fine grained analysis, which is preferable for visualizing the self organization taking
place on the network.
The downside of a local statistic is complexity. Since all potential influences for
the extent of the measured past and future must be taken into account, the number of
considered nodes grows exponentially as the length of measured time increases. Con-
sequently, a global statistic that summarizes the information for the whole network
is sufficient.
Where a property can be specified by a statically sized set of values the actual set
is used, such as the fitness value for each network node since the number of network
nodes does not change. Otherwise, where the set changes, such as the parameter
values for each agent in a F(*-POMDP) swarm that is on a particular network node,
a statistic is necessary. The statistic used in this case is the sample mean.
In most cases, the simulator is not executed for a long enough time to generate
the true future distributions for a given causal state. Consequently, some kind of clus-
tering is necessary to group similar future distributions. Otherwise, in such instances,
every future is unique, and there is as many causal states as there are futures. Thus,
the predictive information metric becomes meaningless.
To cluster the time sequences, expectation maximisation clustering is used. Ex-
pectation maximization clusters data with the simplest probability distribution pos-
sible to predict the greatest amount of data [23]. This is different than the technique
used by [117], where a χ2.05 distribution is used. Expectation maximization is used
because the history does not contain enough time points to produce a large enough
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Figure 9: Offline optimizing online search fitness function
sample space for the χ2.05 distribution. The basic description of the procedure is found
in algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Self organization calculation algorithm
Future distributions ← clusterEM( futures for all pasts)
Return log2(future distributions)
4.4.7 Entangled Hierarchy. In order for the online search to be effective, its
ruleset parameters need to be optimized during the offline process so the emergent
search heuristic approximates the global state as much as possible. The offline process,
in general, evolves the online local fitness metrics, as shown in Figure 9. The online
local fitness metrics that are evolved are the basis for the online swarm’s entangled
control hierarchy, along with the chromosomes that each agent carries for instantiating
new agent swarm solutions. This entangled hierarchy consists of 3 mechanisms, shown
by Figure 10.
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Figure 10: SOMAS entangled hierarchy
• The red arrows show how the swarm concurrently communicates through sensors
during a single time step t. Each agent can view the fitness value of every other
agent at the local node and these fitness values are used in each agent’s rules.
• As shown by the blue arrow, when the swarm has evolutionary actuators, each
agent can view the chromosomes of all the other agents, and each chromosome’s
fitness value, for crossover.
• The green arrow shows how the swarm at t influences the swarm at t+1. In this
case, since the swarm cannot look into the past, the influence is unidirectional.
The actuators in swarm(t) that can affect swarm(t+1) are the agent creation and
deletion actuators. Thus, the red control structure affects whether agents are
created and deleted, and the blue control structure affects which chromosomes
are used to create the new agents and what alleles make up the chromosomes.
These 3 mechanisms of control specify increasing levels of entangledness in the
control hierarchy.
1. NS No Search : Red
Temporal : local control
Solution space : no control
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SOMAS agents are only created from a single set of parameters (a single chro-
mosome).
2. NE No Evolution : Red + Green
Temporal : regional control
Solution space : local control
SOMAS agents can be created from multiple parameter sets (multiple pre-
defined chromosomes).
3. EV EVolution : Red + Blue + Green
Temporal : regional control
Solution space : regional control
SOMAS agents parameter sets are evolved (new chromosomes are defined)
Once the environment changes, the online search may no longer be effective.
Consequently, the offline search must be capable of generating new online searches to
adapt to the changing environment, or generate online searches that can adapt to a
wide range of environments.
4.5 General Simulation Implementation
As discussed in Section 3.7, evaluation is accomplished by generating a SOMAS
swarm from the chromosome, executing the swarm in a simulation, and using a set
of metrics to generate the chromosome’s objective values. This section describes the
components used to construct the simulator. The SOMAS swarm and simulation
must be able to represent all elements mentioned in Section 3.2. Since the elements
are all self contained and do not need to directly interact with the other elements, the
design is based on a component model, where each part is a component that is run
independently during the simulation.
This design has a number of benefits. It allows the design and simulation to be
easily extended, since each component is loosely coupled with the other components.
Other frameworks such as NS2, SWARM, or swarmfare (see Section 2.7) can be used
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Figure 11: Simulation component generation
Table 9: Distinctions between agent aspects
Aspect Input Output
Sensor environment decision state
Rule n/a or decision state decision state
Actuator n/a or decision state agent state or environment
to augment the components, providing extra capabilities. Since each component can
be executed independently of the others, their execution can be parallelized without
the need for significant synchronization, thus speeding up the simulation execution.
The simulator is given a series of components which it simulates individually,
either according to a deterministic or non-deterministic schedule. These components
are the agents, vertices, metrics, and miscellaneous actuators, as in figure 11. The
agents and vertices are combined to create the scenario and behavior. The metrics
are used to evaluate the effectiveness of the swarm behavior in accomplishing the
required objective. The miscellaneous scenario actuators are required for any other
housekeeping functions that are not covered by the previous three components.
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4.5.1 Simulation Components. Each iteration of the MASON simulation,
see Section 2.7, executes a sequence of components. The components can either be
ordered or disordered and the sequence can be randomized. In this investigation the
sequence is not randomized, however, and is executed in the order that components
are added during the scenario creation with the scenario generator.
There is also a priority level associated with each component, and components
with a lower level are executed before components with a higher level. The execu-
tion order of components with the same priority is arbitrary. The priority level is
necessary because certain kinds of components should not be executed before others.
For example, the location actuators should be executed after the agent actuators,
since location state affects agent rule decisions. If the execution order of the two
types of actuators is unspecified some agents execute before and some after a location
changes its state. Consequently, the agents that execute after will potentially react
to a different location state than the first agent set.
4.5.2 Scenario Generator. The scenario generator is the heart of the sim-
ulator software. It is responsible for creating all the simulation components that are
executed by the simulator, which includes the use of sub-generators. Figure 11 details
the components that the scenario generator creates and adds to the simulator. The
primary responsibility of the scenario generator is to ensure all the components share
the correct variables. Most components share a variable dependency, such as the
rules, which are dependent on the sensor variables that the sensors set. The scenario
generator either creates and distributes these variables, or calls another generator to
create the necessary variables.
4.5.3 Agent Generator. The agent generators are necessary because the
scenario generator cannot create all agents that the simulation needs. During the
runtime, while most of the simulation entities’ existence is constant, the agents’ exis-
tence is not. The agents, locations, and miscellaneous actuators all have the potential
to create or delete agents. Consequently, runtime agent generators are necessary as
103
well. All agent generators have a common dependency on 3 variables. These vari-
ables contain the simulation’s scheduler and descheduler, and the agent’s location.
Besides these 3, each agent generator has its own specialized variable dependencies.
The unevolving agent generators are very unspecified in the additional variable de-
pendencies. They may have no more dependencies or many more dependencies. The
evolving agents generators require one more kind of variable, the chromosome, which
is used to instantiate the agent’s phenotype.
4.5.4 Network Generator. The network generator is primarily responsible
for composing the network topology. Since the topology does not change during the
execution, though nodes and links may be deactivated, the topology can be generated
entirely before the simulation is executed. Thus, the network generator is part of the
scenario generator.
4.5.5 Memory Kill Trigger. During preliminary testing, there was no limit
to the number of agents that could be created. Certain chromosomes would create
agents until the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) crashed. To stop this from happening,
the memory usage during the simulation is monitored, and the simulated is stopped if
the memory usage passes a certain threshold. Chromosomes that cause the memory
threshold to be exceeded are considered infeasible.
4.5.6 Graph Update. A number of the agent sensors and actuators depend
on a regional view of the graph. This way agents can determine the best location to
travel to, or the best location to deactivate. The graph updater keeps track of what
locations and links have been deactivated, and updates the global view of the graph
accordingly.
4.6 SOMAS Agent Implementation
A SOMAS agent is composed of 3 basic elements: sensors, rules, and actuators.
The rules use a decision function on the sensor values to decide whether to execute
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Table 10: All implemented sensors, rules, and actuators
Sensors Rules Actuators
Agent List Comm Agent Change Location
Agent Order Compromise Agent Compromise
Agent DDoS Agent Compromise Agent Info Exchange
Agent With Most Pheromone Execute All Compromise Location
ArcTan Filter Receiver Agent Create Agent
Compromised Node Sender Agent Create Agent
Compromise Weighted Crossover Local and Location Chromosome
Context Pheromone DDoS Comm Agent Info Exchange
Local Chromosome Order Decrease Pheromone
Local Chromosome With Most Pheromone Delete Agent
Location Agents Cumulative Pheromone Delete Agent List
Location Chromosome Order Deposit Bad Info
Location Chromosome With Most Pheromone Increase Pheromone
Location Marked Increment Good Info
Location Number Agents Increment Info
Location Number Neighbors Mark Location
Location Order Mutate Self Chromosome
Location Pheromone Mutation Operator
Location Null
Location With Most Pheromone Send Comm Agent List
Metric Aggregator Set Location Pheromone
Next Hop Set Pheromone On Self Chromosome
Next Network Search Hop Unmark Location
Property
Random Value
Receiver Node
Select Thing
Self Pheromone
Sender Node
Target
Thing Pheromone Order
Thing With Most Pheromone
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their actuators. The range of possible sensors, rules, and actuators in an agent is
detailed in Table 10.
There are two steps to the execution of an agent component. First, its list of
sensors is executed. Then its list of rules is executed. This ensures that all necessary
sensor values are initialized before they are used by the rules.
There are two ways the sensors, rules, and actuators are specified in an agent.
In the non-searching agents, the parameters are all set, consequently the relation
between the different aspects are all hardcoded. The sensors, rules, and actuators
are still differentiated, but the actuators are accessed directly instead of indirectly
through datastructures. On the other hand, the relationships between the sensors,
rules, and actuators are based on searching parameters within the searching agents.
Thus, they are accessed indirectly through a list datastructure, like the sensors and
rules. The rules are responsible for specifying the decision relationship between the
rules and the actuators, which changes based on the kind of decision making the agent
does, i.e. simple weighted or clustering.
Besides the generic agent elements of sensors, rules, and actuators, each SOMAS
agent also has a chromosome store. The chromosome store contains the set of chro-
mosomes that are varied by its genetic operators and used to create new agents. Each
chromosome has an associated fitness value, which the SOMAS agent can set. The
fitness value is used to select chromosomes for variation and creation. Each SOMAS
agent can see the chromosome set of all other SOMAS agents in its location.
Besides the chromosome fitness values, all agents and locations also have fitness
values. The agents’ fitness values can be set by themselves and by SOMAS agents.
The fitness value on an agent influences a SOMAS agent’s agent related rule decisions
that choose an action to take, such as whether to delete a local SOMAS agent. A
location’s fitness value is an aggregate of the fitness values of the agents currently
residing at the location.
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Figure 12: Classification rule
4.6.1 Basic Weighted Rule. Each rule is an activation function. These
functions all follow the same format, which is analogous to a classification in machine
learning [23].
measure( ~info, ~weightsactuator) > 0→ actuator .execute (49)
Where ~weightsactuator is a particular set of weights for the given actuator in
the range (-1, 1), which is also statically sized. The execution function used in this
implementation is to take the weighted average of the input variables. If the average
is above an execution threshold, then the rule fires its actuator. As shown in Figure
6, the weights partition the sensor space into an execution and non execution region.
convertweighted( ~data) = mean( ~weightsactuator.× ~data) (50)
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Figure 13: Sensor data transform
4.6.2 Sensors. Sensors convert observation data into the information the
rules use to make decisions. An observation can contain data from both the agent
and its environment, which includes other agents. Adding random and static values
to an agent allow these value types to influence the decision rules. The formalization
of a sensor is:
convertactuator( ~data)→ ~info (51)
Where ~data is statically sized sequence of values in the range (-inf, inf). ~data is
a statically sized sequence of values in the range (-1, 1).
Since the data that the sensor can perceive is potentially infinite, and the differ-
ent data elements that make up an observation need to be comparable to each other,
the sensor requires a scaling mechanism in order to restrict the data to a finite range.
This can be done in a number of ways, such as by restricting the perceivable data
to a certain numerical range, or by using a trigonometric function to scale the data.
Both approaches are illustrated in figure 13.
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Figure 14: Online evolution
4.6.3 Online Search. The offline evolution evolves the agents local fitness
function, as well as the other necessary parameters and weights. See figure 9. By
using the global fitness, the offline evolution can approximate its evaluation at the
local level, providing the online evolution with the ability to respond to a wider
variety of changes in the environment. The local fitness approximation and action of
the swarm are necessary for online search. The fitness value approximation operates
by setting a local fitness function on an entity, whether that entity is the agent itself,
a chromosome it carries, etc., and using the local fitness functions to fire its rules,
select new agent chromosomes for agent creation, and delete other agents. The agent
uses the local fitness values in a population of chromosomes to select a chromosome
to crossover with its own chromosomes. It also mutates its own chromosomes at a
given interval. The operators it uses for crossover and mutation are the same as those
used for offline evolution.
The online search is essentially a search for appropriate agent behavior, where
the search is part of the behavior. The creation and deletion of agents serves to
create a hybrid between depth first and breadth first search. If an agent continually
creates and deletes an agent each iteration so that only a single agent is left from
the procedure, then this is equivalent to a depth first search. Alternatively, when the
agent creates more agents than it deletes, it is searching along multiple possible swarm
behaviors. When it deletes more agents than it creates, then the agent is performing
a heuristic search, i.e. reducing the options available on the open list as described
in [88].
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Figure 15: Online search
The fitness landscape of online search is dynamic at two levels. At the simple
level, it is dynamic because the scenario the swarm is in is dynamic. The swarm
is thus searching for a behavior that best attains desired goal states. However, the
fitness landscape becomes more complex when the agent activities impact the scenario
and thus the state transition and reward functions. In this case, the online search
landscape is represented by a transition function that gives a probability distribution
over one fitness landscape transitioning to another based on evolved agent behaviors.
4.7 Network Implementation
For the purposes of the implementation, there is no difference between the agent
container, see Section 3.2, and network location, see Section 3.7.3. Consequently, both
are represented by the same data structure. Since the individual details of each host
are not considered, the sensors and actuators for the hosts are not implemented. In-
stead, the sensors and actuators provided by the container are stored in the agent’s
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data structure, for simplicity of implementation. Due to the similarity between loca-
tions and agents, each location also has a sensor and rule list.
Additionally, a location contains a neighbor list and an agent list. The neighbor
list is continually updated during a simulation run, in order to take account of the
changes in the network structure, such as nodes being deactivated or reactivated. This
update is accomplished by the graph updater component, see Section 4.5.6.
4.8 Real World Implementation
Since the SOMAS is entirely implemented within the JVM, transitioning the
system itself to a real world setting is possibly trivial. The only augmentation neces-
sary is to distribute the components across a number of JVMs, such that each JVM
has a single network location, corresponding to the real network location on which the
JVM resides. Using remote method invocation (RMI), distributing the components
is straightforward. Remote method invocation allows local processes to invoke and
receive results from non-local objects.
Once the SOMAS is active on a new network, the number variables affecting the
swarm’s effectiveness increases due to the added constraints of real world networks.
A partial list of these variables follows.
• bandwidth
• latency
• heterogenous host systems (hardware, OS, other applications)
• interaction of external world with network
• interaction with other multi agent systems
• trust within and between computer systems
• mission specific needs
• limited computational resources
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• implementation medium (i.e. if agents were to become embedded hardware)
• highly sensitive, volatile locations
• lack of containers on target hosts
The effect of the variables on the SOMAS’ environment is to increase its dynamic
and heterogeneous nature. Thus, the swarms need to be given operators that increase
their adaptive effectiveness.
4.9 Summary
To start the discussion of implementation the methodology for the software
development is covered. Besides the standard object oriented design, a design pat-
tern called the properties design pattern is used which allows objects to be loosely
coupled and formally analyzed. The selection of packages used for implementation
follows. The search algorithm selection, parameter settings, and implementation are
then explained. The primary part of the SOMAS architecture, the simulation used
for chromosome evaluation, is discussed next, since it is part of the variator in the
search algorithm. Finally, there is a discussion of the feasibility of transitioning the
simulated swarm to a real network, with the attendant increase in variables that affect
the swarm’s behavior effectiveness. The testing and analysis procedures and setup
for deteriming whether the SOMAS architecture successfully creates desired swarm
behavior is in the next chapter.
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V. Measuring SOMAS Capabilities
5.1 Overview
This chapter defines and explains the testing hypotheses and methodoloy used
to accomplish the research goal and objectives with the implementation from Chapter
IV. The test hypotheses are described in Section 5.2. The methodology for conducting
the tests is described in Section 5.3. The relevant parameters for the MOEA and
simulation are in Section 5.4, and the behaviors and scenarios to be tested are covered
in Sections 5.5 and 5.6.
5.2 Test Hypotheses
From Chapter 1, the research goal is to investigate network security real-time
performance using a swarm of autonomous self organized agents that evolve a non-
hierarchical entangled cyberspace security management structure. See Section 1.2.
Therefore, the primary testing objective is to determine the impact of self or-
ganization and entangled hierarchies on generating effective swarm behaviors in a
variety of security scenarios. Since all the swarms are evolved using the self organiza-
tion metric, a plot of the PFKNOWN of each scenario is examined to visually identify
the relation between the self organization objective value and the other objective
values.
The success of online evolution compared to unevolving online search and lack
of online search, is evidence for the significance of entangled hierarchies for swarm
adaptation. As explained by Section 4.4.7, online evolution is an entangled hierar-
chy since each agent communicates with other local agents through its fitness value
in order to determine which chromosomes to use for crossover. If evolution is not
employed, then the impact of communication on swarm adaption is lessened as well
as the degree of entangled hierarchy, since the swarm adaptability is limited by the
agents’ chromosome set. Finally, the least influential entangled hierarchy exists in the
case when agents do not perform an online search.
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Table 11: Hypotheses
Objective Hypothesis
Evaluate feasibility of self organization for
effective accomplishment of desired behav-
iors
- Self organization metric improves effec-
tiveness of search
- Visually identifiable self organization is
evolved
Evaluate feasibility of entangled hierar-
chies for effective accomplishment of de-
sired behaviors
- An entangled hierarchy becomes more ef-
fective as the scenario becomes more com-
plex
Table 12: Behavior experiment summary
Behavior Name Scenario Name Topology Topology Scenario
Complexity Dynamics Agent Dynamics
Minimal activity all n/a n/a n/a
Self organization all n/a n/a n/a
Preserve network all n/a n/a n/a
Enemy avoidance EnemyAvoidanceScenario Homogeneous Static Static
Intrusion elimination IntrusionEliminationScenario Homogeneous Static Dynamic
Network defense DDoSScenario Homogeneous Dynamic Dynamic
Competition CompetitionScenario Homogeneous Dynamic Dynamic
Information defense InfoWarScenario Heterogeneous Dynamic Dynamic
Table 13: SOMAS MOEA Parameters
Parameter Value
Allele mutation likelihood 0.1
Allele crossover likelihood 0.1
Chromosomes length (bits) 5000
Evaluations per chromosome 30
Simulation iterations 100
Memory threshold 50%
Initial population 100
Mu 50
Lambda 50
Generations 10
Runs 5
5.3 Testing Methodology
There are three elements required to test the effectiveness of the SOMAS swarms.
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• A variety of behaviors and scenarios to compare swarm capabilities. The be-
haviors are described in Section 5.5 and the scenarios are described in Section
5.6.
• Metrics for measuring and comparing the capabilities of different kinds of swarms
for optimizing results for different behaviors. The metrics are described in Sec-
tion 2.9.1.
• Statistical tests to accept or reject the experiment hypotheses based on the
measurements. The tests are described in Section 2.9.2.
Once the SOMAS runs are complete, a series of bash scripts are used to format,
analyze, and visualize the data. First, all the objective vectors are normalized and
filtered, retaining only the PFTRUE approximation sets for each scenario involved.
Second, the metrics and statistical tests are generated. The metrics consist of the
epsilon, hypervolume, and R2 metrics, discussed in section 2.9.1. The statistical tests
consist of the Fisher exact and the Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests, discussed in
section 2.9.2. Finally, the Pareto front and the test results are converted to graphical
format for ease of reading and analysis.
The PFKNOWN for each generation is derived using the PISA dominance ranking
function. Gnuplot is used for plotting the PFKNOWN . All permutations of objective
functions in sets of 3 are graphed in 3D scatterplots. The shade of subsequent EA
generations in the plots are darker so as to show the EA’s search progression during its
execution. Besides the scatterplots, select chromosomes are executed and visualized
with the MASON simulation to determine whether recognizable self organization is
produced.
The results of the statistical tests are plotted with R using a shaded grid, where
grid cells represent test hypotheses and darker shades correspond to lesser a values
for rejecting the null hypothesis. Complete black entails a statistically significant
result, allowing a reader to quickly guage how a particular scenario fares in the tests.
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Statistical significance means the a value for the experiment must be less than 0.05
in order to reject the null hypothesis.
5.4 Experiment Settings
The population size for each generation is 100, where 50 members come from
the previous generation and 50 members are produced by the variator. The initial
population consists of 100 individuals. Each algorithm is run for 10 generations to
produce a total of 1100 individuals, and 33000 simulation evaluations, due to the use
of 30 simulation runs per individual, see section 2.9.2. These parameters are chosen
so that a run takes at most 2 days to complete, while still providing enough results to
run the statistical tests and generate dependable p-values. If memory consumption
after an iteration passes 50% of the maximum heap size, then the simulation is halted
and the chromosome’s infeasibility objective is set.
5.5 Swarm Behaviors
As explained in Section 3.2 there are two primary elements to the problem
domain: SOMAS agents and the environment. The environment consists of the net-
work and the non-SOMAS agents (scenario agents). Each part of the environment
contributes to the environmental complexity.
• The network can either have a homogeneous or heterogeneous layout. A homo-
geneous layout means that nodes are connected with uniform probability, with
the qualification that each node pair only has one link. A heterogeneous layout
means that the probability of node connection is non uniform.
• The network topology can either be static or dynamic. A dynamic topology
does not retain the same node and link configuration throughout the scenario.
In these experiments, a dynamic network means that a node and its connected
links can be deactivated and reactivated.
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• The scenario agents can either be static or dynamic. If the agents are dynamic,
then their locations, parameters, and the total number of agents can change.
The following subsections present a range of formalized behaviors that can be
tested in the network environments. However, the following behaviors are not tested
due to time constraints.
1. Network preservation
2. Vital vertex identification
3. Intrusion detection
4. Network attack
The behaviors in the following list are tested in the scenarios according to Table
12.
1. Enemy avoidance (assessing intrusions for avoidance)
2. Intrusion elimination (assessing intrusions for targeting)
3. Network defense (engaging intrusions)
4. Competition (assessing, targeting, and engaging intrusions)
5. Information defense (assessing, targeting, engaging, and reacting to intrusions)
Accordingly, the scenarios in table 12 become increasingly more complex. The
scenarios for Behaviors 2-4 all require many of the sub-behaviors necessary for infor-
mation defense, as discussed in Section 6. Finally, the scenario for Behavior 5 is the
most complex of all the scenarios, as is expected given that many of the others only
require its sub-behaviors. Thus, the scenarios represent 3 levels of complexity.
The increase in complexity allows greater exploration of the capabilities of self
organization and entangled hierarchies, fulfilling the test objectives outlined in section
5.2. The objectives relate directly back to the original goal in section 1.2.
By using these network security scenarios and behaviors, the metrics and tests
validate or invalidate the effectiveness of self organization and entangled hierarchies
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for network security. Each of these behaviors is measured by a set of metrics as
explained in Section 4.4.4. Each metric is a component in the simulator, see Section
4.5.1, and is loaded into the scenario using the scenario generator, see Section 4.5.2.
The behaviors are formalized in the following sections. See Section 3.2 for in
depth symbol notation explanations. Subsection 5.5.1 explains the behaviors that are
used by SOMAS swarms in all scenarios. Subsection 5.5.2 explains the behaviors that
are only used by the SOMAS swarm in certain scenarios.
5.5.1 Swarm Specific Behaviors. The self organized behavior metric is the
most important swarm specific behavior. It is directly relevant to the research goal
of investigating the effect of self organization on behavior optimization.
The activity minimization and network preservation metrics are of general util-
ity. The feasibility metric is essential in scenarios where the number of agents can
increase arbitrarily. If the swarm fills up the memory space of the virtual machine,
then the simulation crashes and no measurements are taken.
1. Self Organized: The causal states are calculated with the algorithm detailed
in [117]. According to Shannon’s information theory, the log2 of the number of
causal states represents the amount of information in the set of causal states.
1
log2(|I
−
~H |)
(52)
I− The set of causal states, see Section 2.5.4 for details.
~H The simulation history.
The function is inverted so its maximization produces a minimum value.
2. Non Disruptive: The objective is to minimize agent activity on the vertices,
which entails minimizing agent movement, creation, and deletion. The function
measures the cumulative activity during the entire simulation run by summing
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the absolute difference in agent population on each vertex for each time step.
∑
t∈Tt>1
∑
C∈C
abs(|AC(t)| − |AC(t− 1)|) : AC(t) ≡ A ∩ CS ∩ SS(t) (53)
T The set of all simulation time steps.
C The set of all network vertices during the course of the simulation.
A The set of agents.
SS(t) The scenario state at time t.
3. Network Preservation: The SOMAS agents can use node deactivation actuators.
Deactivating nodes can coincide with achieving objectives, but deactivating the
whole network is not generally a good security solution. To counteract this
tendency, the number of deactivated nodes at the end of the simulation is min-
imized.
|Ci(f)| : Ci(f) ≡ Ci ∩ SS(f) (54)
Ci The set of inactive containers.
SS(f) The scenario state at the final time step.
| . . . | Denotes set cardinality.
4. Feasibility: Feasibility is included in the behavior list because it is one of the
objective values, even though it is not a behavior. The objective measures
the swarms feasibility by flagging whether the swarm passed a certain memory
threshold during a simulation step. If the swarm uses too much memory, it can
cause the container running the agents to crash.
test
(
m(used)
m(total)
> c
)
(55)
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test Boolean function that returns 1 if the condition is true and 0 otherwise.
m Memory measure.
c Constant threshold value.
5.5.2 Scenario Specific Behaviors.
1. Vital Vertex Identification: The behavior is to identify the vital vertices in a
network. The vital vertices are the minimal set of vertices in a network that
cause the greatest network degradation when they are removed. The extent of
network degradation is measured by comparing the cumulative length of the
shortest path for all pairs of vertices and the number of disconnected vertices
before and after the vertices are removed.
This is almost the same as the metric of network degradation in [19]. The
difference lies in counting the number of disconnected vertices. The original
metric did not do this, and only has a single objective. Using a single objective
raises the problem of rating the cost of disconnected vertices. However, making
the metric produce a double objective measure eliminates the ambiguity.
Finding the vital vertices in a network is an NP-Hard problem [19]. The dif-
ficulty of the problem is increased by the fact that the problem information is
only partially observed, each agent only has a partial view of the whole network.
Equations (56-57) measure the network degradation. Equation (58) measures
how concisely the agents can identify the vital vertices.
∑
∀u∀v(shortestpath(u, v) : u, v ∈ C ∩ SS(f) ∧ u 6= v) (56)
∑
∀u∀v(pathexists(u, v) : u, v ∈ C ∩ SS(f) ∧ u 6= v) (57)
|ID(f)| : ID(f) ≡ ID ∩ SS(f) (58)
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C The container set.
ID The set of vertices identified as being vital vertices.
SS(f) The scenario state at the final time step.
| . . . | Denotes set cardinality.
2. Intrusion Detection: Intrusion elimination consists of maximizing the number
of correctly identified nodes, Equation (61), and minimizing the number of in-
correctly identified nodes, Equation (62).
1
|ID√|
: ID√ ≡ ID ∩Cc ∩ SS(f) (59)
|IDX | : IDX ≡ ID ∩C
u ∩ SS(f) (60)
Cc The set of compromised containers.
Cu The set of uncompromised containers.
ID The set of containers identified as being compromised.
SS(f) The scenario state at the final time step.
| . . . | Denotes set cardinality.
3. Enemy Avoidance: Enemy avoidance consists of maximizing the number of safe
SOMAS agents, Equation (61), and minimizing the number of unsafe SOMAS
agents, Equation (62). While it may seem that these two objectives are just the
inverse of each other, that is not the case when the SOMAS swarm can increase
or decrease the number of SOMAS agents.
1
|As|
: As ≡ A ∩Cc ∩ SS(f) (61)
|Au| : Au ≡ A ∩Cu ∩ SS(f) (62)
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Cs The set of safe containers.
Cu The set of unsafe containers.
A The set of SOMAS agents.
SS(f) The scenario state at the final time step.
| . . . | Denotes set cardinality.
4. Intrusion elimination: The intrusion elimination behavior is similar to the com-
petition scenario in Section 6. The difference is that the enemy agents do not
try to destroy the network. Instead, the compromise agents merely compromise
and deposit inactive DDoS agents. The SOMAS swarm’s behavior is to make
the number of compromised nodes as small as possible.
|Cc(f)| : Cc(f) ≡ Cc ∩ SS(f) (63)
Cc The set of compromised containers.
SS(f) The scenario state at the final time step.
| . . . | Denotes set cardinality.
5. DDoS defense: There is only a single objective for this behavior, which is to
maximize the number of targetted nodes that are active at the end of the sim-
ulation.
1
|Cat|
: Cat ≡ Ca ∩Ct ∩ SS(f) (64)
Ca The set of active containers.
Ct The set of targeted containers.
SS(f) The scenario state at the final time step.
| . . . | Denotes set cardinality.
6. Swarm Competition: The behavior is to both delete all enemy agents and pre-
serve all friendly agents. The blue (friendly) objective function is in Equation
(65). It states that the cumulative number of SOMAS agents deleted during
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the scenario run should be minimized. The red (enemy) objective function is in
Equation (66). It states that the cumulative number of enemy agents deleted
during the scenario run should be maximized.
1
∑
t∈Tt>1
|Ab(t)|
: Ab(t) ≡ Ab ∩ SS(t− 1)− SS(t) (65)
∑
t∈Tt>1
|Ar(t)| : Ar(t) ≡ Ar ∩ SS(t− 1)− SS(t) (66)
Ab The set of friendly agents.
Ar The set of malicious agents.
SS(t) The scenario states at time t.
| . . . | Denotes set cardinality.
7. Network defense: The basic behavior is to maximize the amount of friendly in-
formation delivered to friendly nodes, Equation (67), and minimize the amount
of friendly information sent to malicious nodes, Equation (68). All information
is friendly for the purposes of the scenario.
1
∑
t∈Tt>1
|iB(t)|
: iB(t) ≡ i ∩CBS ∩ SS(t)− SS(t− 1) (67)
∑
t∈Tt>1
|iR(t)| : {iR(t) ≡ i ∩CRS ∩ SS(t)− SS(t− 1) (68)
i ∈ A The set of information packets
CBS The set of friendly receiver containers’ states.
CRS The set of malicious receiver containers’ states.
SS(t) The scenario states at time t.
| . . . | Denotes set cardinality.
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Type Sensors Rules Actuators
SOMAS - Chromosome fitness - Weighted rules - Evolve selected chromosome
- Neighbor fitness - Create agent from selected chromosome
- Local agent fitness - Delete agent
- Location and neighborhood aliveness - Change location
- Change self fitness
- Make self chromosome have self fitness
value
Defense - Local agent types - Execute actuators based on types of - Delete agents
local agents
- Execute rest of actuators
Compromise - Local agent types - If location is uncompromised then - Compromise location
- Whether location is compromised compromise it and execute compromise - Create DDoS agent
actuators - Steal information
- Execute actuators based on types of - Corrupt information
local agents - Exchange information with malicious
- Execute rest of actuators agents
DDoS - Local agent types - If local agent has DDoS target then - Send info packets to DDoS targets
read target information
- Execute rest of actuators
DDoS packet - Next hop to destination - If no more hops exist, or at target - Go to next hop
then delete self after time interval - Delete self
- Execute rest of actuators
Sender - Execute actuators - Send info packets to receivers
Receiver - Local agent types - If local agent is info packet then - Increment info counter
increment info counter
DDoS packet - Next hop to destination - If no more hops exist, or at target - Go to next hop
then delete self after time interval - Delete self
- Execute rest of actuators
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Table 15: Metric types
Metric type Measurment
Good info delivery Overall number of info packets to reach
good receivers during simulation
Bad info delivery Overall number of info packets to reach
bad receivers during simulation
Nodes destroyed Total number of nodes no longer alive
at end of simulation
SOMAS agents destroyed Overall number of SOMAS agents destroyed
during simulation
Malicious agents destroyed Overall number of malicious agents
destroyed during simulation
Agent activity Aggregate change of agent count per
location, summed over all locations
Feasibility Whether simulation ran for total number
of steps without running out of memory
Self organization Amount of self organization evident in
simulation history, where the history is
composed of vectors designating a set of
simulation statistics
Table 16: Network types
Type Parameters
Flat {nodes: 50, edges: 150, type: randomly interconnected}
Component {{backbone | nodes: 5, edges: 10, type: fully interconnected},
{component | nodes: 2, edges: 1, type: wheel},
{component | nodes: 5, edges: 8, type: wheel},
{component | nodes: 8, edges: 14, type: wheel},
{component | nodes: 15, edges: 28, type: wheel},
{component | nodes: 23, edges: 44, type: wheel},
{outlier | nodes: 1, edges: 0},
{outlier | nodes: 1, edges: 0}}
5.6 Scenarios
Table 17 gives an overview of the scenarios used in the chromosome evolution.
Tables 14 and 15 list the types of agents and metrics used in the scenarios. For
examples of the network layouts used, see the scenario figures. Figure 16 details a
graph with a large number of network components and Figure 20 details a flat graph.
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Table 17: Scenario types
Scenario Agents Metrics Network type
All - SOMAS - Minimize activity
- Maximize self organization
- Maximize feasibility
- Minimize number of dead nodes
Vital Element - Minimize marked nodes - Flat
- Maximize gain in shortest path
length
- Maximize gain in number of
disconnected subgraphs
Intrusion Elimination - Compromise - Minimize number of locations - Flat
- DDoS compromised
Enemy Avoidance - DDoS - Minimize number of unsafe - Flat
SOMAS agents
- Maximize number of safe
SOMAS agents
DDoS - DDoS - Minimize number of targets - Flat
- DDoS packets destroyed
- Maximize number of malicious
agents destroyed
Competition - Compromise - Minimize number of SOMAS agents - Flat
- DDoS destroyed
- DDoS packets - Maximize number of malicious
agents destroyed
Information War - Compromise - Maximize amount of friendly - Component
- DDoS infomation delivered
- DDoS packets - Minimize amount of enemy
- Sender information delivered
- Receiver
- Info packets
• Scenario Generalities: For all scenarios except for Info Attack, every node,
except for the outlier nodes, contains a single SOMAS agent at step 0. All
flat graph network layouts are randomly constructed, given a set of parameters.
The random construction takes place by randomly selecting and connecting two
nodes per iteration, with the constraints that only the set number of edges can
be created and the graph must be connected. The component graph network
layouts all have the same topology. The parameters are detailed in Table 16. In
the component based graph, all the components and outliers are connected to
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Figure 16: Info War scenario
the backbone subgraph by a single link from one of the external nodes on the
wheel.
Each of the scenario figures are an actual snapshot from the swarm visualizer.
Figure 16 gives an overview of what each element in a scenario snapshot means.
1. Vital Element Identification: The vital elements are those elements in the net-
work that cause the most amount of damage to the network with the removal
of the least number of elements. Solving the problem optimally is an NP-Hard
problem [19]. The SOMAS agents find a solution by marking and unmarking
nodes as vital, and the nodes that are marked by the end of the simulation run
are considered vital nodes.
2. Intrusion Elimination: A set of compromise agents randomly travel around the
network compromising nodes and creating DDoS agents. The SOMAS agents
attempt to uncompromise as many nodes as possible.
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Figure 17: Vital Element scenario
3. DDoS: In the network there are a set of unsafe nodes that the SOMAS agents
attempt to avoid. The more SOMAS agents there are on the safe nodes the
better, and this includes SOMAS agents creating more agents on the safe nodes
and deleting agents from the unsafe nodes.
4. DDoS: In the network there are a set of target nodes that the DDoS agents
attempt to destroy. The SOMAS agents use their capabilities to eliminate as
many of the DDoS agents and packets as possible while also keeping all the
targetted nodes alive.
5. Competition: Compromise agents and SOMAS agents are pitted against each
other. The compromise agents attempt to destroy the network by compromising
nodes and creating DDoS agents, which in turn mount a DDoS attack against
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Figure 18: Intrusion Elimination scenario
every node on the network. Whenever a node is destroyed, all agents on the node
are removed from the simulation. The SOMAS agents can delete agents they
find and also destroy or bring back up network nodes. However, the SOMAS
agents do not know which agents are friendly and which agents are malicious.
The SOMAS agents have these same capabilities for the rest of the scenarios.
6. Info War: The Info War is the most complex scenario, and combines elements
of most of the other scenarios. The network layout is composed of multiple
subcomponents, instead of being flat. Within the network, there are a set
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Figure 19: DDoS scenario
of sender and receiver nodes. The sender nodes attempt to continually send
information packets to the receiver nodes.
There are also a number of compromise agents, who begin on nodes situated
outside of the main network. They enter the network, compromised as many
nodes as possible, and create as many DDoS agents as possible. Meanwhile,
they also delete friendly information packets and steal the information and send
it out of the network. The DDoS agents target all the receiver nodes in order
to stop all friendly information traffic.
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Figure 20: Competition scenario
Successfully completing this scenario requires that the SOMAS swarm use mul-
tiple behaviors from the previous scenarios. First, they must stop the receiver
nodes from being deactivated by the DDoS agents. This is the same behav-
ior that is necessary for the DDoS scenario. Second, the SOMAS agents need
to stop the compromise agents from compromising the network nodes. The
behavior is a combination of the behaviors from the Competition, DDoS, and
Intrusion Elimination scenarios. Additionally, the SOMAS swarm must develop
new behaviors to stop the compromise agents from stealing information.
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5.7 Summary
This chapter describes how the effectiveness metrics, visualizations, statistical
tests, behaviors, and scenarios are used to evaluate the significance of self organiza-
tion and entangled hierarchies for creating effective SOMAS swarms. The effectiveness
metrics and statistical tests are used to compare different SOMAS swarm types, and
the behaviors and scenarios show the range of capabilities the SOMAS swarm pos-
sesses. The following chapter uses these test elements in the prescribed methodology
to verify and validate, or invalidate the test objectives. This is accomplished both
quantitatively with the tests, and qualitatively with the visualizations.
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VI. SOMAS Simulation Analysis
6.1 Overview
Using the testing methods discussed in Chapter V, this chapter presents the
results in order to determine whether specified hypotheses based on research objectives
have been falsified or validated (since experimentation cannot verify hypotheses).
Analysis of quantitative statistical results and visualizations is discussed in Section
6.2. Besides confirming or denying the hypotheses the results also describe a few other
items of interest, which are covered in Section 6.3.
6.2 Hypotheses Validation
Table 18: Hypotheses results
Hypothesis Outcome
- Self organization metric improves effec-
tiveness of search Partial success
- Visually identifiable self organization is
evolved Success
- An entangled hierarchy becomes more ef-
fective as the scenario becomes more com-
plex Success
Table 19: Legend of shorthand notation
Notation Description
Non mod Scenario is not modified beyond any changes mentioned in the caption
No evo SOMAS agents do not evolve the chromosomes they carry
No c/d SOMAS agents do not create or delete any of their own kind
Single SOMAS agent chromosomes are evaluated on a single scenario
Multi SOMAS agent chromosomes are evaluated on multiple scenarios
Dest SOMAS agents can destroy network nodes
Non dest SOMAS agents cannot destroy network nodes
w/ destruction SOMAS agents can destroy network nodes
NV SOMAS swarm does not have network node deactivation and activation actuators
NS SOMAS swarm does not use online search
NE SOMAS swarm does not evolve itself, but still uses online search
EV SOMAS swarm uses evolutionary search
6.2.1 Self Organization Metric Improves Effectiveness of Search. The self
organization metric is negatively correlated with a number of objectives:
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• Maximizing Feasibility
• Minimizing good agent deletion
• Maximizing bad agent deletion
• Maximizing the delivery of information to good receivers
It is positively correlated with:
• Minimizing agent activity
• Minimizing targetted location deactivation
• Maximizing uncompromised nodes
• Minimizing compromised nodes
• Minimizing delivery of information to bad receivers
The correlation of the feasibility metric with the other objectives is the complete
opposite of the self organization metric. This shows that the self organization metric
primarily measures the inverse of feasibility. However, this does not mean that it is
equivalent to the inverse of feasibility, which will be explained in Section 6.3.5.
The reason for this inverse relationship is because with a small number of agents
the simulation history is fairly undifferentiated and long. Thus, the clustering algo-
rithm used to extract the causal pasts (see Section 2.5.4) creates a minimal number
of clusters and there is not very much predictive information that can be potentially
extracted. However, with a large amount of agents, the simulation history is both
irregular and is likely short due to memory overflow. These two influences cause the
clustering algorithm to create a larger number of clusters, increasing the potential
amount of predictive information that can be extracted.
Despite the lack of success optimizing the search using the self organization
metric, self organization is seen in another aspect of the search. The SOMAS offline
search demonstrates a phenomena known as self organized criticality [17]. While
interesting for the possible uses of such a phenomena, it also appears to pull the
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search out of a local optima. These issues are discussed more completely in Section
6.3.5.
Therefore, the first hypothesis is partially successful.
6.2.2 Visually Identifiable Self Organization is Evolved. The visualization
produces a simple network topology showing the types of agents at each node. Thus,
the visualization can only show self organized behavior in terms of agent creation, dele-
tion, fitness values, and movement. The SOMAS framework evolves various emergent
behaviors, but they vary in the amount of self organization also exhibited.
The simplest strategy that emerges in the Information War scenario is that of
doing nothing. Amongst the SOMAS swarms that can deactivate network nodes, a
common strategy is to deactivate nodes until an objective is met, whether that means
deleting all enemy agents or stopping a DDoS attack. This deactivation is carried out
either by directly deactivating nodes, or by creating so many agents on a node that the
node automatically deactivates. However, this behavior does not show organization
amongst the swarm agents.
A less destructive behavior in the Information War Scenario is to restart the
DDoS’d nodes. The enemy DDoS agents have a specific order of targets they are
meant to deactivate, and will not proceed to the next target as long as any previous
targets are active. By reactivating the DDoS’d nodes, the DDoS agents are kept from
deactivating the other receiver nodes.
Besides these simplistic emergent behaviors, there are also emergent behaviors
that exhibit greater organization in the swarm. In the Competition scenario there is a
strategy that produces swarms that move as groups around the network, deactivating
nodes. The swarm is able to halt the compromising of network nodes and consequent
DDoS attack against the network.
There are solutions in the Information War scenario where the swarm will acti-
vate a network destruction and creation process when under attack by DDoS agents.
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The agents will start reproducing very rapidly and DoSing nodes themselves, as well
as restarting deactivated nodes. Once this behavior begins in one component of the
network, the behavior rapidly spreads itself to the other components. Unfortunately,
the behavior eventually leads to receiver nodes being destroyed and restarted, which
limits the good information flow. However, the behavior also can delete sender nodes,
and this is beneficial insofar as the amount of information that can be stolen is limited.
The reason why this behavior evolves is because it both restarts nodes that
have been DDoS’d, thus ensuring enemy DDoS agents remain fixated on one target,
and deactivate the bottlenecks in the network, which keeps the malicious agents from
compromising network nodes in the network components and creating new DDoS
agents. Thus, the SOMAS agents are creating a decoy for the DDoS agents.
These behaviors verify the second hypothesis, it is consequently successful.
This is a verification instead of only a validation because the SOMAS framework
has demonstrated this capability.
6.2.3 Entangled Hierarchy More Effective as Scenario Becomes More Com-
plex. The statistical tests, which are found in Appendix B, demonstrate that as
the scenario becomes more complex, swarms capable of more complex and influential
entangled hierarchies become more effective than less capable swarms. As described in
Table 12 in Section 5.2 the the scenarios are categorised according to the complexity
of the network layout, and whether the environments and agents are static/dynamic.
The figures in appendix B give a visual representation of how the categories affect
the search landscapes. As shown, the online search swarms produce a wider variety
of objective values in the offline search space. This suggests these swarms are able to
acquire a greater number of building blocks and construct better solutions.
The results plots in Appendix B show that in almost all network scenarios,
swarms with online search (EV and NE swarms) decisively outperform swarms that
lack online search. Not only are online search swarms more capable than non searching
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swarms in more complex scenarios, the searching swarms are more capable almost
across all scenarios.
This successfully validates the third hypothesis in Table 18, so it is successful.
While the use of online search explains why the EV and NE swarms do better
than the NS swarm, it does not explain why the EV swarm outperforms the NE swarm
in only certain scenarios. Contrary to expectations, the increase in the EV swarm’s
effectiveness does not strictly follow the increase in scenario complexity, though such
a trend is evident.
The distinguishing feature is that the scenarios where the EV swarm is more
effective require a greater specificity of behavior than the scenarios where the NE
swarm is more effective. For instance, even though the complexity of the Competition
scenario is greater than the complexity of the DDoS scenario, the actual activity in
the Competition scenario is much more homogeneous. In the Competition scenario it
isn’t important to perform specific actions in specific portions of the network, since the
elimination of enemy agents is worth the same amount regardless of network location.
Thus, the same swarm behavior is generally effective regardless of swarm location.
In the DDoS scenario the swarm has to protect specific targets, so the swarm
needs to use different behaviors for different parts of the network. Thus, the swarm
in this scenario needs to be capable of greater specificity in its behavior. The same
pattern can be seen with the Information War scenario. When the swarm has node
deactivation and activation actuators the EV swarm is more effective. This is because
the swarm defends the network better if it focusses on reactivating the nodes targetted
by DDoS agents, as explained in the previous Section 6.2.2. On the other hand,
without these actuators, the swarm cannot be as specific in its behavior, so the greater
capability for specificity is no longer needed.
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Figure 21: Pareto fronts comparing evolution with and without network destruction,
part 1
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6.3 Secondary Testing and Analysis
Besides the hypotheses for testing the research objectives, a number of other
tests and analysis are carried out for problem exploration. As noted with swarm
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Figure 22: Pareto fronts comparing evolution with and without network destruction,
part 2
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behavior effectiveness, the ability of the swarm to destroy the network significantly
changes whether swarm evolution is preferable or not. More tests are carried out
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Figure 23: Pareto fronts comparing evolution with and without network destruction,
part 3
InfoWarScenario
F
ea
si
bi
lit
y
ActivitySelf organization
InfoWarScenario_NV
F
ea
si
bi
lit
y
ActivitySelf organization
between swarms capable of destruction and swarms incapable of destruction to more
precisely determine there respective effectiveness.
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During the discussions in the previous chapters, it is mentioned that the swarm
behaviors can be composed of sub behaviors. This claim is tested by evaluating swarm
chromosomes on multiple scenarios during the course of the search to see whether
simpler scenarios can be combined to create more effective complex behavior.
Further analysis is carried out on the accomplished tests to look for other char-
acteristics besides those originally being tested. Interesting results are found, such
as evidence for the efficacy of differential evolution, objectives from disparate scenar-
ios working together to overcome a royal road, and the existence of self organized
criticality during the search process.
6.3.1 Effectiveness of Network Destruction. Generally, the swarms with
node deactivation and activation actuators decisively outperforms the swarms that
do not have these actuators, as shown in Appendix C. However, the exception is in
the case of the two scenarios where specificity of action is not significantly required
(Competition and Intrusion Elimination scenarios) and with the swarm less capable
of specific action (non searching swarm). Thus, the results corroborate with the
conjecture from the previous experiments that the online search swarms are so effective
because they are capable of more specific behavior.
6.3.2 Multi Scenario Evolution. For the DDoS and Information War scenar-
ios using multiple scenarios for evolving a chromosome works much better than using
a single scenario. For others, the results are ambiguous. These results are shown in
Appendix D. The cause is most likely the dependency between scenarios. The set of
behaviors necessary for success in the Competition and Intrusion Elimination scenar-
ios is a subset of the behaviors for the Info War and DDoS scenarios, as explained
in Section 6. Thus, all progress in the former scenarios helps the latter, but progress
in the latter does not necessarily help the latter. In fact, the behaviors may become
too complex to benefit the simpler scenarios. Figures 24, 25, 26, and 27 compares the
exploration of single and multi-scenario evolution. For the Information War plot, the
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Figure 24: Pareto fronts comparing explorativeness of single and multi-scenario evo-
lution, part 1
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multi-scenario results converge clearly better than those of the standard scenario. In
the others, it is much harder to judge, even in the case of the DDoS scenario.
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Figure 25: Pareto fronts comparing explorativeness of single and multi-scenario evo-
lution, part 2
DDoSScenario
D
D
oS
 a
tta
ck
er
s 
de
le
te
d
ActivityTargets deleted
MultiScenario_Mean
D
D
oS
 a
tta
ck
er
s 
de
le
te
d
ActivityTargets deleted
6.3.3 Evidence of Differential Evolution Usefulness. In a couple of the sce-
narios, there seem to be two primary strategies that shape the direction of evolutions,
see Figure 28. Even though in MOPs there is no guarantee a pattern in the geno-
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Figure 26: Pareto fronts comparing explorativeness of single and multi-scenario evo-
lution, part 3
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type implies a pattern in the phenotype, such consistency is suggestive that there is.
If this is the case, then these scenarios can benefit from differential evolution using
real values instead of bit strings. Differential evolution is a combination of gradient
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Figure 27: Pareto fronts comparing explorativeness of single and multi-scenario evo-
lution, part 4
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descent and genetic algorithms, as described in [125]. By finding the rate of change
between the objectives of chromosomes, differential evolution may be able to adapt
to the patterns in the plots and find the optimal points much more quickly.
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Figure 28: Two strategies for intrusion elimination
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Nowak researched the use of differential evolution for evolving self organized
swarm behaviors, and demonstrated its superiority over neural networks for his prob-
lem domain [89]. Given the similarity between the his work and this thesis it is
146
possible differential evolution can follow the linear patterns in the pareto plots and
increase the search’s convergence rate, while retaining the same level of exploration.
Figure 29: Independent and interacting objectives
MultiScenario_Mean
B
ad
 a
ge
nt
s 
de
le
te
d 
(I
nt
r)
Good agents deleted (Comp)Bad agents deleted (Comp)
MultiScenario_Mean
B
ad
 a
ge
nt
s 
de
le
te
d 
(I
nt
r)
Targets deletedDDoS attackers deleted
147
6.3.4 Objective Dependencies In Multi-Scenario Evolution. While it is not
surprising when objectives from different scenarios are independent, it is strange when
the addition of a foreign objective to a PFknown plot results in objectives from the
same scenario becoming independent as well, especially when ostensibly the foreign
objective should be the same as one of the local objectives. Yet, this is shown in
the first plot of Figure 29. The literal meaning is that improvement in the foreign
objective, of deleting more bad agents, is uncorrelated with improvement in either of
the other two objectives. The main difference between the two scenarios from which
the objectives are derived is that in the Competition scenario the DDoS agents that
the rogue agents create can destroy the network, and consequently destroy the SOMAS
agents, whereas the SOMAS agents are under no threat in the Intrusion Elimination
scenario. So, the independence may be due to SOMAS agents not needing to protect
themselves.
The second plot shows that foreign objectives are not always independent of
local objectives. There is a clear interaction between the number of targets deleted by
DDoS agents and the number of intruders deleted. This makes sense, because in both
cases being able to delete DDoS agents is beneficial. However, it is again surprising
that the DDoS attackers deleted is fairly independent of bad agent deletions.
The discrepancy is possible a result of the difference in ideal strategy between
the scenarios. In the Intrusion Elimination scenario a node is cleaned from intruders
if it is destroyed, meaning a very simple and effective strategy is to merely destroy
all the nodes in the network. Consequently, most chromosomes probably localize on
variants of this strategy, resulting in different numbers of target nodes being destroyed.
Such a strategy does not work well in the DDoS scenario since the number of targets
destroyed would be maximized. Thus, the SOMAS agents need a more sophisticated
approach to rid the network of DDoS attackers, and the strategies for malicious agent
deletion between the two scenarios do not correlate. Visualizations of behaviors from
these scenarios show validity for this hypothesis.
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Figure 30: Objective attractor
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Figure 30 shows two interesting aspects of multi-scenario evolution. First, some-
thing of a royal road exists in combination of the Info War and DDoS objectives; they
are inversely correlated until a drop off point. If the activity objective were not in-
cluded, then the tradeoff between the two would hamper evolving chromosomes for
either scenario. But, the addition of the activity objective pulls the path over the
royal road’s cliff, ending in an attractor right around the optimal solution. Thus,
synergy is created by grouping objectives from different scenarios.
The second interesting characteristic is the attractor. The previous plot of the
independent objectives in figure 29 and the plot of the royal road show attractors
in the solution space. These do not seem to be prevalent in the PFknown plots for
single scenario evolution. Perhaps this is due to the commonalities between the ideal
behaviors in the different scenarios. These commonalities will amplify the success of
certain chromosomes since their success translates to most of their objectives.
6.3.5 Self Organized Criticality. Throughout many of the scenarios, the
PFknown plot shows an intriguing gap in patterns of dominant chromosomes. Chromo-
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Figure 31: Pareto fronts showing objective relationships for self organized criticality,
part 1
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some evaluation produces fairly tight variances along a path up to a certain midway
point, then the variance becomes large very rapidly and certain sections along the
path do not contain any values. By comparing the different objective plots, it is clear
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Figure 32: Pareto fronts showing objective relationships for self organized criticality,
part 2
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that this relationship holds between the feasibility, self organization, and bad agent
deletion. This pattern does not also hold between activity and good agent deletion
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because the number of good agents is static if they are not deleted while the number
of bad agents increases if they are not deleted.
Figure 33 shows that the gap disappears when non creating agents are compared
to creating agents, but it shows up again when both kinds of agents are creative. The
question is, why is there a gap at the midway point? Due to the chaos created by
many agents, it might be assumed that the greatest variance would be found at the
path end with the most agent activity.
The discrepancy is explained by the concept of self organized criticality [17].
In self organized systems, self organization reaches its highest level at a point right
before chaos, where most of the system’s energy levels are filled. Thus, a disturbance
in the system results in an avalanche of energy dissipation.
Since the system is so close to chaos, yet is very well ordered at the same time,
there is great potential for a variety of behaviors to emerge. However, when the system
is not very self organized, due to singificant chaos or simple behavior, there are not
many new behaviors that can develop. Consequently, the greatest range of behavior,
and thus the greatest range of objective values, will be found around the point of self
organized criticality. Self organized criticality can even lead to new regions of the
solution space that would not otherwise have been reached, as in Figure 34.
There are a couple uses for this section of self organization. First, it is useful
for finding effective behavior. Figure 34 shows how criticality can benefit the EA’s
search. Before the point of criticality, the path of the objective values shows an inverse
correlation. Evidently, there is an effective strategy that is restricting the search. The
point of criticality allows the search to find a new strategy that introduces a correlation
between the objectives, leading to an attractor much closer to the optimal value.
Second, it can be used as a feedback mechanism for the self organization met-
ric. The plots show that the metric is not accurate, since the optimal level of self
organization is not found at the point of criticality. During the development of a self
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organization metric, its effectiveness can be measured by determining how closely it
identifies the criticality point.
6.4 Summary
The test results for hypotheses to validate the research objectives are analyzed
to see whether the hypotheses are valid. For the first hypothesis, that the self organi-
zation metric optimizes the search, it is shown that the self organization metric does
not succeed in totally optimizing the search. It correlates positively with some ob-
jectives and negatively with other objectives. At the same time, swarms are evolved
that do exhibit self organized behavior when visualized.
The entangled hierarchy hypothesis is successfully validated. The test results
show that as the scenarios become more complex, the swarms with entangled hier-
archies are more effective than those that do not have entangled hierarchies, or have
entangled hierarchies to a lesser extent. Additionally, with more entangled hierarchies
the swarms are capable of more specific behaviors.
Based on the first set of testing and analysis, new tests are run to investigate
features of the SOMAS capabilities, and more analysis is done on the tests to identify
other characteristics. In the testing of entangled hierarchies, it is noticed that the
swarm’s ability to deactivate and activate the network significantly affects whether
an entangled hierarchy is a benefit. Further tests show that swarms that use online
evolution without network deactivation and activation actuators fare much worse
than swarms that can destroy the network. Again, this result is linked to the greater
capability for specific behavior exhibited by the swarms with more of an entangled
hierarchy.
Another aspect of SOMAS that is tested is whether using sub-behaviors in
the objective space can evolve more capable behaviors. However, this experiment
does not show success in evolving the behaviors, though some of the sub-behaviors
are evolved more effectively. The plots do show objectives from different behaviors
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working together to improve the search, so there is evidence that the technique may
work. There is just no conclusive evidence that the technique is universally effective.
When the results are analyzed for other characteristics, a few new findings are
observed. There is evidence that differential evolution may work well in the SOMAS
problem domain. Even though the self organization metric did not prove especially
useful, the Pareto plots of the search show that self organized criticality plays an
important role in the optimization of certain objectives. All of these results pave the
way for important conclusions and extensive future research. The conclusions and
future research are covered in the next chapter.
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Figure 33: Evidence that self organized criticality depends on agent creation
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Figure 34: Self organized criticality leading to optimal
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VII. Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Summary of Research
Overall, the objectives in Chapter I have been achieved. Based on the back-
ground material in Chapter II, the SOMAS architecture is successfully created in
Chapters III and IV. The self organization metric correlates with certain behavioral
objectives and guides the search towards a region of self organized criticality. How-
ever, the metric does not serve to totally optimize the objective attainment since it is
inversely correlated with some SOMAS behavioral objectives. Finally, the effective-
ness of a self evolving swarm on a more complex scenario has been satisfied. These
results are shown with the tests and results analysis in Chapters V and VI.
The experiments in Chapter VI show self organization does play an significant
role in the search process for effective SOMAS, see Figure 5, through self organized
criticality. While the extremes of the search generally have small variance, the mid-
points of certain scenarios contain potentially chaotic regions that produce both good
and bad chromosomes. Their high level of exploration can also lead to areas of the
search space that may not have been found otherwise. These chaotic regions are
explained by the theory of self organized criticality. However, the metric used to
measure self organization should be developed further.
While the experimentation with self organization is not totally conclusive, the
experiments with entangled hierarchies in Chapter VI, see Figure 10, show definitive
results. When swarms can evolve online they are much more effective in complex
scenarios than swarms that cannot evolve, as is hypothesized. Since online evolution
is adaptation through the use of entangled hierarchies, the success of these swarms
is an indication that entangled hierarchies provide the needed flexibility for network
security management.
The following lists the objectives from Section 1.2 and whether they have been
successfully accomplished. Multi-objective non-parametric testing and analysis sta-
tistically validates objective hypotheses for objectives 2 and 3. Pareto plots show the
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search history for feature identification and correlation, swarm simulations visualize
behaviors for observational verification of self organization in Sections 6.2 and 6.3.
Objective 1. Create a robust simulation framework for evolving self organizing multi-agent
systems (SOMAS)
Success: Using the MASON and PISA packages, and customized coding,
SOMAS swarms are effectively evolved and evaluated.
Objective 2. Evaluate effectiveness of self organization for accomplishing objectives
Partial success: The self organization metric does not result in total opti-
mization for all behavioral objectives. However, the search exhibits useful self
organized criticality. Chromosomes are evolved that exhibit clearly self orga-
nized behavior when visualized. The latter two pieces of evidence show that self
organization has utility for SOMAS.
Objective 3. Evaluate effectiveness of entangled hierarchies for accomplishing objectives
Success: Experimental results show that as the scenarios become more com-
plex, entangled hierarchies become more effective.
However, these particular behaviors only demonstrate SOMAS feasibility and
are not totally comprehensive of the system’s capability. SOMAS can be applied to a
wide variety of other network security problems, such as intrusion detection, network
defense, hiding high value targets, etc. as well as issues not only restricted to network
defense. Some of these areas of exploration are described in the following section,
along with other methods of improving SOMAS.
7.2 Future Research
There are numerous potential research projects motivated by this investigation.
They range from the theoretical to particular applications.
7.2.1 SOMAS Improvements.
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1. The software needs to be written with better software engineering practices. It
needs to be better organized and incorporate the formal model checking algo-
rithm.
2. The offline evolutionary algorithm can adapt itself to the landscape by encoding
MOEA paramaters in the agent chromosome, similar to the technique used in
adaptive evolutionary strategies. However, if the landscape is dynamic then the
adaptive algorithm may not be able to adapt to the dynamics, especially if they
are noncyclic, and thus may be worse than just Monte Carlo sampling.
3. Since artificial intelligence has not generated any kind of mechanism resembling
human intelligence, it is crucial to incorporate humans into the SOMAS pro-
duction loop. As an analogy, computer systems are autistic savants, they are
very good at very specific tasks, but are not very good when required to take in
the larger picture. Humans, on the other hand, sometimes are autistic savants,
but more generally they are more effective at large picture thinking. Thus, the
best combination is to use the SOMAS framework as intelligence augmentation,
focussing on how to best relay the necessary information for the operator to see
the big picture and then order SOMAS to accomplish a specific task.
4. Currently, SOMAS just executes serially. However, since the bottleneck in evo-
lutionary algorithms tends to be the fitness function, they are an embarrassingly
parallel problem. Great gains in execution speed are possible by decomposing
SOMAS into a grid computing solution.
5. Genetic programming can be incorporated into SOMAS by making parts of the
chromosome represent an instruction set for a programming language. Since
using only genetic programming can require a large amount of time to generate
agent rules, a hybrid approach is possible where genetic programming is used to
evolve an actuator set and the existing genetic algorithm continues to produce
the weights and parameters for the sensors and rules.
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6. The difference between mechanically and naturally created artifacts and inten-
tionally created artifacts [33] based on fractal geometry can be used to develop
a search heuristic that tunes search parameters based on how much human
intentional development influences the search landscape.
7. The technique used in the self organization metric to extract the predictive
information in a history can also be used as a form of differential evolution.
Essentially, an operator uses the predictive information to predict where an-
other good solution may lie in the solution space. The predictive information
is extracted from the generative history maintained by keeping track of which
chromosomes have produced each other.
8. Incorporate a lifespan into the swarm, such that very complex swarm behaviors
have a short lifespan and a low likelihood of becoming chaotic, and a simple
swarm behavior has a longer lifespan since it is safer.
9. Add the offline search and simulation to the containers. Thus, the containers
can develop models directly from the network they reside on and can farm out
chromosomes to each other for parallelized SOMAS evolution. The advantage
of this approach over an offline search that is separate from the target network
is a shorter response time and a smaller data transfer.
10. Allow SOMAS agents to install containers themselves. Combined with the pre-
vious item, SOMAS is self sufficient in that it does not require any kind of
home-base for generation.
11. Formalize and simplify the SOMAS model. For example, the agents can be for-
malized to sets of rules and parameters within the container’s rule and parameter
sets. This helps reduce the difference between container and agent, allowing the
model to be more flexible. Additionally, once the agents are represented as a
set of rules, then the problem domain as a whole can be formalized very rigor-
ously and concisely. Essentially, the domain consists of a set of containers and
regions (containers within 1 hop of a container). The problem is to find the
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highest ordered state transition function (as opposed to a path to goal states).
A container can change its state and change the transition function in its re-
gion, though it cannot directly affect the states of other containers. Transition
functions are defined by rulesets. Thus, since agents are rulesets, they define
the transition functions for containers and regions. The problem becomes that
of finding the necessary rulesets to create the highest ordered state transition
function.
12. Behaviors can be programmed into the SOMAS agents a priori. For example,
if the agents need to visit waypoints in the network each agent can have a list
of nodes that it needs to visit. The benefit of this approach is that necessary
behaviors that are already known do not have to be searched for by the swarm,
and the search process can focus on the unknown aspects of the swarm behavior.
7.2.2 Testing.
1. Once ready for real world use, the self organized and entangled hierarchy metrics
must be tested on very complex systems that do not have an effective means of
control.
2. The entangled hierarchy metric should be used as an objective function, and
compared with a priori constructed hierarchical swarms and swarm evolved
without the entangled hierarchy objective function, to investigate more precisely
the effect of entangled hierarchies.
3. The results can be investigated more fully by performing ANOVA tests to de-
termine how self organization affects different objectives, and by comparing the
Pareto fronts produced with and without the self organization metric. In order
to do this, the metric for self organization needs to be developed so it is more
accurate.
4. There are a great range of security scenarios that still need to be investigated.
For instance, a network warfare competition scenario would be very interesting.
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In this scenario, there are 2 or more different agent sets that all possess territory
on a network. Coevolution is used to evolve the best competitive agent swarm.
Another area of exploration for network objectives is operations effictiveness.
This includes capabilities such as efficient routing, information availability, pro-
viding services, etc.
Finally, continuing on the theme of human involvement discussed in the last
section, it would be interesting to use human produced scenarios. One simple
way of doing this is to use the Amazon c© Mechanical Turk c© service, where
users submit a job and people all around the world complete it for a minimal
fee.
5. A greater range of statistics are possible for the objective values than just the
average of the simulation runs. For instance, in order to take both the number
of runs and the variance into account, the confidence interval can be used.
Including the number of runs in this way is useful since it allows the run count
to be varied. For instance, the simulation run count can be increased until
the chromosome produces a small enough confidence interval, or a run limit is
passed. The statistics from this technique can also be used as an entropy metric
for the general population to guage swarm stability.
7.2.3 Analysis.
1. While in multi-objective problems there is no guarantee that the solution space
maps to the objective space in a regular manner, the Pareto plots suggest that
this may be the case in certain instances. If so, then such a mapping can pro-
vide insight for creating specialized variation operators to exploit the mapping’s
pattern.
2. The Pareto plots do detail useful information about the search space. However,
a sparse plot can be difficult to interpret. Using a non convex hull surfaces for
PFKnown (i.e. not Delaunay triangulation) can make this visualization easier.
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3. Self organization can be visually highlighted by making the self organized as-
pects of the swarm stand out more than the aspects that are not self organized.
This technique is used in [117].
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Appendix A. Swarm Search Experiments (Pareto front plots)
This appendix shows Pareto plots for each tested scenario. Since each scenario has
more than 3 objectives, the Pareto plots are of a subset of the objectives in each
scenario.
Numbered objectives in each scenario:
• DDoSScenario
1. Activity
2. Targets taken down
3. DDos agents deleted
4. Self organization
5. Feasibility
• EnemyAvoidanceScenario
1. Activity
2. Safe somas agents
3. Unsafe somas agents
4. Self organization
5. Feasibility
• IntrusionEliminationScenario
1. Activity
2. Locations not compromised
3. Locations compromised
4. Self organization
5. Feasibility
• CompetitionScenario
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1. Activity
2. Good agent deletion count
3. Bad agent deletion count
4. Self organization
5. Feasibility
• InfoWarScenario
1. Activity
2. Good info
3. Bad info
4. Self organization
5. Feasibility
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Figure 35: EnemyAvoidanceScenario
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Figure 36: EnemyAvoidanceScenario
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Figure 37: EnemyAvoidanceScenario NV
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Figure 38: EnemyAvoidanceScenario NV
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Figure 39: IntrusionEliminationScenario
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Figure 40: IntrusionEliminationScenario
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Figure 42: IntrusionEliminationScenario NV
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Figure 46: DDoSScenario NV
EV NE NS
DDoSScenario_NV_EV_ibea
F
ea
si
bi
lit
y
ActivitySelf organization
DDoSScenario_NV_NE_ibea
F
ea
si
bi
lit
y
ActivitySelf organization
DDoSScenario_NV_NS_ibea
F
ea
si
bi
lit
y
ActivitySelf organization
Objectives 1, 4, and 5
DDoSScenario_NV_EV_ibea
S
el
f o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
Targets deletedDDoS attackers deleted
DDoSScenario_NV_NE_ibea
S
el
f o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
Targets deletedDDoS attackers deleted
DDoSScenario_NV_NS_ibea
S
el
f o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
Targets deletedDDoS attackers deleted
Objectives 2, 3, and 4
DDoSScenario_NV_EV_ibea
F
ea
si
bi
lit
y
Targets deletedDDoS attackers deleted
DDoSScenario_NV_NE_ibea
F
ea
si
bi
lit
y
Targets deletedDDoS attackers deleted
DDoSScenario_NV_NS_ibea
F
ea
si
bi
lit
y
Targets deletedDDoS attackers deleted
Objectives 2, 3, and 5
DDoSScenario_NV_EV_ibea
F
ea
si
bi
lit
y
Targets deletedSelf organization
DDoSScenario_NV_NE_ibea
F
ea
si
bi
lit
y
Targets deletedSelf organization
DDoSScenario_NV_NS_ibea
F
ea
si
bi
lit
y
Targets deletedSelf organization
Objectives 2, 4, and 5
DDoSScenario_NV_EV_ibea
F
ea
si
bi
lit
y
DDoS attackers deletedSelf organization
DDoSScenario_NV_NE_ibea
F
ea
si
bi
lit
y
DDoS attackers deletedSelf organization
DDoSScenario_NV_NS_ibea
F
ea
si
bi
lit
y
DDoS attackers deletedSelf organization
Objectives 3, 4, and 5
177
Figure 47: CompetitionScenario
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Figure 51: InfoWarScenario
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Figure 54: InfoWarScenario NV
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Appendix B. Swarm Search Experiments (Statistics plots)
Figure 55: Interpreting results diagrams
1 2 3
1
2
3
Better
W
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Each grid cell is the p-value of a significance test. If the cell is completely black,
then the a value will have to have been set < 0.05 in order to reject H0.
For the Fisher sign and Mann-Whitney tests the hypotheses are:
• H0: Mbetter = Mworse
• H1: Mbetter < Mworse
Where M is the population median of the Pareto metric calculated on 5 samples. A
lower metric value is better than a higher metric value.
The correspondence between axis numbers and swarm types is:
1. EV: SOMAS swarm uses online evolution
2. NE: SOMAS swarm uses online search without evolution
3. NS: SOMAS swarm does not use online search
Example: the above image shows that both EV and NE outperform NS with
statistical significance, whereas they are indifferent when compared to each other.
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Appendix C. Network Destruction Experiments (Statistics plots)
Figure 56: Interpreting results diagrams
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Each grid cell is the p-value of a significance test. If the cell is completely black,
then the a value will have to have been set < 0.05 in order to reject H0.
For the Fisher sign and Mann-Whitney tests the hypotheses are:
• H0: Mbetter = Mworse
• H1: Mbetter < Mworse
Where M is the population median of the Pareto metric calculated on 5 samples. A
lower metric value is better than a higher metric value.
The correspondence between axis numbers and swarm types is:
1. V: SOMAS swarm has node deactivation and reactivation actuators
2. NV: SOMAS swarm does not have node deactivation and reactivation
actuators
Example: the above image shows that V statistically outperforms NV, but not with
statistical significance.
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Table 22: Enemy Avoidance scenario network destruction experiments
Metric Statistical Test EV NE NS
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Table 23: Intrusion Elimination scenario network destruction experiments
Metric Statistical Test EV NE NS
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Table 24: DDoS scenario network destruction experiments
Metric Statistical Test EV NE NS
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Table 25: Competition scenario network destruction experiments
Metric Statistical Test EV NE NS
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Table 26: Info War scenario network destruction experiments
Metric Statistical Test EV NE NS
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Appendix D. Multi-Scenario Evolution Experiments (Statistics plots)
Figure 57: Interpreting results diagrams
1 2
1
2
Better
W
or
se
Each grid cell is the p-value of a significance test. If the cell is completely black,
then the a value will have to have been set < 0.05 in order to reject H0.
For the Fisher sign and Mann-Whitney tests the hypotheses are:
• H0: Mbetter = Mworse
• H1: Mbetter < Mworse
Where M is the population median of the Pareto metric calculated on 5 samples. A
lower metric value is better than a higher metric value.
The correspondence between axis numbers and swarm types is:
1. SBS: SOMAS swarm chromosome is only evaluated on a single behavior and
scenario.
2. MBS: SOMAS swarm chromosome is evaluated on multiple behaviors and
scenarios.
Example: the above image shows that MBS outperforms SBS with statistically
significance.
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Appendix E. Sofware Design Concepts
E.1 Object Oriented Design
The rationale behind object oriented design is to avoid redundancy in code and
make code reuse as straightforward as possible. Consequently, there are three primary
characteristics that define object oriented design.
• Encapsulation:
All the necessary datastructures, variables, methods, and functions for a given
item as grouped so that the user only needs to be aware of a shared interface
and does not need to know any of the underlying details.
• Loose coupling:
Coupling entails the degree that items depend on each other, and how much
they know about their counterpart’s internals. The items that are encapsulated
are simplified as much as possible, so that they tend to have only one overall
purpose, while keeping the dependencies between items low. For instance, an
object oriented representation of a tooth brush has a single object for the bris-
tles, instead of an object for each bristle. If there is an object for each bristle,
then there is a large number of items that the handle has to be coupled with.
• Polymorphism:
Polymorphism is defined by the principle of Liskov substitution. This principle
states if one object can be substituted in the place of another for a certain func-
tion, for instance circle.volume() makes just as much sense as square.volume(),
then they belong to a parent class, i.e. shape.volume(). Polymorphism is the
calling of the same function on different types.
E.2 Properties Design Pattern
The properties design pattern is based on object oriented programming. There
are two main differences between the two techniques. The first is that while the
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non-abstract class inheritance graph for object oriented programming is a forest, the
inheritance graph for the properties design pattern is a graph. The second is that
class structures can only be defined at compile time in object oriented programming
(without specialized low level coding), whereas class structures can be define during
runtime with the properties design pattern.
E.2.1 General Description. The properties design pattern is composed of
two basic objects: a Thing and a Machine. Thing consists of a table that maps
property names to objects. There are two kinds of accessors: direct and indirect. The
combination of the two allows multiple Things to share the same property Object.
The Machine is a subclass of Thing, which simply adds an execute function.
The properties design pattern is used as the fundamental concept of the systems
SOMAS design, due to the two features differentiating it from object oriented design.
Thus, it is a more general design and also allows certain methods described below
that OO does not allow, or does not provide a simple and easy mechanism.
The properties model is also slightly augmented in that the execution of either
a Thing or Machine method returns the Thing or Machine object. This allows oper-
ations to be chained together, with the possible inclusion of a glue procedure. This is
an incorporation of Haskell’s monad design pattern. The most straightforward ben-
efit is conciseness of coding using the properties design pattern. A more theoretical
benefit is that a sequence of operations can be treated as an entity in itself. Chaining
together operations and using the chain as a first class object, i.e. can be passed and
returned from functions, is a very effective functional programming technique.
E.2.2 Advantages.
• Loose coupling:
Since all operations share the same basic class, it is simple to tie anything de-
signed with the properties model into an external library. The interface with
external libraries goes two ways: when used by the SOMAS system, a library
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operation is encapsulated within the Machine class; and when a SOMAS op-
eration is used by an external library, it only needs to set the properties it is
concerned with, which should encompass all similar potential libraries.
• Bottom up programming:
When creating a certain operation, often it is easier to specify what is required
than how it is acquired. The use of properties allows requirements to be a
primary concern over acquirement. Properties are used in the operation as
needed, and the properties can easily be artificially filled for testing purposes.
This allows easy segmentation of code for testing purposes.
• Runtime class specification:
A significant impediment of the traditional approach to OO as in Java and C++
is that it is usually impossible, or very difficult, to produce new classes during
runtime. However, this is easy to do when a class is merely defined by a set of
properties, since the properties can be defined at runtime.
• Model checking (top down programming):
Since all objects are of the same type and all allow their properties to be accessed
in the same way, it is possible to specify a general model checking framework.
For instance, to check that a system has been implemented correctly, the shar-
ing of properties between objects is validated by checking whether objects share
the same object for a specific property. The existence of properties is simply
validated by testing whether a given property returns a null. These basic tech-
niques are amenable to further sophistication, such as testing whether a certain
invariant holds before and/or after an operation. This is possible because all
operations are also of the same basic type, and consequently can all be tested
in the same way.
The benefit of this model checking methodology is that it makes debugging sim-
pler. It is also possible to use computational logic to deduce general properties
of the system.
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Furthermore, since, as mentioned, the design specifies a graph, graph theory can
be used for model checking. For example, in some cases a partially ordered set
is necessary. The problem with specifying the dependency relation in a partially
ordered set is that a cyclical dependency can be created. Cycle detection can
find such problems. General software design techniques can also be measure.
For instance, if a system has very high connectivity, then it is not very loosely
coupled and is likely to be badly designed.
E.2.3 Disadvantages. The properties are similar to Java’s OO system, so
there is redundancy in the implementation. Such redundancy also implies slower
runtimes and greater memory usage.
Java and C++’s OO system is combined with many common integrated devel-
opment environments, which can alert the programmer about errors in their code as
they are writing it. Since the properties design pattern is not integrated with these
same IDEs, their convenience can not be exploited to the same degree.
The code may be more verbose in some cases than if implemented directly using
a traditional OO system.
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Appendix F. Behavior Range
• level 0 - single agent
– change location
– look for information
– create information
The mechanism of information transfer is part of the system that the agent
is in, so this behavior encompasses both static and dynamic forms of in-
formation. I.e. pheromones and packet based communication.
– change information
– react to information
• level 1 - single agent
– set waypoint
Probably can consist of just setting a host IP, MAC, etc address
– return to waypoint
Use recorded host info to get routed back
– release pheromone/message
– look for pheromone/message
– create decoy
– create new agent
– destroy agent
– attack target
– adapt to information
This can be like a chameleon, so the agent looks like normal data. It can
also be used to represent the kind of data it is most suited for, which works
into the Characteristic Adaptation behavior.
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– specific signals
∗ behavior trigger
∗ behavior modification
This is a meta operator where agents can directly modify each others
rule set
• level 2 - multi agent There are only a small set of behaviors at this level, it is
similar to level 0 in that it defines a basic behavior set.
– triangulate (needs multiple nodes) This behavior is integral to many other
mult-agent behaviors, since it provides a spacial overlay that can be used
to calculate such behaviors as convergence or divergence.
∗ position of other agents
∗ position of targets
– converge behavior
Positive feedback, agents copying each other’s behavior parameters. This
also encompasses location and belief convergence.
– diverge behavior
Negative feedback, agents varying their behavior parameters based on
agents’ observations of each other This also encompasses location and belief
divergence.
– cluster
This behavior can be described by something like k-means clustering or
the like. This can be based on a system where agents are also pheromones,
where their pheromone resemble some information signature (i.e. a specific
file, or IP subnet), and they are attracted or repelled based on similarity.
Also, this can be a combination of sync and diverge behaviors. In this
case, the clustering takes place at a non physical level. Consequently,
clustering can be considered a generic behavior that takes place at a number
of different levels.
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• level 3 - SO
– Attack
∗ Deceive
∗ Lure (honey pot)
∗ Ambush
∗ Moving target discovery
– Defense
∗ Quarantine
∗ Attack discovery
∗ Identify abnormal behavior
– Surveillance
∗ Map network control points
– Generic
∗ Special ops behaviors
For instance: formations, decoys, etc.
∗ Discover rogue agent
∗ Retreat from discovery
∗ Characteristic adaptation
A metaphor for this behavior is the bodywide signalling system, i.e.
the nervous system. However, this is different than just plain commu-
nication. This is a high level behavior where agents are created that
proliferate in a certain network. The interaction is bi-directional, so
agents both adapt to information and change information.
This general behavior can do a couple things:
∗ Artificial immune system
∗ QoS (certain agent adaptations retard the traffic, and others accelerate
it) - using the wasp competition ranking
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∗ Create new swarm for new objective
– Distribute over network
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Appendix G. QuERIES Examination
G.1 Overview
The QuERIES methodology [30] uses three primary techniques:
• decision theory
• attack modelling with a POMDP model
• using markets to estimate probabilities for POMDPs
Assuming that the market effectiveness assumption holds such that a red team can
accurately estimate the POMDP’s transition and observation probabilities, the rest
of the model appears to be a formally valid method for accomplishing risk analysis.
The different costs in the decision grid are generally estimable, and a POMDP
model, while it is PSPACE-hard [88] to derive an optimal policy, can still be used to
generate approximate policies with techniques such as random point value
iteration [121] and principle component analysis. These approximation techniques
have shown success in a real world problem of robot navigation [122].
G.2 Need for Modelling Multiple Attacks
However, the general technique assumes attacks operate mutually independently of
any other attack. While other attacks may be proceeding at the same time, they
cannot have any influence on each other, otherwise the assumption behind the
POMDP model does not hold. Since the QuERIES technique is being developed for
the DoD and other owners of high value IP it is important that this assumption is
accurat.
However, it is unlikely that attacks mounted against such customers will be isolated
and independent. Infact, the current reports of the many and ongoing attacks
against DoD show anything but isolated, mutually independent attacks. Instead,
there are constant attacks occurring across the whole range of attack vectors, both
orchestrated and independent.
206
In order to model such attacks, decentralized POMDP (DEC-POMDP) models [22]
for the orchestrated attacks and interactive POMDP (I-POMDP) models [40] for the
multiple independent attacks are necessary for accurate modelling. These models are
even more intractable. NEXP-complete for DEC-POMDPs [22]. Unsolvable due to
infinite belief nesting in the case of I-POMDPs [40]. Again, with certain assumptions
and by using approximation algorithms it is possible to generate policies from such
models. However, current research has not scaled to significant problem sizes yet.
G.3 Need for Adaptive Attack Vectors
Another problem is that POMDP models do not adapt themselves. During the
course of an attack, an attacker is bound to change his attack method, and thus his
states and state transition probabilities, as soon as defense operators begin to
counteract what he is doing. While computational models are incapable of
representing the full range of what humans can do in such a scenario, it is possible
to at least improve on POMDP models by augmenting the models with a model
transition function. In this way, the models can adapt themselves [56].
An issue with such adapted POMDP models is that they can be potentially Turing
complete, depending on the nature of the model transition function. If the models
become Turing complete, then it is impossible to generate a policy from them in the
general case due to the halting problem.
G.4 Addressing Needs With Top Down Policy Generation
That being said, there is a tractable technique to generate approximate policies from
augmented DEC-POMDP and I-POMDP models. The standard techniques for
generating policies focus on a bottom up approach: the final solution is assembled
from partial solutions using some kind of heuristic search algorithm.
It is also possible to generate policies using a top down approach where the space of
complete solution is searched. The way this works is to first generate an arbitrary
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policy (which is a complete solution), evaluate it, then assemble new policies based
the evaluated policies. This process repeats until a halting condition is reached, such
as convergence or number of iterations. There are many existing algorithms that use
this procedure, such as simulated annealing, evolutionary algorithms, tabu search,
and ant colonies.
This technique allows policies to be generated that can be followed by multi-agent
systems and are Turing complete, in a tractable amount of time [56]. Thus, the
policies address the two needs of modelling multiple attackers and adaptive attack
vectors.
The result is that top down policy generation using solution space search is capable
of providing more realistic attack models for QuERIES.
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